

Mapping Between

Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16-June-2017

and

NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4

Important Caveats

- Product vs. System.** The Common Criteria is designed for the evaluation of products; the Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37 Revision 1, DOD 8510.01) and associated control/control interpretations (NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, CNSSI № 1253) are used for the assessment and authorization of mission systems. **Products cannot satisfy controls outside of the system context.** Products may support a system satisfying particular controls, but typically satisfaction also requires the implementation of operational procedures; further, given that systems are typically the product of integration of multiple products configured to meet mission requirements, an overall system assessment is required to determine if the control is satisfied in the overall system context.
- SA-4(7).** Perhaps it is needless to say, but satisfaction of any NIAP PP supports system satisfaction of SA-4(7), which is the implementation of CNSSP № 11.
- System context of supported controls.** For a conformant TOE to support these controls in the context of an information system, the selections and assignments completed in the TOE's Security Target must be congruent with those made for the supported controls. For example, the TOE's ability to generate audit records only supports AU-2 to the extent that the TOE's audit records are included in the set of "organization-defined auditable events" assigned by that control. The security control assessor must compare the TOE's functional claims to the behavior required for the system to determine the extent to which the applicable controls are supported.

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR		NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 Control Supports		Comments and Observations
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals				
FAU_GEN.1	<u>Audit Data Generation</u>	AU-2	Auditable Events	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate audit records for various events. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit

				log is part of the overall system's auditing.
		AU-3	Content of Audit Records	A conformant TOE will ensure that audit records include date, type, outcome, and subject identity data. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.
		AU-3(1)	Content of Audit Records: Additional Audit Information	A conformant TOE will generate audit information for some auditable events beyond what is mandated in AU-3. This may or may not be sufficient to satisfy this control based on the additional audit information required by the organization. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.
		AU-12	Audit Generation	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate audit logs. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control

				and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.
FAU_STG.1	<u>Audit Storage Protection</u>	AU-9	Protection of Audit Information	A conformant TOE has the ability to prevent unauthorized modification and deletion of audit records.
FAU_STG.4	<u>Prevention of Audit Data Loss</u>	AU-5	Response to Audit Processing Failures	A conformant TOE has the ability to react in a specific manner when the allocated audit storage space is full, which supports part b of the control.
FCS_CKM.1	<u>Cryptographic Key Generation</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	The ability of the TOE to generate symmetric and asymmetric keys satisfies the key generation portion of this control.
		SC-12(3)	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Asymmetric Keys	A conformant TOE's ensures that generated asymmetric keys provide an appropriate level of security.
FCS_CKM.2(1)	<u>Cryptographic Key Establishment</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a key establishment function.
		SC-12(3)	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Asymmetric Keys	A conformant TOE supports the production of asymmetric keys by providing a key establishment function.
FCS_CKM.2(2)	<u>Cryptographic Key Establishment:</u> While Device Is Locked	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a key establishment function.

		SC-12(3)	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Asymmetric Keys	A conformant TOE supports the production of asymmetric keys by providing a key establishment function.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	<u>Cryptographic Key Support</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE uses a REK to ensure secure key storage, satisfying the key storage portion of this control.
FCS_CKM_EXT.2	<u>Cryptographic Key Random Generation</u>	SC-12(2)	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Symmetric Keys	A conformant TOE will support the production of symmetric keys by ensuring that sufficient entropy is made available to the key generation function when a (symmetric) DEK is generated.
FCS_CKM_EXT.3	<u>Cryptographic Key Generation</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE provides a key generation function through some combination of password-based key derivation and other methods.
		SC-12(2) or SC-12(3)	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Symmetric Keys -or- Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management: Asymmetric Keys	A conformant TOE may support either or both of these controls, depending on whether the TSF uses symmetric and/or asymmetric KEKs.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4	<u>Key Destruction</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to destroy cryptographic keys and plaintext keying material such as passwords to protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to securely destroy cryptographic keys.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5	<u>TSF Wipe</u>	MP-6	Media Sanitization	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing an interface to wipe TSF data.
		MP-6(8)	Media Sanitization: Remote Purging / Wiping of Information	This control is supported by the fact that the wipe mechanism may be engaged remotely under certain conditions (i.e. if the mobile device is enrolled with an MDM).
FCS_CKM_EXT.6	<u>Salt Generation</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE generates salts in support of various key generation and establishment functions.
FCS_COP.1(1)	<u>Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform symmetric encryption and decryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_COP.1(2)	<u>Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform cryptographic hashing using NSA-approved

				and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_COP.1(3)	<u>Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform cryptographic signing using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_COP.1(4)	<u>Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform keyed-hash message authentication using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_COP.1(4)	<u>Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform password-based key derivation using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	<u>HTTPS Protocol</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE will support the implementation of PKI-based authentication by validating peer certificates as part of the authentication process.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8 (1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or alternate protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
FCS_IV_EXT.1	<u>Initialization Vector Generation</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate initialization vectors that ensure the secure

			Establishment and Management	operation of cryptographic functions.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	<u>Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE's use of an appropriate DRBG ensures that generated keys provide an appropriate level of security.
FCS_SRV_EXT.1	<u>Cryptographic Algorithm Services</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing an interface to the cryptographic services provided by the TSF, which can then be used for various cryptographic operations.
FCS_STG_EXT.1	<u>Cryptographic Key Storage</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to securely store cryptographic keys.
FCS_STG_EXT.2	<u>Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE will use a key hierarchy to ensure the secure storage of cryptographic keys.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will use encryption to ensure the security of stored cryptographic data at rest.
FCS_STG_EXT.3	<u>Integrity of Encrypted Key Storage</u>	SI-7(6)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE uses cryptographic methods to ensure the integrity of stored data.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	<u>TLS Protocol</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted communications, satisfying this control.

		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8 (1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or alternate protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE's use of TLS to secure data in transit allows it to conform with NSA standards.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1	<u>Security Access Control</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE can provide a mechanism/access policy to restrict access to system services and stored data by applications or groups of applications. This supports the control provided that the restrictions that can be enforced by the TSF are consistent with organizational policies as defined by AC-1.
		AC-6	Least Privilege	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing the ability to restrict system services and data to its applications to the minimum set required for their use.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1	<u>Protected Data Encryption</u>	AC-19(5)	Access Control for Mobile Devices: Full Device/Container-based Encryption	The device storage is encrypted using a DEK.

		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A conformant TOE provides a method to protect information at rest.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	The specific method used by the TOE to protect information at rest is encrypted storage.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2	<u>Sensitive Data Encryption</u>	AC-3(4)	Access Enforcement: Discretionary Access Control	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a mechanism to mark certain data as sensitive. Note however that this support relies on this behavior being part of the organization's access control policies as defined by AC-1.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE can use this functionality in order to meet organizational requirements for secure key storage.
		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	The TOE supports this control by providing a method to define the specific information at rest that should be protected.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1	<u>Subset Information Flow Control</u>	AC-17(2)	Remote Access: Protection of Confidentiality/Integrity Using Encryption	The SFR allows a conformant TOE to implement secure remote access using a VPN.
		SC-7(7)	Boundary Protection: Prevent Split Tunneling for Remote Devices	A conformant TOE requires all traffic to flow through the VPN client, it is not possible for a device to use split tunneling.

		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE supports this control by securing data in transit.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The TSF's method of securing data in transit is through the use of an IPsec VPN.
FDP_STG_EXT.1	<u>User Data Storage</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE supports item (h) of this control by providing secure storage for trust anchors.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports this control by securing the contents of the Trust Anchor Database, which contains private key data.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1	<u>Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection</u>	AC-4(21)	Information Flow Enforcement: Physical/Logical Separation of Information Flows	A conformant TOE allows information flows to be separated based on the protocols and/or radios used by different applications on the device.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE will support this control by providing a protected communication channel between mobile applications and remote trusted IT products.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The protected communications implemented by the TOE use cryptographic methods to secure data in transit.
		SC-11	Trusted Path	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a trusted path from the user of the device to remote

				trusted IT products through user-facing applications.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1	<u>Authentication Failure Handling</u>	AC-7	Unsuccessful Login Attempts	A conformant TOE has the ability to detect when a defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur and take some action based on this.
FIA_BLT_EXT.1	<u>Bluetooth User Authorization</u>	AC-18	Wireless Access	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing restrictions on Bluetooth pairing, assuming the organization's policies include such restrictions.
		AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by requiring the user to authenticate any remote device before Bluetooth pairing can occur.
FIA_BLT_EXT.2	<u>Bluetooth Mutual Authentication</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by requiring mutual authentication between itself and a remote Bluetooth device prior to allowing wireless access.
		IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE will require mutual authentication with a remote Bluetooth device prior to establishing a link to it.
FIA_BLT_EXT.3	<u>Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by disallowing duplicate

				Bluetooth device addresses to authenticate to the TOE.
		IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE will require a Bluetooth device to be uniquely identified prior to attempting to authenticate it.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4	<u>Secure Simple Pairing</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by using SSP to establish Bluetooth connectivity.
		IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE may use SSP as part of performing device authentication, depending on the remote logical interfaces provided by the TSF.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	<u>Password Management</u>	IA-5(1)	Authenticator Management: Password-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE will have the ability to enforce some minimum password complexity requirements, although they are not identical to CNSS or DoD requirements or to those specified in part (a) of this control.
FIA_TRT_EXT.1	<u>Authentication Throttling</u>	AC-7	Unsuccessful Login Attempts	A conformant TOE supports this control by enforcing a delay between unsuccessful authentication attempts. Note, however, that this is not fully consistent with what is required by the control and also likely differs from CNSS or DoD requirements.

FIA_UAU.5	<u>Multiple Authentication Mechanisms</u>	IA-2	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	A conformant TOE will require user identification and authentication before permitting access to the mobile device.
		IA-2(1)	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users): Network Access to Privileged Accounts	A conformant TOE may provide multi-factor authentication in order to access the mobile device.
		IA-2(2)	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users): Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts	A conformant TOE may provide multi-factor authentication in order to access the mobile device.
		IA-2(3)	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users): Local Access to Privileged Accounts	A conformant TOE may provide multi-factor authentication in order to access the mobile device.
		IA-2(4)	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users): Local Access to Non-Privileged Accounts	A conformant TOE may provide multi-factor authentication in order to access the mobile device.
		IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE may offer biometric verification as a form of authentication.
FIA_UAU.6	<u>Re-Authentication</u>	IA-11	Re-Authentication	A conformant TOE supports this control by requiring re-authentication upon change of any

				authentication factor. Note that this control is only supported to the extent that this behavior represents an ‘organization-defined’ situation for it to occur.
FIA_UAU.7	<u>Protected Authentication Feedback</u>	IA-6	Authenticator Feedback	The TOE is required to provide obscured feedback to the user while authentication is in progress.
FIA_UAU_EXT.1	<u>Authentication for Cryptographic Operation</u>	SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A compliant TOE supports this control by protecting information at rest until the device user is authenticated.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A compliant TOE supports this control by enforcing cryptographic protection of information at rest.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	<u>Timing of Authentication</u>	AC-14	Permitted Actions Without Identification of Authentication	A conformant TOE will define a list of actions that are permitted prior to authentication.
FIA_X509_EXT.1	<u>Validation of Certificates</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE has the ability to validate certificate path and status.
		SC-23(5)	Session Authenticity: Allowed Certificate Authorities	A conformant TOE specifies what CA’s are allowed.
FIA_X509_EXT.2	<u>X509 Certificate Authentication</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by requiring X.509 authentication for remote trusted communications.

		CM-5(3)	Access Restrictions for Change: Signed Components	A conformant TOE may support this control by requiring the use of X.509 certificates for update integrity verification, depending on selections made.
		IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE as the ability to identify and authenticate itself to trusted remote entities using mutual authentication.
		SI-7(15)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Code Authentication	A conformant TOE may use X.509 certificates to authenticate software updates to the TOE, depending on selections made
FIA_X509_EXT.3	<u>Request Validation of Certificates</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE supports this control in part by providing an interface to perform certificate validation.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1	<u>Management of Security Functions Behavior</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing access control restrictions to various functions. Note that the extent of support depends on the extent to which this behavior is captured in the organizational access control policies defined by AC-1.
		AC-3(7)	Access Enforcement: Role-Based Access Control	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing different role-based levels of management functionality to users, administrators, and MDM.

		AC-6	Least Privilege	A conformant TOE supports the concept of least privilege by limiting device management functions to only the roles that are needed to perform them.
		AC-6(1)	Least Privilege: Authorize Access to Security Functions	A conformant TOE will enforce access restrictions such that users are not granted excessive administrative privileges to manage the TSF.
		AC-6(10)	Least Privilege: Prohibit Non-Privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions	A conformant TOE supports this control by defining some management functionality as privileged such that ordinary users cannot perform these functions.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1	<u>Specification of Management Functions</u>	AC-2(5)	Account Management: Inactivity Logout	If optional functionality for configuration of screen lock and/or remote connection inactivity timeout is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to enforce inactivity logout mechanisms.
		AC-14	Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication	The ability of a conformant TOE to configure the unauthenticated services that are available to it allows for the implementation of an access control policy.
		AC-17	Remote Access	If optional functionality for configuration of a remote management server is selected, a

			conformant TOE has the ability to implement remote access in accordance with an organizational policy.
		AU-4	Audit Storage Capacity If optional functionality for configuration of audit storage capacity is selected, a conformant TOE will have the ability to satisfy this control.
		AU-4(1)	Audit Storage Capacity: Transfer to Alternate Storage If optional functionality for configuration of remote audit/logging server is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to offload audit data to alternate storage.
		AU-8(1)	Time Stamps: Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source If optional functionality for configuration of network time server is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to satisfy this control.
		AU-9(4)	Protection of Audit Information: Access by Subset of Privileged Users This will allow a conformant TOE to assign responsibilities for management of the audit data.
		AU-12	Audit Generation If optional functionality for configuration of audit rules is selected, a conformant TOE satisfies the control related to the ability to select the events audited by the system.
		CM-6	Configuration Settings A conformant TOE may satisfy one or more optional capabilities defined in this SFR. In general, a conformant TOE will satisfy this control to

				the extent that the TOE provides a method to configure its behavior in accordance with STIGs or other organizational requirements. Specific additional controls may be supported depending on the functionality claimed by the TOE; the security control assessor must review what has been selected in the Security Target and determine what additional support is provided, if any.
		CM-11	User-Installed Software	A conformant TOE will provide the ability to enforce restrictions on the software that users can install on the mobile device.
		IA-4	Identifier Management	If the optional management function for directory server configuration is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to support identifier management through connection to a centralized directory server.
		IA-5	Authenticator Management	If optional management functions for the composition of user/administrator passwords are selected, a conformant TOE has mechanisms used to ensure strength of secrets for passwords.
		SC-7	Boundary Protection	If optional management functionality for enabling/disabling use of external interfaces is

				selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to ensure that connectivity to it occurs only through managed and monitored interfaces.
		SC-7(12)	Boundary Protection: Host-Based Protection	If optional management functionality for the configuration of a host-based firewall is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to apply host-based protection to itself.
		SC-7(14)	Boundary Protection: Protects Against Unauthorized Physical Connections	If optional management functionality for the ability to enable/disable use of USB ports is selected, a conformant TOE has the ability to restrict physical access to the information system.
FMT_SMF_EXT.2	<u>Specification of Remediation Actions</u>	MP-6(8)	Media Sanitization: Remote Purging /Wiping of Information	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing the ability to perform a wipe of enterprise data upon unenrollment of the mobile device.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)</u>	SI-16	Memory Protection	A conformant TOE will provide ASLR and for the base address of any user-space memory to consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits that addresses the control's broader requirement for memory protection.
FPT_AEX_EXT.2	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)</u>	SI-16	Memory Protection	A conformant TOE will have the ability to enforce read, write and execute permissions on every page of physical memory that addresses the control's broader

				requirement for memory protection.
FPT_AEX_EXT.3	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)</u>	N/A	N/A	There is no control that specifically relates to buffer overflow.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4	<u>Domain Isolation</u>	SC-39	Process Isolation	The TOE's enforced isolation of address spaces between applications is addressed by this control. The isolation of address spaces also serves to protect processes against modification by other processes.
		SC-3	Security Function Isolation	A conformant TOE has the ability to isolate non-security from security functions in order to prevent any tampering or unauthorized access.
FPT_JTA_EXT.1	<u>JTAG Disablement</u>	SI-16	Memory Protection	A conformant TOE supports this control by preventing unauthorized access to system memory through a JTAG interface.
FPT_KST_EXT.1	<u>Key Storage</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE supports part (h) of this control by ensuring that any secret key data that may be used as part of an authenticator is not stored in plaintext.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports the key storage portion of this control by ensuring that

				cryptographic key data is not stored insecurely.
		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A conformant TOE can support this control if the organization defines key data as information at rest that is subject to protection.
FPT_KST_EXT.2	<u>No Key Transmission</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE supports part (h) of this control by ensuring that any secret key data that may be used as part of an authenticator is not transmitted outside the TOE boundary.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports the key storage portion of this control by ensuring that cryptographic key data is not transmitted outside the TOE boundary.
FPT_KST_EXT.3	<u>No Plaintext Key Export</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE supports part (h) of this control by ensuring that any secret key data that may be used as part of an authenticator is not exported from the TOE.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports the key storage portion of this control by ensuring that cryptographic key data is not exported from the TOE.
FPT_NOT_EXT.1	<u>Self-Test Notification</u>	SI-6	Security Function Verification	A conformant TOE may support part (c) of this control if the SFR selection includes notifying the administrator of a self-test failure. By transitioning to a non-operational mode

				following a self-test failure it also supports part (d) of this control.
		SI-7(8)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Auditing Capability for Significant Events	A conformant TOE may have the ability to audit failed tests depending on the selections made in this SFR.
		SC-24	Fail in Known State	A conformant TOE will transition into the locked state upon the detection of a self-test failure and potentially other failures depending on the selections made in this SFR.
FPT_STM.1	<u>Reliable Time Stamps</u>	AU-8	Time Stamps	A conformant can generate and use time stamps addresses the actions defined in this control.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	<u>TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing</u>	SI-6	Security Function Verification	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the correct operation of its cryptographic functionality.
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1)	<u>TSF Integrity Checking</u>	SI-7	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of the TOE's software components that can be considered a subset of the actions available for selection and assignment in the SFR.
		SI-7(1)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Integrity Checks	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of the boot chain prior to execution.
		SI-7(6)	Software, Firmware and Information	A conformant TOE has the ability to implement cryptographic

			Integrity: Cryptographically-Validated Integrity	mechanisms to detect unauthorized change.
		SI-7(9)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Integrity of System Boot	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of the boot process.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	<u>TSF Version Query</u>	CM-8	Information System Component Inventory	A conformant TOE supports this control to the extent that it unambiguously identify itself and any installed applications, which can be used as inputs when defining a component inventory.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2	<u>TSF Update Verification</u>	CM-5(3)	Access Restrictions for Change: Signed Components	A conformant TOE has the ability to require that third-party applications running on it use signed updates.
		SI-7(1)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Integrity Checks	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of updates to itself.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	<u>TSF- and User-Initiated Locked State</u>	AC-11	Session Locking	A conformant TOE has the ability to initiate a session lock after a defined period of time or upon user request
		AC-11(1)	Session Locking: Pattern Hiding	A conformant TOE has the ability obfuscate the display when in the locked state.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1	<u>Trusted Channel Communication</u>	IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing 802.1X as a method of device authentication over a WLAN.
		IA-3(1)	Device Identification	The use of EAP-TLS as part of establishing

			and Authentication: Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication	WLAN communications allows a conformant TOE to support this control by providing cryptographic bidirectional authentication for wireless devices.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	The use of the cryptographic protocols specified in the SFR ensures the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.

Optional Requirements

FIA_UAU_EXT.4	<u>Secondary User Authentication</u>	IA-2	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE has the ability to implement access control policies that prohibit access to Enterprise resources until a secondary authentication factor is provided by the user.
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Selection-based Requirements

FCS_CKM_EXT.7	<u>Cryptographic Key Support (REK)</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	If consistent with organizational requirements, a conformant TOE supports the key management portion of this control through ensuring appropriate measures for the generation and storage of its REK.
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FCS_DTLS_EXT.1	<u>DTLS Protocol</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted communications, supporting this control.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	The TOE provides cryptographic methods to secure data in transit which may satisfy organization-defined uses if the functionality claimed by the TSF is consistent with organizational requirements.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	<u>TLS Client Protocol</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to limit the elliptic curves that can be used for key establishment.
FDP_ACF_EXT.2	<u>Security Access Control</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a mechanism/access policy to restrict access to stored data to applications, assuming that this is part of the organization's access control policies as defined by AC-1.

FDP_PBA_EXT.1	<u>Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE supports part (h) of this control by providing the ability to securely store user authentication credentials.
FIA_BMG_EXT.1	<u>Accuracy of Biometric Authentication</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE will ensure that biometric authentication meets a quality standard for false error/reject rates.
FPT_TST_EXT.3	<u>TSF Integrity Testing</u>	CM-5(3)	Access Restrictions for Change: Signed Components	A conformant TOE will ensure that code is not executed unless a valid code signing certificate is provided.
		SI-7(15)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Code Authentication	A conformant TOE will ensure that code is not executed unless a valid code signing certificate is provided.
FPT_TUD_EXT.3	<u>Trusted Update Verification</u>	CM-5(3)	Access Restrictions for Change: Signed Components	A conformant TOE will ensure that updates are not installed unless a valid code signing certificate is provided.
		SI-7(15)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Code Authentication	A conformant TOE will ensure that updates are not installed unless a valid code signing certificate is provided.
Objective Requirements				
FAU_SAR.1	<u>Audit Review</u>	AU-7	Audit Reduction and Report Generation	A conformant TOE provides audit review mechanisms to administrators.
		AU-6(7)	Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting: Permitted Actions	A conformant TOE will allow designation of permitted actions to their respective roles.
FAU_SEL.1	<u>Selective Audit</u>	AU-12	Audit Generation	A conformant TOE has the ability to support part (b) of this control by providing a

				mechanism to determine the set of auditable events that result in the generation of audit records.
FCS_CKM_EXT.7	<u>Bluetooth Key Generation</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the encryption portion of this control by supporting the functionality needed for Bluetooth communications to be encrypted.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports the key generation function of this control, specifically as it relates to Bluetooth keys.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2	<u>Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE supports the key generation function of this control through its handling of random bit generation.
FCS_RBG_EXT.3	<u>Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)</u>	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE's preservation of its DRBG state between power cycles provides assurance of availability for random bit generation services.
FCS_SRV_EXT.2	<u>Cryptographic Algorithm Services</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform encryption and decryption as well as cryptographic hashing and cryptographic signature services using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.3	<u>TLS Client Protocol</u>	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted

				communications, supporting this control.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	The TOE provides cryptographic methods to secure data in transit which may satisfy organization-defined uses if the functionality claimed by the TSF is consistent with organizational requirements.
FDP_ACF_EXT.3	<u>Security Attribute Based Access Control</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE supports this control by preventing simultaneous write and execute permissions except in specific cases. This supports the control provided that enforcement of these restrictions is consistent with organizational policies as defined by AC-1.
FDP_BCK_EXT.1	<u>Application Backup</u>	N/A	N/A	While NIST SP 800-53 includes controls for the backup of information system data, there is no security control for the ability to deliberately exclude items from the backup function.

FDP_BLT_EXT.1	<u>Limitation of Bluetooth Device Access</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE can enforce access control on the Bluetooth interface by limiting its use to certain applications only. This supports the control provided that enforcement of these restrictions is consistent with organizational policies as defined by AC-1.
		AC-18	Wireless Access	A conformant TOE requires a service to be authorized before it can communicate with a paired Bluetooth device.
		IA-9	Service Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE supports identification of services by limiting the services that can invoke the Bluetooth interface.
FIA_BLT_EXT.5	<u>Bluetooth Authentication – Secure Connections Only</u>	SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE supports this control by ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data transmitted over the Bluetooth interface.
FIA_BLT_EXT.6	<u>Bluetooth User Authorization</u>	AC-18	Wireless Access	A conformant TOE supports this control by requiring explicit user authorization for devices to gain access to Bluetooth profiles.
		IA-9	Service Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE supports service identification because it has the ability to authorize or limit access to specific services through their associated Bluetooth profiles.

FIA_BMG_EXT.2	<u>Biometric Enrollment</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE will enforce quality requirements on biometric data used for enrollment.
FIA_BMG_EXT.3	<u>Biometric Verification</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE will enforce quality requirements on biometric data used for enrollment.
FIA_BMG_EXT.4	<u>Biometric Templates</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE will enforce quality requirements on biometric data used for enrollment.
FIA_BMG_EXT.5	<u>Handling Unusual Biometric Templates</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE will enforce quality requirements on biometric data used for enrollment.
FIA_BMG_EXT.6	<u>Spoof Detections for Biometrics</u>	IA-5(12)	Authenticator Management: Biometric Authentication	A conformant TOE will implement spoof detection for biometric authentication in order to reduce the false acceptance rate of the authentication mechanism.
FIA_X509_EXT.4	<u>X509 Certificate Enrollment</u>	AC-18(1)	Wireless Access: Authentication and Encryption	A conformant TOE supports the authentication portion of this control by supporting enrollment of certificates that are subsequently used for authentication.
		IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to request certificate enrollment which serves as initial authenticator content, satisfying part (b) of this control.
		IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management:	A conformant TOE will validate certificate

			PKI-Based Authentication	responses, satisfying part (a) of this control.
FIA_X509_EXT.5	<u>X509 Certificate Enrollment</u>	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate certificate request messages that can be used to establish initial authenticator content, satisfying part (b) of this control.
		IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: PKI-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE will validate certificate responses, satisfying part (a) of this control.
FMT_SMF_EXT.3	<u>Current Administrator</u>	AC-6(7)	Least Privilege: Review of User Privileges	A conformant TOE will provide the ability to enumerate the administrators of the TOE and the privileges assigned to them.
FPT_AEX_EXT.5	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)</u>	SI-16	Memory Protection	A conformant TOE will provide ASLR and for the base address of any user-space memory to consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits that addresses the control's broader requirement for memory protection.
FPT_AEX_EXT.6	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)</u>	SI-16	Memory Protection	A conformant TOE will have the ability to enforce read, write and execute permissions on every page of physical memory that addresses the control's broader requirement for memory protection.
FPT_AEX_EXT.7	<u>Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)</u>	N/A	N/A	There is no control that specifically relates to buffer overflow.
FPT_BBD_EXT.1	<u>Application Processor Mediation</u>	SC-3(1)	Security Function Isolation:	A conformant TOE will separate baseband processor code from

			Hardware Separation	accessing application processor resources.
FPT_BLT_EXT.1	<u>Limitation of Bluetooth Profile Support</u>	IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a method to limit the devices that are permitted to be authenticated over the Bluetooth interface.
FPT_NOT_EXT.2	<u>Self-Test Notification</u>	IA-3(4)	Device Identification and Authentication: Device Attestation	A conformant TOE will provide software integrity verification values as a method of device attestation.
FPT_TST_EXT.2(2)	<u>TSF Integrity Checking</u>	SI-7	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of the TOE's software components that can be considered a subset of the actions available for selection and assignment in the SFR.
		SI-7(1)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Integrity Checks	A conformant TOE has the ability to verify the integrity of executable code prior to execution.
		SI-7(6)	Software, Firmware and Information Integrity: Cryptographically-Validated Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to implement cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized change.
FPT_TUD_EXT.4	<u>Trusted Update Verification</u>	CM-5(3)	Access Restrictions for Change: Signed Components	A conformant TOE will require an X.509v3 certificate in order to permit the installation of mobile applications.
FTA_TAB.1	<u>Default TOE Access Banners</u>	AC-8	System Use Notification	The TOE displays an advisory warning to the user prior to authentication.

FTP_BLT_EXT.1	<u>Bluetooth Encryption</u>	SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE will support this control by providing a protected communication channel over the Bluetooth interface.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The protected communications implemented by the TOE use cryptographic methods to secure data in transit.
FTP_BLT_EXT.2	<u>Bluetooth Encryption</u>	SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE will support this control by providing a protected communication channel over the Bluetooth interface.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection	The protected communications implemented by the TOE use cryptographic methods to secure data in transit.