



National Information Assurance Partnership

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme

CCEVS Policy Letter #10

8 September 2008

SUBJECT: Acceptance of Security Targets (STs) Into NIAP CCEVS Evaluation

PURPOSE: The United States (US) Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) Evaluation Laboratories and Candidate Laboratories (henceforth both are referred to as CCTLs) shall adhere to the policy described herein when submitting an Evaluation Application Package (EAP) containing a Security Target (ST) in order to begin an evaluation. The ST defines the scope of the evaluation through a Target of Evaluation (TOE).

BACKGROUND: DoD policies (NSTISSP 11 and DoD 8500) require products to be evaluated (or in evaluation) in order to be acquired by DoD customers. Based on extensive experience, the CCEVS has determined that evaluations started without a clear definition of the TOE prove to be problematic.

OBJECTIVES: The primary objective of this policy is to improve the quality of submitted STs so that the TOE boundary and its intended security services are clearly defined before the product is accepted into evaluation and listed on the CCEVS website as being in evaluation. In addition, scarce validation resources will not need to be allocated to the evaluation until the CCTL has verified that the ST has a clearly defined TOE.

A. As part of the EAP, the CCTL shall submit an ST in which:

1. The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) Description section shall provide a clear, complete, and accurate description of the following:
 - a) TOE Physical Boundary clearly describing the boundary of the TOE sufficiently to determine what is inside and what is outside the TOE.
 - b) TOE Logical Boundary, including clear delineation of components that are in the TOE, but do not contribute to meeting any of the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and hence are excluded from the TOE Security Functions (TSF)
 - c) TOE Security Function (TSF) Functions Summary
 - d) The security architecture including a plausible explanation of how the TSF cannot be bypassed, corrupted, or otherwise compromised, and including a description of any role played by the IT environment
2. While not a requirement, the CCTL is strongly encouraged to include in the TOE Description section a clear, complete, and accurate description of TSF data, user data,

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and security attributes. When present, this description and delineation shall be consistent with the SFR claims.

3. The SFRs shall clearly articulate the security claims being made to a degree that they can be measured or otherwise verified. This includes no uncompleted assignments and no contradictions between the SFRs and the TOE description (e.g., no saying the *syslog* daemon is outside the TOE and including audit related SFRs that contradict the assertion).
4. IT Environment SFRs, if applicable, shall be completely specified and:
 - a. All audit events shall be specified consistent with the rest of the IT Environment SFRs.
 - b. All management actions shall be specified consistent with the rest of the IT Environment SFRs.
5. Audit events, if applicable, shall be specified, in the applicable TOE SFRs, consistent with the rest of the SFRs.
6. Management actions, if applicable, shall be specified, in the applicable TOE SFRs, consistent with the rest of the SFRs.

B. The CCTL shall submit a passing ASE ETR as part of their IVOR package.

This policy is not meant to imply that the ST will remain static once the evaluation has begun; it is expected that the ST shall be updated during the life of the evaluation as required.

Original Signed By

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