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TD0504:  Cryptographic selections and updates for use with VPN Client PP-Module w/MDF PP

Publication Date
2020.09.04

Protection Profiles
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1

Other References
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2(1)

Issue Description

The VPN Client PP-Module did not have the current key generation and key establishment selections necessary for use with the MDFPP.

Resolution

This TD supersedes TD0330.

MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1 is modified as follows:

Section 5.2.2 Applicable Modified SFRs

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm

·         ECC schemes using [selection:

o    “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [selection: P-521, no other curves] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4,

o   Curve25519 schemes that meet the following: RFC 7748], and

·         FFC schemes using [selection:

o   cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1,

o   Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3,

o    “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography], and

[selection:

·         RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3,

·         no other key generation methods].

 

Application Note: This SFR is functionally identical to what is defined in the MDF PP except that FFC and ECC key generation have been made mandatory in support of IPsec due to the mandated support for DH groups 14, 19, and 20 in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8, and support for P-256 is made mandatory due to its use in DH group 19. Curve25519 schemes are included to satisfy FDP_DAR_EXT.2.2 in the MDF PP; these schemes are not used in support of IPsec. RSA remains present as a selection since it may be used by facets of the MDF TOE that are not specifically related to VPN client functionality.

 

FCS_CKM.2.1(1) The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:

·         Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,

[selection:

·         Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,

·         Key establishment schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526, Section 3], and

[selection:

·         RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following [selection:

·         NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography,”

·         RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2],

·         no other key establishment schemes].

Application Note: This SFR differs from its definition in the MDF PP by moving elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes from selectable to mandatory (due to the mandated support for DH groups 19 and 20 in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8). It also provides the ability to claim either NIST SP 800-56A or RFC 3526 for key establishment using finite field cryptography. One of these two claims must be made in support of DH group 14 in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8. The use of RSA is not explicitly mandated by the VPN client but may be selected in the MDF PP, which is why it remains here.

 

MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1-SD is modified as follows:

Section 2.2.1.1.1: FCS_CKM.2(1) Cryptographic Key Establishment

 

For all key establishment schemes refer to the Assurance Activity for FCS_CKM.2(1) in the MDF PP. Note that because a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module must implement IPsec, the tested protocols shall include IPsec at minimum.

 

 

 

Justification

See issue description.

 
 
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