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TD0527:  Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)

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Issue Description

Validation of certificates, if not done correctly, can introduce vulnerabilities (like CVE-2020-0601). Testing to ensure proper validation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates is lacking allowing spoofing attacks to exist in evaluated products.


The following test is added to the Test EA for FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV and FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT.

Test 8: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1/SigGen). The evaluator shall establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain. The evaluator shall replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 8 with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 8, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.


For further information, please see the NIT interpretation at:




The new (conditional) test will help prevent exploitation of spoofing vulnerabilities.

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