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TD0489:  Update to FCS_COP.1 in MOD_FEEM

Publication Date
2020.01.30

Protection Profiles
MOD_FEEM_V1.0

Other References
FCS_COP.1(5); FCS_COP.1(7)

Issue Description

FCS_COP.1(5) and FCS_COP1.(7) in MOD_FEEM_V1.0 conflict with each other.

Resolution

The following changes are made to MOD_FEEM_V1.0:

Section 4.1

FCS_COP.1(7) is deleted from O.KEY_MATERIAL_SERVER

Section 5.2.1

FCS_COP.1(5) is modified as shown below, with underlines denoting additions:

FCS_COP.1.1(5) The TSF shall [selection:
- not perform key wrapping,
- use platform-provided functionality to perform Key Wrapping,
- implement functionality to perform Key Wrapping in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the following modes [selection:
  -  Key Wrap,
  -  Key Wrap with Padding,
  -  GCM mode,
  -  CCM mode,

 -  CBC mode


] and the cryptographic key size [selection: 128 bits (AES), 256 bits (AES)] that meet the following: [selection:

  -  “NIST SP 800-38C”,
  -  “NIST SP 800-38D”,
  -  “NIST SP 800-38F”,

  -  “NIST SP 800-38A”
] and no other standards
].

FCS_COP.1(7) is deleted

FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1: The bullets that refer to FCS_COP.1(7) are deleted

Section 5.2.4

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1: The SFR is modified as follows, with strikethroughs denoting deletions:

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store keys in non-volatile memory only when [selection:
-  wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(5),
-  encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(1) (from [AppPP]),
-  the plaintext key is stored in the underlying platform's keystore as specified by FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 (from [AppPP]),
-  the plaintext key is stored in a SQL database in the Operational Environment,
-  the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.,
-  the plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning,
-  the plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1 and another contribution to the split is [selection: wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(5) or
   encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(7), derived and not stored in non-volatile memory] ,
-  the plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization factor.,
-  the plaintext key is used to encrypt a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(7) or wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(5) that is already encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(7)
   or wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(5)
].

Section 6.1.4

The entry for FCS_COP.1(7) is deleted

Section D.2

FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1: The bullets that refer to FCS_COP.1(7) are deleted

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1: The SFR is modified as follows, with strikethroughs denoting deletions:

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store keys in non-volatile memory only when [selection:
-  wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(5),
-  encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(1) (from [AppPP]),
-  the plaintext key is stored in the underlying platform's keystore as specified by FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 (from [AppPP]),
-  the plaintext key is stored in a SQL database in the Operational Environment,
-  the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.,
-  the plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning,
-  the plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1 and another contribution to the split is [selection: wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(5) or
   encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(7), derived and not stored in non-volatile memory] ,
-  the plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization factor.,
-  the plaintext key is used to encrypt a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(7) or wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(5) that is already encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(7)
   or wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(5)
].

The following changes are made to MOD_FEEM_V1.0 SD:

Section 2.1.3

FCS_COP.1(5): The following sentence is added to the Tests Evaluation Activities just before the AES Key Wrap test:

The assurance activity tests specified for AES in CBC mode in the underlying [AppPP] shall be performed in the case that "CBC" is selected in the requirement.

FCS_COP.1(7) is deleted

 

 

Justification

To remedy the conflict FCS_COP.1(5) and FCS_COP1.(7) are combined into a single SFR that contains all modes for key wrapping/encryption.

 
 
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