TD0521: Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
Validation of certificates, if not done correctly, can introduce vulnerabilities (like CVE-2020-0601). Testing to ensure proper validation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates is lacking allowing spoofing attacks to exist in evaluated products.
01/25/2021 - Fixed typo in SFR (id-dp replaced with id-kp)
The following replaces the SFR, Application Note, and Test EA for FIA_X509_EXT.1.1.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [selection: invoke platform provided functionality, implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
Application Note: FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 lists the rules for validating certificates. The ST author shall select whether revocation status is verified using OCSP or CRLs. FIA_X509_EXT.2 requires that certificates are used for HTTPS, TLS, and DTLS; this use requires that the extendedKeyUsage rules are verified. If OCSP is not supported the EKU provision for checking the OCSP Signing purpose is met by default.
OCSP stapling and OCSP multi-stapling only support TLS server certificate validation. If other certificate types are validated, either OCSP or CRL should be claimed.
Regardless of the selection of implement functionality or invoke platform-provided functionality, the validation is expected to end in a trusted root CA certificate in a root store managed by the platform.
The evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.
The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. If the application supports chains of length four or greater, the evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA. If the application supports a maximum trust depth of two, then a chain with no Intermediate CA should instead be created.
Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing, for each of the following reasons, in turn:
The evaluator shall then establish a valid certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then remove trust in one of the CA certificates, and show that the function fails.
Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.
Test 3: The evaluator shall test that the TOE can properly handle revoked certificates-“conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, OCSP Stapling or OCSP Multi-stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then the following tests shall be performed for each method:
The evaluator shall test revocation of the node certificate.
The evaluator shall also test revocation of an intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA), if intermediate CA certificates are supported. If OCSP stapling per RFC 6066 is the only supported revocation method, this test is omitted.
The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.
Test 4: If any OCSP option is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set, and verify that validation of the CRL fails.
Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)
Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)
Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)
Test 8a: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain.
Test 8b: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 8a with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 8a, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.
Updates clarify the appropriate certificate validation and testing. The new (conditional) test will help prevent exploitation of spoofing vulnerabilities.