CAVP Mapping Version 1.0

17 November 2016

This document serves as a guideline for CCTLs to determine if a CAVP certificate is acceptable as evidence of meeting some PP/cPP assurance activities. This document shows which cryptographic algorithm validation list, as well as the modes, states, key sizes, etc. (depending on the requirements and selections), are required to meet the applicable Security Functional Requirement (SFR).

Key:

- v inclusive 'or' used to form expressions
- ^ 'and' used to form expressions
- or 'or' used to join expressions

SFR	CAVP Validation List and Description/Notes
FCS_CKM - Key Generation	
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of	RSA Validation List
2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS	FIPS 186-4:
PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",	186-4KEY(gen):
Appendix B.3	PGM(ProvRandom) ^ ((2048 SHA(256 v 384 v 512)) v (3072
	SHA(256 v 384 v 512)))
	or
	PGM(ProbRandom) ^ (2048 v 3072) ^ PPTT(C.2 v C.3)
	or
	PGM(ProvPrimeCondition) ^ (2048 SHA(256 v 384 v 512)) v
	(3072 SHA(256 v 384 v 512))
	or
	PGM(BothPrimeCondition) ^ ((2048 SHA(256 v 384 v 512)) v
	(3072 SHA(256 v 384 v 512))) ^
	PPTT(C.2 v C.3)
	or
	PGM(ProbPrimeCondition) ^ (2048) v (3072) ^
	PPTT(C.2 v C.3)
ECC schemes using "NIST curves that meet the	ECDSA Validation List
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature	FIPS 186-4
Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4	PKG: Curves ((P-256 v P-384 v P-521) and
	PKV: Curves ((P-256 v P-384 v P521)
	NOTE : Hash algorithms following each of the relevant
	curves must include what has been selected in FCS_COP

FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of	DSA Validation List
2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS	FIPS 186-4:
PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",	KeyPairGen: [(2048,256) v (3072,256)]
Appendix B.1	(20.2)2007
FCC CVAA Van Cananatian M/I AN Comments	
FCS_CKM - Key Generation WLAN Symmetric	
Generate symmetric cryptographic keys in	HMAC Validation List
accordance with PRF-384 meeting the following: [IEEE 802.11-2012]	HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="" v="">BS)</bs>
	and
	Other Validations: WiFi CERTIFIEDTM
	NOTE : The WiFi CertifiedTM testing only addresses a portion of the Assurance Activity testing.
Generate symmetric cryptographic keys in	HMAC Validation List
accordance with PRF-704 meeting the following:	HMAC-SHA384 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="BS" td="" v="" v<=""></bs>
[IEEE 802.11ac-2013]	KS>BS)
	and
	Other Validations:
	Wifi CERTIFIEDTM
	NOTE : The WiFi CertifiedTM testing only addresses a
	portion of the Assurance Activity testing.
FCS_CKM - Key Distribution WLAN	
Decrypt Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance	AES Validation List
with a specified cryptographic key distribution	KW (AD ^ (AES-128 v AES-256) ^
method [AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame]	((CMAC (Verification) ^ (KS: 128)) v
that meets the following: [NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE	HMAC Validation List
802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing considerations] and does not expose the	HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="" v="">BS))</bs>
cryptographic keys	And
	Other Validations:
	Wifi CERTIFIEDTM
FCS_CKM - Key Establishment	
[RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meet	No CAVP exists, must be described in TSS – See FIPS 140-2
the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56B,	I.G. D.4: Vendor Affirmation -
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key	http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
Establishment	<u>2/FIPS1402IG.pdf</u>

Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography"]

SHS Validation List - Hash algorithms as applicable

<u>DRBG Validation List</u> - Supported Random Bit Generators (DRBG)

RSA Validation List - An RSA key pair generation algorithm in FIPS 186-4

[Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"]

If using 800-56A KDF, KAS Validation List

ECC: SCHEMES [(FullUnified v FullMQV v EphemeralUnified v OnePassUnified v OnePassMQV v OnePassDH v StaticUnified)] ^

For each SCHEME listed:

(EC: P-256 ^ (SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512)) ^

(ED: P-384 ^ (SHA384 v SHA512)) ^

(EE: P-521 ^ SHA512)]

or

If using a non 800-56A KDF, Component Validation List (CVL)

<u>Component Validated:</u> All of SP800-56A EXCEPT KDF "ECC" and a KARole of either Initiator or Responder (depending on the PP and TOE's role) and listing NIST Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 equal to what is claimed in the SFRs

NOTE: In the future an applicable CVL for <u>SP800-135 KDFs</u> will also be required to meet included protocol SFRs.

or

If using a non 800-56A KDF, KAS Validation List

ECC: SCHEMES [(FullUnified v FullMQV v EphemeralUnified v OnePassUnified v OnePassMQV v OnePassDH v StaticUnified)] ^

For each SCHEME listed:

(EC: P-256 ^ (SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512)) ^

(ED: P-384 ^ (SHA384 v SHA512)) ^

(EE: P-512 ^ SHA512)]

NOTE: In the future an applicable CVL for <u>SP800-135 KDFs</u> will also be required to meet included protocol SFRs.

NOTE: The component validation called "Section 5.7.1.2: ECC CDH Primitive" does <u>NOT</u> suffice for the validation "All of SP800-56A EXCEPT KDF". The testing for the component

	validation "Section 5.7.1.2: ECC CDH Primitive" does not include many of the tests that are in the component validation "All of SP800-56A EXCEPT KDF" and in the assurance activity.
[Finite field-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"]	If using a 800-56A KDF, KAS Validation List FFC: SCHEMES [(HYBRID1 v MQV2 v EPHEM v HYBRID1FLOW v MQV1 v ONEFLOW v STATIC) ^ ((FB: SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512) v (FC: SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512))] or If using a non 800-56A KDF, Component Validation List (CVL) Component Validated: All of SP800-56A EXCEPT KDF "FFC" and a KARole of either Initiator or Responder (depending on the PP and TOE's role).
	NOTE: In the future an applicable CVL for SP800-135 KDFs will also be required to meet included protocol SFRs.
	If using a non 800-56A KDF, KAS Validation List FFC: SCHEMES [(HYBRID1 v MQV2 v EPHEM HYBRID1FLOW v MQV1 v ONEFLOW v STATIC) ^ ((FB: SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512) v (FC: SHA256 v SHA384 v SHA512))] NOTE: In the future an applicable CVL for SP800-135 KDFs will also be required to meet included protocol SFRs.
FCS_CKM – Key Support REK NIST SP 800-108 key derivation	KBKDF (SP800-108) Validation List MACSupported([HMACSHA1] v [HMACSHA224] [HMACSHA256] v [HMACSHA384] v [HMACSHA512])
FCS_COP - Cryptographic Operation – AES Encryption/Decryption	
AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)	AES Validation List CBC (e/d; 128 v 192 v 256)
AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)	AES Validation List GCM (KS: AES_128(e/d)) v (KS: AES_192(e/d)) v GCM (KS: AES_256(e/d))
	NOTE : If GCM listing specifies: "IV Generated: (Internally)", the GCM implementation must use the same DRBG that is referenced in FCS_RBG_EXT.1

A 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E)	AES Validation List
	XTS((KS: XTS_128(e/d) ^ KS: XTS_256(e/d))
AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C)	AES Validation List
,	CCM(KS: 128 ^ 192 ^ 256)
AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F)	AES Validation List
	KW ((AE v AD) ^(AES-128 v AES-256)
AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP) (as defined in	AES Validation List
NIST SP 800-38F)	KWP KWP ((AE v AD) ^(AES-128 v AES-256)
AES-CCMP (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE	AES Validation List
802.11-2012)	CCM(KS: 128 ^ 256))
	and
	Other Validations (For WLAN and Mobile only):
	Wifi CERTIFIEDTM
	AES Validation List
	CCM(KS: 256) ^
AES-CCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38C and	and
IEEE 802.11ac-2013)	
	Other Validations (For WLAN and Mobile only):
	Wifi CERTIFIEDTM
AES-GCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38D and	AES Validation List
IEEE 802.11ac-2013)	GCM(KS: 256) ^
1222 002.1146 2013)	GEW(N3. 230)
	And
	Other Validations (For WLAN and Mobile only):
	Wifi CERTIFIEDTM
FCS_COP – Cryptographic Operation - Signature	
Algorithms	
	RSA Validation List
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes [of	FIPS 186-4:
2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS	ALG [ANSIX9.31] v [RSASSA-PSS] v
PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",	[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]
Section 4	For each ALG listed:
	SIG(gen) (2048 SHA (256 v 384 v 512)) v
Note: Both Generation and Verification are	(3072 SHA(256 v 384 v 512)) ^
required	SIG(ver) (2048 SHA (256 v 384 v 512)) v
	(3072 SHA (256 v 384 v 512))
ECDSA schemes using ["NIST curves" P-256, P-384	ECDSA Validation List

and [selection: P-521, no other curves]] that meet	FIPS186-4:
the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature	PKG: CURVES(P-256 ^ P-384 ^ P-521) ^
Standard (DSS)", Section 5]	SigGen: CURVES(P-256: (SHA (256 v 384 v 512)) ^ P-384:
Standard (555) , Section 5]	(SHA (256 v 384 v 512)) ^ P-521: (SHA (256 v 384 v 512)) ^
Note: Both Generation and Verification are	PKV: CURVES(P-256 ^ P-384 ^ P-521) v
required	PKV: CURVES(ALL-P) ^
104400	SigVer: CURVES(P-256: (256 v 384 v 512)) ^ P-384: (SHA
	(256 v 384 v 512)) ^
	P-521: (256 v 384 v 512))
FCS_COP - Cryptographic Operation - Hashing	
Algorithms	
SHS that meets: FIPS Pub 180-4 or ISO/IEC 10118-	SHS Validation List
3:2004.	SHA-1 (BIT) v SHA-1 (BYTE-only) ^
SHA	SHA-256 (BIT) v SHA-256 (BYTE-only) v
Bit-oriented Mode	SHA-384 (BIT) v SHA-384 (BYTE-only) v
Byte-oriented Mode	SHA-512 (BIT) v SHA-512 (BYTE-only)
FCS_COP - Cryptographic Operation - Keyed Hash	
	HMAC Validation List
HMAC that meets: FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-	HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="BS" td="" v="" v<=""></bs>
Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS Pub	KS>BS)^
180-4, "Secure Hash Standard or ISO/IEC 9797-	HMAC-SHA256(Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="BS" td="" v="" v<=""></bs>
2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"	KS>BS) v
	HMAC-SHA384(Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="BS" td="" v="" v<=""></bs>
Application Note: The selection in this	KS>BS) v
requirement must be consistent with the key size	HMAC-SHA512(Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS <bs ks="BS" td="" v="" v<=""></bs>
specified for the size of the keys used in	KS>BS)
conjunction with the keyed-hash message	Note: Each HMAC should have a corresponding hash
authentication.	function
FCS_RBG – Random Bit Generation	
	DRBG Validation List
Hash_DRBG(any)	Hash_Based DRBG: [(SHA-1 v SHA-256 v SHA-384 v SHA-
	512) (SHA Val#)]
	NOTE: DRBG Val# must correspond to SHA-1 v SHA-256 v
	SHA-384 v SHA-512 Val#(s)
	DRBG Validation List
HMAC_DRBG(any)	HMAC_Based DRBG: [(SHA-1 v SHA-256 v SHA-384 v SHA-
	512) (HMAC Val#)]
	NOTE: DRBG Val# must correspond to HMAC-SHA1 v
(TD, DDDC(456)	HMAC-SHA256 v HMAC-SHA384 v HMAC-SHA512 Val#(s)
CTR_DRBG(AES)	DRBG Validation List
	CTR_DRBG[(AES-128 v AES-192 v AES-256)
	NOTE: DRBG Val# must correspond to AES-128 v AES-192 v
	AES-256 Val#(s)]