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TD0343:  NIT Technical Decision for Updating FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Tests

Publication Date
2018.08.02

Protection Profiles

Other References
ND SD V2.0, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

Issue Description

The NIT issued a technical decision for updating FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Tests.

Resolution

 

 

 

NDcPP V2.0, FWcPP V2.0, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 shall be modified to read as follows:

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier, where the presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields and types: [selection: SAN: IP address, SAN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), SAN: user FQDN, CN: IP address, CN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), CN: user FQDN, Distinguished Name (DN)] and [selection: no other reference identifier type, [assignment: other supported reference identifier types]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Application Note 89 shall be modified to read as follows:

<new> When using RSA or ECDSA certificates for peer authentication,  the reference and presented identifiers take the form of either a DN, IP address, FQDN or user FQDN. The reference identifier is the identifier the TOE expects to receive from the peer during IKE authentication. The presented identifier is the identifier that is contained within the peer certificate body. The ST author shall select the presented and reference identifier types supported and may optionally assign additional supported identifier types in the second selection. Excluding the DN identifier type (which is necessarily the Subject DN in the peer certificate), the TOE may support the identifier in either the Common Name or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or both.

The critical requirement of X.509 identifiers is the ability to bind the public key uniquely to an identity. This can be achieved by using strongly-typed identifiers or controlling the CA and certificate issuance. One recommended method for identity verification is supporting the use of the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using DNS names, URI names, or Service Names. However, the support for a SAN extension is optional as long as identifier uniqueness can be achieved by other means.

In a future version of this cPP, SAN and/or DN support might be required for all TOEs, support for CN might be optional, and the “other supported referenced identifier types” selection might be removed. In a future version of this cPP, it might also be required that the SAN (when present) shall take precedence over CN.</new>

 

ND Supporting Document V2.0, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 TSS Evaluation Activity shall be modified to read as follows:

<new>The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE compares the peer’s presented identifier to the reference identifier. This description shall include which field(s) of the certificate are used as the presented identifier (DN, Common Name, or SAN). If the TOE simultaneously supports the same identifier type in the CN and SAN, the TSS shall describe how the TOE prioritizes the comparisons (e.g. the result of comparison if CN matches but SAN does not). If the location (e.g. CN or SAN) of non-DN identifier types must explicitly be configured as part of the reference identifier, the TSS shall state this. If the          ST author assigned an additional identifier type, the TSS description shall also include a description of  that type and the method by which that type is compared to the peer’s presented certificate, including what field(s) are compared and which fields take precedence in the comparison.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Guidance Evaluation Activity shall be modified to read as follows:

<new> The evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance describes all supported identifiers, explicitly states whether the TOE supports the SAN extension or not, and includes detailed instructions on how to configure the reference identifier(s) used to check the identity of peer(s). If the identifier scheme implemented by the TOE does not guarantee unique identifiers, the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance provides a set of warnings and/or CA policy recommendations that would result in secure TOE use. </new>

ND Supporting Document V2.0, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Test Evaluation Activity shall be modified to read as follows:

<new> In the context of the tests below, a valid certificate is a certificate that passes FIA_X509_EXT.1 validation checks but does not necessarily contain an authorized subject.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

·         Test 1: (conditional) For each CN/identifier type combination selected, the evaluator shall configure the peer’s reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the field in the peer’s presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds. If the TOE prioritizes CN checking over SAN (through explicit configuration of the field when specifying the reference identifier or prioritization rules), the evaluator shall also configure the SAN so it contains an incorrect identifier of the correct type (e.g. the reference identifier on the TOE is example.com, the CN=example.com, and the SAN:FQDN=otherdomain.com) and verify that IKE authentication succeeds.

·         Test 2: (conditional) For each SAN/identifier type combination selected, the evaluator shall configure the peer’s reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the field in the peer’s presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds. If the TOE prioritizes SAN checking over CN (through explicit specification of the field when specifying the reference identifier or prioritization rules), the evaluator shall also configure the CN so it contains an incorrect identifier formatted to be the same type (e.g. the reference identifier on the TOE is DNS-ID; identify certificate has an identifier in SAN with correct DNS-ID, CN with incorrect DNS-ID (and not a different type of identifier)) and verify that IKE authentication succeeds.

·         Test 3: (conditional) For each CN/identifier type combination selected, the evaluator shall:

a)       Create a valid certificate with the CN so it contains the valid identifier followed by ‘\0’. If the TOE prioritizes CN checking over SAN (through explicit specification of the field when specifying the reference identifier or prioritization rules) for the same identifier type,  the evaluator shall configure the SAN so it matches the reference identifier.

b)      Configure the peer’s reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the CN without the ‘\0’ and verify that IKE authentication fails.

·         Test 4: (conditional) For each SAN/identifier type combination selected, the evaluator shall:

a)       Create a valid certificate with an incorrect identifier in the SAN. The evaluator shall configure a string representation of the correct identifier in the DN. If the TOE prioritizes CN checking over SAN (through explicit specification of the field when specifying the reference identifier or prioritization rules) for the same identifier type, the addition/modification shall be to any non-CN field of the DN. Otherwise, the addition/modification shall be to the CN.

b)      Configure the peer’s reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the correct identifier (expected in the SAN) and verify that IKE authentication fails.

·         Test 5: (conditional) If the TOE supports DN identifier types, the evaluator shall configure the peer’s reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the subject DN in the peer’s presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds.

·         Test 6: (conditional) If the TOE supports DN identifier types, to demonstrate a bit-wise comparison of the DN, the evaluator shall create the following valid certificates and verify that the IKE authentication fails when each certificate is presented to the TOE:

a)       Duplicate the CN field, so the otherwise authorized DN contains two identical CNs.

b)      Append ‘\0’ to a non-CN field of an otherwise authorized DN. 

</new>

For further information, please see the NIT interpretation at: https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/ccevs/NITDecisionRfI201718rev3.pdf

 

Justification

See issue description.

 
 
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