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Archived TD0501:  Cryptographic selections and updates for OS PP

Publication Date
2020.09.03

Protection Profiles
PP_OS_V4.2.1

Other References
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2

Issue Description

FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2 in the GPOS PP does not include/specify appropriate selections for various key agreement groups and does not support safe primes. 

Resolution

FCS_CKM.1 is modified as follows:

FCS_CKM.1.1 The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:

·         RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3,

·         ECC schemes using "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and [selection: P-521, no other curves] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4,

·         FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.1,

·         FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526,

·         FFC Schemes using safe primes that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes]

and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .

Application Note:

The ST author shall select all key generation schemes used for key establishment and entity authentication. When key generation is used for key establishment, the schemes in FCS_CKM.2 and selected cryptographic protocols must match the selection. When key generation is used for entity authentication, the public key is expected to be associated with an X.509v3 certificate.

If the OS acts only as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the OS does not need to implement RSA key generation.

The TSS and Guidance activities remain unchanged.

Under Assurance Activity -> Tests, add:

Diffie-Hellman Group 14 and FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups

 

Testing for FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 and/or "safe-prime" groups is done as part of testing in FCS_CKM.2.1

 

 

FCS_CKM.2 is modified as follows:

FCS_CKM.2.1               The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:

 [selection:

·         RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2,

·         Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,

·         Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,

·         Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526]

] that meets the following [assignment: list of standards].

Application Note: The ST author shall select all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols. 

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme shall correlate with the curves specified in FCS_CKM.1.1. The domain parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are specified by the key generation according to FCS_CKM.1.1.

The TSS and Guidance activities remain unchanged.

 

Under Assurance Activity -> Tests, remove:

            SP800-56B Key Establishment Schemes

 

Under Assurance Activity -> Tests, add:

RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.

Diffie-Hellman Group 14

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of Diffie-Hellman group 14 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 that uses Diffie-Hellman Group 14.

FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups (identified in Appendix D of SP 800-56A Revision 3)

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of "safe-prime" groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 that uses "safe-prime" groups. This test must be performed for each "safe-prime" group that each protocol uses.

 

 

 

Justification

See issue description.

 
 
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