A couple clarifications are addressed via this TD: Modifying the Evaluation Activities (under TSS) for the addition for exception processing and modifying the condition FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 Test 3 (In order to test the edge cases for exceptions (e.g., if TLS exceptions are configurable to allow for leaf certificates, but not for CA certificates).

This TD supercedes TD 0604, which had previously superceded TD0525.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 in OS PP V4.2.1 is replaced as follows, with the underlined text indicating additions and strike-through indicating deletions.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1            The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
• The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
• The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
• The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [selection: OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, CRL as specified in RFC 8603, an OCSP TLS Status Request Extension (OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066, OCSP TLS Multi-Certificate Status Request Extension (i.e., OCSP Multi-Stapling) as specified in RFC 6961] with [selection: no exceptions,  [assignment: exceptional use cases and alternative status check]] 

• The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
• Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
• Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
• Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
• S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
• OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing Purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
• [selection: Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field, no other rules].

Application Note: FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 lists the rules for validating certificates. The ST author shall select whether revocation status is verified using OCSP or CRLs. FIA_X509_EXT.2 requires that certificates are used for HTTPS, TLS, and DTLS; this use requires that the extendedKeyUsage rules are verified.

OCSP stapling and OCSP multi-stapling only support TLS server certificate validation. If other certificate types are validated, either OCSP or CRL should be claimed. If OCSP is not supported the EKU provision for checking the OCSP Signing purpose is met by default.

If the OS receives server certificates presented for EST, then the ST author should make the selection for EST in the SFR.

If the OS cannot perform revocation in accordance with one of the specified revocation methods, then the specific use cases where revocation checking is not possible must be described, along with any alternative to certificate status checking for each use case. For example, for the use case 'update functions when network connections are not available, notice of a compromised certificate disables automatic updates.'

Evaluation Activities:

TSS

The evaluator will ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

If there are exceptional use cases where  the OS cannot perform revocation checking in accordance with at least one of the revocation methods, the evaluator will ensure the TSS describes each revocation checking exception use case, and for each exception, the alternate functionality the TOE implements to determine the status of the certificate and disable functionality dependent on the validity of the certificate.

TEST

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing, for each of the following reasons, in turn:

• by establishing a certificate path in which one of the issuing certificates is not a CA certificate,
• by omitting the basicConstraints field in one of the issuing certificates,
• by setting the basicConstraints field in an issuing certificate to have CA=False,
• by omitting the CA signing bit of the key usage field in an issuing certificate, and
• by setting the path length field of a valid CA field to a value strictly less than the certificate path.

The evaluator shall then establish a valid certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then remove trust in one of the CA certificates, and show that the function fails.

Test 2: The evaluator will demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.

Test 3 [Conditional, to be performed for use cases identified in exceptions that cannot be configured to allow revocation checking if exceptions to performing revocation are not selected]: The evaluator will test that the OS can properly handle revoked certificates - conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, OCSP stapling, or OCSP multi-stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator will test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). If OCSP stapling per RFC 6066 is the only supported revocation method, testing revocation of the intermediate CA certificate is omitted. The evaluator will ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails. If the exceptions are configurable, the evaluator shall attempt to configure the exceptions to allow revocation checking for each function indicated in FIA_X509_EXT.2. 

Test 4: If any OCSP option is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set and verify that validation of the CRL fails.

Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)

Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature of the certificate will not validate.)

Test 8a: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain.

Test 8b: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 8a with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 8a, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.

Test 9 [Conditional, to be performed if exceptions to performing revocation are selected]: For each exceptional use case for revocation checking described in the ST, the evaluator shall attempt to establish the conditions of the use case, designate the certificate as invalid and perform the function relying on the certificate. The evaluator shall observe that the atlternate alternate revocation checking mechanism successfully prevents performance of the function.

Changes made to add for clarifications in Evaluation Activities in accordance with SME colloboration