TD0466: Selectable Key Sizes for AES Data Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1(1) replaces the SFR from NDcPP. This SFR only allows the use of ASE KW and ASE GCM modes, so none of the trusted path SFRs can be implemented when restricted to these options. It appears that MACsec is the only trusted channel SFR that can be implemented with these algorithm restrictions.
The iteration of FCS_COP.1.1(5) mandates cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits rather than allowing selection of key sizes.
TD 134 and 357 are archived, and this TD takes their place.
FCS_COP.1(1) is updated to indicate a different iteration that focuses on the MACsec trusted channel SFR. The original FCS_COP.1(1) will be inherited (with no change) from the NDcPP.
Section 18.104.22.168 “FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)” from the EP is removed.
Added section (22.214.171.124) “FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption/Decryption)”
FCS_COP.1.1(5) Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.
Application Note: This EP mandates the use of GCM for MACsec and AES Key Wrap for key distribution so this SFR has been further refined from the NDcPP.
The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the supported AES modes that are required for this EP in addition to the ones already required by the NDcPP.
No additional guidance review activities are required.
The evaluator shall perform testing for AES-GCM as required by the NDcPP.
In addition to the tests specified in the NDcPP for this SFR, the evaluator shall perform the following tests for AES Key Wrap in accordance with the NIST “Key Wrap Validation System”:
To test the authenticated encryption capability of AES KW, the evaluator shall provide the TSF, for each key length, five sets of 100 messages and keys. Each set of messages and keys shall correspond to one of five plaintext message lengths (detailed below). The evaluator shall have the TSF encrypt the messages with the associated key. The evaluator shall verify that the correct ciphertext was generated in each case.
To test the authenticated decryption capability of AES KW, the evaluator shall provide the TSF, for each key length, five sets of 100 ciphertext values and keys. Each set of ciphertexts and keys shall correspond to one of five plaintext message lengths (detailed below). For each set of 100 cyphertext values, 20 shall not be authentic (i.e. fail authentication). The evaluator shall have the TSF decrypt the ciphertext messages with the associated key. The evaluator will then verify the correct plaintext was generated or the failure to authenticate was correctly detected.
The messages in each set for both tests shall be the following lengths:
In addition, a modified version of FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash from the NDcPP is added:
FCS_COP.1(1)/KeyedHashCMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1(1)/ KeyedHash:CMAC Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CMAC] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 256 bits] and message digest size of 128 bits that meets NIST SP 800-38B.
Application Note: AES-CMAC is a keyed hash function that is used as part of the key derivation function (KDF) that is used for key generation.
CMAC Generation Test
To test the generation capability of AES-CMAC, the evaluator shall provide to the TSF, for each key length-message length-CMAC length tuple (in bytes), a set of 8 arbitrary key-plaintext tuples that will result in the generation of a known MAC value when encrypted. The evaluator will then verify that the correct MAC was generated in each case.
CMAC Verification Test
To test the generation capability of AES-CMAC, the evaluator shall provide to the TSF, for each key length-message length-CMAC length tuple (in bytes), a set of 20 arbitrary key-MAC tuples that will result in the generation of known messages when verified. The evaluator will then verify that the correct message was generated in each case.
The following information should be used by the evaluator to determine the key length-message length-CMAC length tuples that should be tested:
See issue description.