TYPE: NIAP Interpretation
NUMBER: I-0406
STATUS: Formally Superseded
TITLE: Automated Or Manual Recovery Is Acceptable
SUPERSEDED BY:
CCIMB-INTERP-0056
EFFECTIVE: 2001-03-15
SUPERSEDED: 2003-10-31
SOURCE REFERENCE: CC v2.1 Part 2 Subclause 10.8 FPT_RCV
CC v2.1 Part 2 Subclause J.8 FPT_RCV
RELATED TO:
I-0389 Recovery To A Known State
CCIMB ENTRY: CCIMB-INTERP-0153
ISSUE:
The current CC v2.1 FPT_RCV.1 elements are worded in such a fashion as to
preclude the use of automated mechanisms when manual recovery is to be
supported. This is an unlikely situation; a PP/ST author may not care whether
recovery is automated or manual.
STATEMENT
Either manual or automated recovery systems are acceptable. The PP/ST
author has the discretion to specify for what recovery scenarios
automated recovery is appropriate, and for what recovery scenarios manual
recovery is appropriate.
RECOMMENDED CRITERIA CHANGES
To address this interpretation, the following changes are made to CC v2.1,
Part 2:
(additions marked
thusly; deletions marked
thusly)
- In Clause 10.8, delete the existing FPT_RCV.1. As a result of this,
Paragraph 415 and the "Management"
section for FPT_RCV.1 are deleted; FPT_RCV.1 is removed from
the "Audit" header between paragraphs 421 and 422, the "Component
levelling" figure is modified to delete component 1, and the
component decomposition figures (Clause 10, Figure 10.1 and Clause J, Figure
J.1) showing the levelling structure for FPT are corrected to eliminate
component 1. Additionally, the annex material for FPT_RCV.1 is deleted.
- FPT_RCV.2 is relabeled as FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406. Unless otherwise noted in
these changes, all normative and informative material associated with
FPT_RCV.2 is incorporated unchanged into FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406, and all
references to FPT_RCV.2 in the CC, CEM, or other Common Criteria documentation
is changed to refer to FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406.
- FPT_RCV.3 is relabeled as FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406. Unless otherwise noted in
these changes, all normative and informative material associated with
FPT_RCV.3 is incorporated unchanged into FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406, and all
references to FPT_RCV.3 in the CC, CEM, or other Common Criteria documentation
is changed to refer to FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406.
- The "Class Decomposition" figure in Clause 10, Figure 10.1 is modified to
show
component 2-NIAP-0406 as the first hierarchical component off of FPT_RCV,
with component 3-NIAP-0406 immediately hierarchical to 2-NIAP-0406.
- The "Component Levelling" figure in Subclause 10.8 is modified to show
component 2-NIAP-0406 as the first hierarchical component off of FPT_RCV,
with component 3-NIAP-0406 immediately hierarchical to 2-NIAP-0406.
- Subclause 10.8, Paragraph 416 is replaced with the following:
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406
Automated recovery
Recovery from Failure,
provides, for at least one type of service
discontinuity,
a specific list (possibly empty) of discontinuities
for which the TSF must provide the capability for recovery to a secure
state
without human intervention; recovery for
other discontinuities may require human intervention.
- Subclause 10.8, Paragraph 417 is replaced with the following:
FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406
Automated recovery
Recovery without undue
loss, also provides for
automated
recovery
from failure, but strengthens the requirements by disallowing
undue loss of protected
objects.
- In Clause 10.8, the following changes are made to FPT_RCV.2:
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406
Automated recovery
Recovery
from Failure
Hierarchical To:
FPT_RCV.1
No Other Components
FPT_RCV.2.21-NIAP-0406 For [selection: [assignment:
list of
failures/service
discontinuities],
"no failures/service discontinuities"], the TSF shall ensure
the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.2.12-NIAP-0406 When automated recovery
from a failure or
service discontinuity is not possible,
the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a
secure state is provided.
- In Clause 10.8, the following changes are made to FPT_RCV.3:
FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406
Automated recovery
Recovery
without undue loss
Hierarchical To: FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406
FPT_RCV.3.21-NIAP-0406 For [selection: [assignment:
list of
failures/service
discontinuities],
"no failures/service discontinuities"], the TSF
shall ensure
the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.3.12-NIAP-0406 When automated recovery
from a failure or
service discontinuity is not possible,
the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a
secure state is provided.
- The "Class Decomposition" figure in Annex J, Figure J.1 is modified to
show
component 2-NIAP-0406 as the first hierarchical component off of FPT_RCV,
with component 3-NIAP-0406 immediately hierarchical to 2-NIAP-0406.
- In Subclause J.8, the application notes for FPT_RCV.2 are modified as
follows:
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406
Automated recovery
Recovery from Failure
This component requires the TSF to provide mechanisms for automated or
manual recovery. Automated recovery is considered to be more useful than
manual recovery, as it
allows the machine to operate in an unattended fashion.
However, there may be situations where the list of discontinuities that
required automated recovery is not known in advance, or the PP/ST author does
not want to mandate automated recovery.
User Application Notes
The component FPT_RCV.2 extends the feature coverage of FPT_RCV.1 by
requiring that there be at least one automated method of recovery from failure or
service discontinuity. It addresses the threat of protection compromise resulting
from an unattended TOE returning to an insecure state after recovery from a failure
or other discontinuity.
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406 addresses the threat of protection compromise resulting from a
TOE returning to an insecure state after recover from a failure or other
discontinuity. It provides the ability for unattended recovery for anticipated
discontinuities.
Evaluator application notes
It is acceptable for the functions that are available to an authorised user
for trusted recovery to be available only in a maintenance mode. Controls
should be in place to limit access during maintenance to authorised users.
For FPT_RCV.2.12-NIAP-0406, it is the
responsibility of the
developer of the TSF to determine
the set of recoverable failures and service discontinuities.
If "no failures/service discontinuities" is selected for FPT_RCV.2.1-NIAP-0406,
this means that there
are no explicitly mandated discontinuities for which automated recovery must
be provided. The TOE developer always has the option to provide an automated
recovery mechanism for a discontinuity.
It is assumed that the robustness of the automated recovery mechanisms will be
verified.
Operations
Selection:
If there are no explicit situations for which automated recovery is
mandated, "no failures/service discontinuities" should be selected in
FPT_RCV.2.1-NIAP-0406. Otherwise, the assignment should be selected to provide
the list of failures or other discontinuities for which automated recovery
must be possible.
It is acceptable for a PP author to complete only the selection and leave the
assignment open, so as to indicate that the list of discontinuities for which
automated recovery is
required must be non-empty.
Assignment:
For FPT_RCV.2.21-NIAP-0406, the PP/ST
author should specify the
list of failures
or other discontinuities for which automated recovery must be possible.
- In Subclause J.8, the application notes for FPT_RCV.3 are modified as
follows:
FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406
Automated
recovery
Recovery without undue loss
This component requires the TSF to provide mechanisms for automated or
manual recovery. Automated recovery is considered to be more useful than
manual recovery, as it
allows the machine to operate in an unattended fashion, but it
runs the risk of losing a substantial number of objects. Preventing undue loss of
objects provides additional utility to the recovery effort.
User Application Notes
The component FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406 extends
the feature coverage of FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406 by
requiring that there not be undue loss of TSF data or objects within the
TSC. At
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406, the
automated recovery
mechanisms could conceivably recover by
deleting all objects and returning the TSF to a known secure state. This type
of
drastic
automated recovery is precluded in
FPT_RCV.3-NIAP-0406.
This component addresses the threat of protection compromise resulting from an
unattended TOE returning to an insecure state after recovery from a failure or other
discontinuity with a large loss of TSF data or objects within the TSC.
Evaluator application notes
It is acceptable for the functions that are available to an authorised user for trusted
recovery to be available only in a maintenance mode. Controls should be in place
to limit access during maintenance to authorised users.
For FPT_RCV.3.12-NIAP-0406, it is the
responsibility of the
developer of the TSF to determine
the set of recoverable failures and service discontinuities.
If "no failures/service discontinuities" is selected for FPT_RCV.3.1-NIAP-0406,
this means that there
are no explicitly mandated discontinuities for which automated recovery must
be provided. The TOE developer always has the option to provide an automated
recovery mechanism for a discontinuity.
It is assumed that the evaluators will verify the robustness of the automated
recovery mechanisms.
Operations
Selection:
If there are no explicit situations for which automated recovery is
mandated, "no failures/service discontinuities" should be selected in
FPT_RCV.3.1-NIAP-0406. Otherwise, the assignment should be selected to provide
the list of failures or other discontinuities for which automated recovery
must be possible.
It is acceptable for a PP author to complete only the selection and leave the
assignment open, so as to indicate that the list of discontinuities for which
automated recovery is
required must be non-empty.
Assignment:
For FPT_RCV.3.21-NIAP-0406, the PP/ST
author should specify the
list of failures
or other discontinuities for which automated recovery must be possible.
For FPT_RCV.3.3, the PP/ST
author should provide a quantification
for the amount of loss of TSF data or objects that is acceptable.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
Other families and components in Part 2 should be examined to correct any
dependency references to components in FPT_RCV.
SUPPORT:
This reworking of the FPT_RCV elements makes
it so that automated mechanisms are permitted in all cases, or the PP/ST
author has the option of indicating the specific situations in which automated
recovery is mandated.
2003-07: This was reviewed by the CCIMB, who issued the following statement:
The CCIMB agrees with the intent of the national interpretation but disagrees
with the solution provided.
The CCIMB has agreed that the resolution to this national interpretation be
included in the interpretation for RI 56.
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