


**National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme**



Validation Report

Apple iPadOS 14: iPads

Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11147-2021

Dated: September 1, 2021

Version: 1.0

**National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 2089**

**National Security Agency
ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Validation Team

Patrick W Mallett, Ph.D.
Jerome F. Myers, Ph.D.
J David Thompson
DeRon Graves
The Aerospace Corporation

Common Criteria Testing Laboratory

Trang Huynh
King Ables
Randy Baker
Quentin Gouchet
Stephan Mueller
atsec information security corporation, Austin TX

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

- 1. Executive Summary1**
- 2. Identification.....2**
- 3. Architectural Information4**
 - TOE Evaluated Configuration5
 - Physical Scope of the TOE.....7
 - Un-evaluated Functionality7
- 4. Security Policy8**
 - Security Audit8
 - Cryptographic Support8
 - User Data Protection.....10
 - Identification and Authentication10
 - Security Management11
 - Protection of the TSF.....11
 - TOE Access.....11
 - Trusted Path/Channels.....11
- 5. Assumptions.....12**
 - Clarification of Scope12
- 6. Documentation13**
- 7. IT Product Testing.....15**
 - Developer Testing15
 - Evaluation Team Independent Testing.....16
- 8. Evaluated Configuration17**
- 9. Results of the Evaluation18**
 - Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)18
 - Evaluation of the Development Documentation (ADV).....18
 - Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)19
 - Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC).....19
 - Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).....19

Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN).....	20
Summary of Evaluation Results	21
10. Validator Comments/Recommendations.....	21
11. Annexes.....	21
12. Security Target	21
13. Glossary	21
14. Bibliography.....	23

1. Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Apple iPadOS 14: iPads provided by Apple Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) atsec information security corporation in Austin, TX, United States of America, and was completed in September 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by the CCTL, atsec information security corporation. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria (CC) Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements given in:

- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 28 February 2020
 - Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, dated 16 June 2017
 - PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, dated 25 April 2019
 - The PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, dated 5 October 2017
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 8 February 2016.

The TOE is Apple iPadOS 14: iPads executing on the following platforms:

- iPad mini 7.9-inch (5th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad Air (4th gen) (A14 Bionic processor)
- iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen) (A9 processor)
- iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen) (A10 Fusion procession)
- iPad Pro 9.7-inch (A9X processor)
- iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen) (A10 Fusion processor)
- iPad 10.2-inch (8th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 10.5-inch (A10X Fusion processor)

- iPad Pro 11-inch (A12X Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen) (12Z Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (A9X processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen) (A10X Fusion processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen) (A12X Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)

The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the “Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5)” (CEM) for conformance to the “Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5)” (CC) and the Assurance Activities (AA) of the aforementioned PP-Configuration, Protection Profile, PP Modules, and Extended Packages. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, reviewed testing activities, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). The validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target, Version 1.5.

2. Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List.

The following table provides information needed to completely identify the product, including the following.

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): The fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
- The ST: Describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product
- The conformance results of the evaluation
- The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	<p>Apple iPadOS 14: iPads executing on the following platforms:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • iPad mini 7.9-inch (5th gen) (A12 Bionic processor) • iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen) (A12 Bionic processor) • iPad Air (4th gen) (A14 Bionic processor) • iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen) (A9 processor) • iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen) (A10 Fusion procession) • iPad Pro 9.7-inch (A9X processor) • iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen) (A10 Fusion processor) • iPad 10.2-inch (8th gen) (A12 Bionic processor) • iPad Pro 10.5-inch (A10X Fusion processor) • iPad Pro 11-inch (A12X Bionic processor) • iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen) (12Z Bionic processor) • iPad Pro 12.9-inch (A9X processor) • iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen) (A10X Fusion processor) • iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen) (A12X Bionic processor) • iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)
PP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 28 February 2020 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, dated 16 June 2017 ○ PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, dated 25 April 2019 ○ The PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, dated 5 October 2017

Item	Identifier
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients Version 1.0, dated 8 February 2016.
ST	Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target (ST), Version 1.5 dated 2021-08-31.
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report for a Target of Evaluation Apple iPadOS 14: iPads, Version 1.0, dated 2021-08-27
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor	Apple Inc.
Developer	Apple Inc.
CCTL	atsec information security corporation, Austin, TX
CCEVS Validators	Patrick W Mallett, Jerome F. Myers, J David Thompson, DeRon Graves

3. Architectural Information

Note that the following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.

The implementation of TOE architecture can be viewed as a set of layers. Lower layers contain fundamental services and technologies. Higher-level layers build upon the lower layers and provide more sophisticated services and technologies.

These individual layers provide the following services.

The **Cocoa Touch layer** contains key frameworks for building apps. These frameworks define the appearance of apps. They also provide the basic app infrastructure and support for key technologies such as multitasking, touch-based input, push notifications, and many high-level system services.

The **Media layer** contains the graphics, audio, and video technologies you use to implement multimedia experiences in apps.

The **Core Services layer** contains fundamental system services for apps. Key among these services are the Core Foundation and Foundation frameworks, which define the basic types that all apps use. This layer also contains individual technologies to support features such as location, iCloud, social media, and networking.

This layer also implements data protection functions that allow apps that work with sensitive user data to take advantage of the built-in encryption available on some devices. When an app designates a specific file as protected, the system stores that file in an encrypted format. While the device is locked, the contents of the file are inaccessible to both the app and to any potential intruders. However, when the device is unlocked by the user, a decryption key is created to allow the app to access the file. Other levels of data protection are also available.

The **Core OS layer** contains the low-level features that most other technologies are built upon. Even if an app does not use these technologies directly, they are most likely being used by other frameworks. And in situations where an app needs to explicitly deal with security or communicating with an external hardware accessory, it does so by using the frameworks in this layer.

Security related frameworks provided by this layer are as follows.

- the Generic Security Services Framework, providing services as specified in Request for Comment (RFC) 2743 (Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1) and RFC 4401 (Pseudo Random Function);
- the Local Authentication Framework;
- the Network Extension Framework, providing support for configuring and controlling VPN tunnels;
- the Security Framework, providing services to manage and store certificates, public and private keys, and trust policies (this framework also provides the Common Crypto library for symmetric encryption and hash-based message authentication codes); and
- the System Framework, providing the kernel environment, drivers, and low-level UNIX interfaces (the kernel manages the virtual memory system, threads, file system, network, and inter-process communication and is therefore responsible for separating apps from each other and controlling the use of low-level resources).

The TOE is managed by an MDM solution that enables an enterprise to control and administer the TOE instances that are enrolled in the MDM solution.

TOE Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the following hardware and software, when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in Section 6. The evaluation covers the following Apple iPads running iPadOS 14 operating system as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Devices covered by the evaluation

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
A9	iPad 9.7-inch (5 th gen)	A1822
		A1823
A9X	iPad Pro 9.7-inch	A1673
		A1674
		A1675
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch	A1584
		A1652
A10 Fusion	iPad 9.7-inch (6 th gen)	A1893
		A1954

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
	iPad 10.2-inch (7 th gen)	A2198
		A2199
		A2200
		A2197
A10X Fusion	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2 nd gen)	A1670
		A1671
		A1821
	iPad Pro 10.5-inch	A1701
		A1709
		A1852
A12 Bionic	iPad mini 7.9-inch (5 th gen)	A2125
		A2133
		A2124
		A2126
	iPad Air 10.5-inch (3 rd gen)	A2152
		A2154
		A2123
		A2153
	iPad 10.2-inch (8 th gen)	A2270
		A2428
		A2429
		A2430
A12X Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch	A1934
		A1979
		A1980
		A2013
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3 rd gen)	A2014
		A1876
		A1895
		A1983
A12Z Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch (2 nd gen)	A2068
		A2228
		A2230

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4 th gen)	A2231
		A2069
		A2229
		A2232
		A2233
A14 Bionic	iPad Air (4 th gen)	A2316
		A2324
		A2072
		A2325

Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a Mobile Device which consists of a hardware platform and its system software. It provides wireless connectivity and includes software for VPN connections to access the protected enterprise network and other Mobile Devices.

The TOE provides secured communication channels between itself and other trusted IT products using IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, IPsec, and Bluetooth. Via the established network connection, the TOE can communicate with an MDM server allowing administrative control of the TOE.

Un-evaluated Functionality

The following functionality is excluded from the scope of the evaluation:

- **Two-Factor Authentication**

Two-factor authentication is an extra layer of security for an Apple ID used in the Apple store, iCloud and other Apple services.

- **Bonjour**

Bonjour is Apple's standards-based, zero configuration network protocol that lets devices find services on a network.

- **VPN Split Tunnel**

VPN split tunnel is not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the Mobile Device configurations to meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

- **Siri Interface**

The Siri interface is capable of supporting commands related to configuration settings.

- **Third-party MDM Agents**

Third-party applications are available that provide functionality as a Mobile Device MDM Agent. No third-party MDM Agent applications were included in the evaluation and are outside the scope of the evaluated configuration.

- **VPN Protocols and Authentication Methods**

The following Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols are not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the Mobile Device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

- Cisco IPsec
- Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) over IPsec
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN
- Shared secret authentication

4. Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE including the following.

1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security Management
6. Protection of the TSF (TOE Security Functionality)
7. TOE access
8. Trusted Path/Channels
9. Objective Requirements

Security Audit

The TOE provides the ability for responses to be sent from the MDM Device Agent to the MDM Server. These responses are configurable by the organization as per the Over-the-Air Profile Delivery and Configuration document.

Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data-at rest, secure communication channels and for use by applications. In addition, the TOE implements several cryptographic protocols that can be used to establish a trusted channel to other IT entities.

As noted in the Security Target, section 1.5.2.1 the TOE provides cryptographic services via the following cryptographic modules.

- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software] (User Space)

- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] (Kernel Space)
- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware]

The **Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software]** is a dynamically loadable library that resides within the TOE OS user space. The library is loaded into an app running in user space to provide cryptographic functions.

The functions listed below are used to implement the security protocols supported and the encryption of data-at-rest.

- Random number generation
- Data encryption and decryption
- Signature generation/verification
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key derivation (PBKDF2)
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

The **Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software]** is a TOE OS kernel extension (KEXT) optimized for library use within the TOE OS kernel. Once the module is loaded into the kernel, its cryptographic functions are made available to TOE OS Kernel services only.

The functions listed below are used to implement the security protocols supported as well as for the encryption of data-at-rest.

- Random number generation
- Data encryption/decryption
- Signature generation/verification
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

The **Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware]** is a single-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module (System on a Chip (SoC)/System-in-Package (SiP)) running on a multi-chip device and provides services intended to protect data in transit and at rest.

The cryptographic services provided by the module are:

- Random number generation

- Data encryption/decryption
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

User Data Protection

User data in files is protected using cryptographic functions, ensuring this data remains protected even if the device gets lost or is stolen. Critical data (like passcodes used by apps or application-defined cryptographic keys) can be stored in the key chain, which provides additional protection. Passcode protection and encryption ensure that data-at-rest remains protected even in the case of the device being lost or stolen.

The Secure Enclave Processor (SEP), a separate CPU that executes a stand-alone operating system and has separate memory, provides protection for critical security data such as keys.

Data is protected such that only the app that owns the data can access it.

Identification and Authentication

Except for making answering calls, emergency calls, accessing Medical ID information, using the cameras (unless their use is generally disallowed), using the flashlight, using the control center, and using the notification center, users need to authenticate using a passcode or a biometric (fingerprint or face). The user is required to use the passcode authentication mechanism under the following conditions.

- Turn on or restart the device
- Press the Home button or swipe up to unlock your device (configurable)
- Update software
- Erase the device
- View or change passcode settings
- Install iPadOS Configuration Profiles

The passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode policies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the frequency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed attempts of entering the passcode.

The TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity and the user is required to either enter his passcode or use biometric authentication (fingerprint or face) to unlock the TOE.

External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPsec) can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.

Security Management

Security functions can be managed either by the user or by an authorized administrator through a Mobile Device Management system. Table 5 of the Security Target identifies the functions that can be managed and if the management function can be performed by the user, the authorized administrator or both.

Protection of the TSF

Some of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are as follows:

- Protection of cryptographic keys
- Use of memory protection and processor states to separate applications and protect the TSF from unauthorized access to TSF resources
- Digital signature protection of the TSF image
- Software/firmware integrity self-test upon start-up
- Digital signature verification for applications
- Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked

TOE Access

The TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request and after an administrator-configurable time of inactivity.

Access to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by user/administrator defined policy.

Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product.

- IEEE 802.11-2012
- IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)
- IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6)
- IEEE 802.1X
- EAP-TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)
- TLS (1.2)
- IPsec

- Bluetooth (4.0, 4.2, 5.0)

5. Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the associated PP-Configuration:

- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 28 February 2020
 - Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, dated 16 June 2017
 - PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, dated 25 April 2019
 - The PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, dated 5 October 2017
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 8 February 2016

That information has not been reproduced here and the respective documents should be consulted if there is interest in that material. Additionally, the Security Problem Description has been presented in the Security Target.

Clarification of Scope

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in ST and the associated PP-Configuration.

Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the device needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.

Note: As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V3.0, MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0) performed by the evaluation team.

Specific exclusions from this evaluation are described in the subsection Un-evaluated Functionality in Section 3.

6. Documentation

The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the TOE.

Reference	Document Name	Location
Mobile Device Administrator Guidance		
[CCGUIDE]	Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide	https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11147-agd.pdf
[DEV_MAN] (2021)	Device Management	https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement
Mobile Device User Guidance		
[iPad_UG]	iPad User Guide (online)	https://support.apple.com/guide/ipad/welcome/ipados
[PASSCODE-Help] (March 18, 2021)	Use a passcode with your iPhone, iPad or iPod touch	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204060 International: https://support.apple.com/HT204060
[BLUETOOTH_HELP] (September 24, 2019)	Pair a third-party Bluetooth accessory with your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204091 International: https://support.apple.com/HT204091
Mobile Device Management		
[AConfig]	Apple Configurator 2 User Guide (online)	https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-configurator-2/welcome/mac
[ABM_Guide] (October 8, 2020)	Apple Business Manager User Guide	https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-business-manager/welcome/web
[PM_Help] (2021)	Profile Manager User Guide	https://support.apple.com/guide/profile-manager/welcome/mac
Supporting Documents		

Reference	Document Name	Location
[DeployRef]	Deployment Reference for iPhone and iPad	https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment-reference-ios/welcome/web
[LOGGING]	Logging	https://developer.apple.com/documentation/os/logging?language=objc
[PROFS_LOGS]	Profiles and Logs (iOS info applies to iPadOS)	https://developer.apple.com/bug-reporting/profiles-and-logs/?platforms=ios
[MDM_SETTINGS]	Mobile Device Management Settings	https://support.apple.com/guide/mdm/welcome/web
[TRUST_STORE]	List of available trusted root certificates in iOS 14, iPadOS 14, macOS 11, watchOS 7, and tvOS 14	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212140 International: https://support.apple.com/HT212140
[MANAGE_CARDS] (April 12, 2021)	Manage the cards that you use with Apple Pay	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205583 International: https://support.apple.com/HT205583
[PAY_SETUP] (January 15, 2021)	Set up Apple Pay	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204506 International: https://support.apple.com/HT204506
[OTAConfig] (April 9, 2018)	Over-the-Air Profile Delivery and Configuration	https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/iPhoneOTAConfiguration/Introduction/Introduction.html
[CONTENT-CACHING]	Set up content caching on Mac	https://support.apple.com/en-euro/guide/mac-help/mchl3b6c3720/10.15/mac/10.15

Reference	Document Name	Location
[APFS_DOC]	File system formats available in Disk Utility on Mac	https://support.apple.com/en-euro/guide/disk-utility/dsku19ed921c/20.0/mac/1.0
App Developer Guidance		
[CKTSREF] (2021)	Certificate, Key, and Trust Services	https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate_key_and_trust_services
[KEYCHAINPG] (2021)	Keychain Services (Programming Guide)	https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services
[AP_SEC]	Apple Platform Security	https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf
[APFS_DEV_DOC] (2021)	About Apple File System	https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/file_system/about_apple_file_system
[HTTPSTN2232]	Technical Note TN2232 HTTPS Server Trust Evaluation	https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2232/index.html

Only the Administrator Guide listed above, and the specific sections of the other documents referenced by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this product in its evaluated configuration.

7. IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. The specific test configurations and test tools utilized may be found in the Assurance Activity Report (AAR) in Section 2.2.

Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The ST lists more devices compared to the subset of devices used for testing. The tests were performed on the Mobile Devices listed above which were selected, by choosing one from within each device family.

One device family is defined by the hardware that impacts the TSF operation: the CPU. The other hardware, such as form factor, size of non-volatile storage, presence or absence of modem devices such as GSM, CDMA or LTE do not affect the TSF. All TSF functions are solely implemented in software which uses the process isolation and memory separation capabilities offered by the CPU. The software of the TOE is compiled once to form one set of binaries which run on all devices and therefore on all CPUs equally.

In addition, the security functions specified in the ST are all implemented above the hardware layer. Once a request is processed by the hardware, the security relevant decisions have been already made by the software. The hardware now only needs to enforce the functionality requested by the software. Based on this consideration, the evaluation team used the hardware information provided by the developer which lists all devices found in the ST and references the CPUs used by those devices. All devices listed in the ST use one of the following CPUs:

- A9
- A9X
- A10 Fusion
- A10X Fusion
- A12 Bionic
- A12X Bionic
- A12Z Bionic
- A13 Bionic
- A14 Bionic

The test system was set up according to a setup strategy that followed the evaluated configuration requirements specified in the guidance, supplemented by configurations required to perform testing.

The testing was performed by setting up a Linux server that operated as a:

- WLAN access point,
- VPN endpoint,
- VPN Gateway with the Strongswan IKE daemon and the Linux kernel IPsec support
- Web server with TLS support,
- Key generator, and

- Bluetooth endpoint.

The Linux system was equipped with the appropriate tools to perform sniffing of the different traffic types and analyzing the traffic, e.g., wireshark, tcpdump, bluez-hcidump.

Apple Configurator 2 was used to create the configuration profiles/policies and deploy the profiles/policies onto the different test systems. An Apple system hosting the Apple Profile Manager software component acted as the MDM server to which the test devices connected.

The TOE is part of a Commercial Off the Shelf System (COTS) and is distributed either as already installed software on a device via retail channels, or via download from Apple using a proprietary protocol. The TOE is installed and configured precisely as specified in [CCGUIDE] and verified to be in the evaluated configuration at the start of each test.

The TOE is connected to a private WLAN network which hosts also a Linux system as well as a macOS server (a macOS server is formed by using the macOS operating system and installing the macOS Server software on top of it that can be obtained from the Apple App store).

The Linux server provides:

- WLAN access point functionality,
- an uplink to the Internet (Internet access is required for the TOE to be initialized as well as for the Apple Push Notification Service (APNS) upon which the communication between the MDM server and the TOE rests),
- the hosting of network sniffer tools required for testing, and
- a VPN Gateway with the Strongswan IKE daemon and the Linux kernel IPsec support.

The macOS server provides:

- the MDM server (by using the Apple Profile Manager product part of the macOS Server software published by Apple), and
- the Apple Configurator 2 application.

8. Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the following hardware and software, when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 6.

- Apple device with CPU A9: iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A9X: iPad Pro 9.7-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch,
- Apple device with CPU A10 Fusion: iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen), iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A10X Fusion: iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 10.5-inch
- Apple device with CPU A12 Bionic: iPad mini 7.9-inch (5th gen), iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen), iPad 10.2-inch (8th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A12X Bionic: iPad Pro 11-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen)
- Apple device with CPU A12Z Bionic: iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4rd gen)

- Apple device with CPU A14 Bionic: iPad Air (4th gen)

The guidance documentation provides specific instructions for creating Configuration Profiles that configure the TOE to comply with the functions defined in the Security Target.

9. Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR.

All work units defined by CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5 and the CFG_MDF-MDM_AGENT-VPNC_V1.0, PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 received a pass verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements as well as assurance activities. The evaluation was conducted based upon CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined the TOE to be CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 extended, and to meet the assurance requirements defined by the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0.

Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit and the assurance activity specified in the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The ST evaluation ensured that the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Apple iPadOS 14 iPad product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Evaluation of the Development Documentation (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target and guidance documents.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. Both the administrator and user guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the developer procedures to protect the TOE and the TOE documentation during TOE development and maintenance to reduce the risk of the introduction of TOE exploitable vulnerabilities during TOE development and maintenance. The ALC evaluation also ensured the TOE is identified such that the consumer can identify the evaluated TOE.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The evaluation team ensured that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation and demonstrated that the TOE enforces the TOE security functional requirements. The evaluation team performed devised an independent set of tests as mandated by the protection profile.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The vendor provided security updates to the TOE during the evaluation, therefore, while the tested version of the TOE did contain vulnerabilities, subsequent security updates, in line with the guidance provided in Scheme Policy Letter 15, fixed all known issues. The evaluation team ensured that the currently available version of the TOE does not contain known exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based upon the evaluation team's vulnerability analysis, and the evaluation team's performance of penetration tests.

The evaluators searched for publicly known vulnerabilities applicable to iPadOS using the following sources. The search was performed on multiple occasions 2021-01-20 and 2021-02-19, and again on 2021-03-25, 2021-04-27, 2021-05-04, 2021-05-24, 2021-07-12, and 2021-08-30.

Apple security content disclosure statements for releases of iPadOS 14 related to this evaluation

- MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List
- NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

using the following search terms:

- ipados ipad
- ipados core tls
- ipados core crypto
- ipados common crypto
- ipados http
- ipados https
- ipados tcp
- ipados ip
- ipados bluetooth
- ipados ipsec
- ipados vpn
- ipados mdm
- ipados mobile
- ipados touchid
- ipados faceid
- broadcom wi-fi

The evaluator's CVE search found no vulnerabilities apart from the ones listed in the developer's security content disclosure statements, all of which have been fixed in subsequent releases of iPadOS.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1,

MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's performance of the testing defined by the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and the penetration test also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validator's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and the PP_MD_V3.1, MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0, and MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.1, and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10. Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.0 document. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

11. Annexes

Not applicable.

12. Security Target

Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target (ST) Version 1.5, dated 2021-08-31.

13. Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document.

AA Assurance Activity

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ARM	Advanced RISC Machine
CC	Common Criteria
CCEVS	Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CDMA	Code Division Multiple Access
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory—An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
CEM	Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology
CPU	Central Processing Unit
Conformance	The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
EAP-TLS	Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security
EC	Elliptic Curve
EP	Extended Package (for a Protection Profile)
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
Evaluation	The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence	Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
HKDF	HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
HMAC	Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
LTE	Long-Term Evolution
MDM	Mobile Device Management
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NSA	National Security Agency
NVLAP	National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
PBKDF	Password Based Key Derivation Function
PP	Protection Profile
REK	Root Encryption Key
RFC	Request For Comments

SEP	Secure Enclave Processor
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation—A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
Validation	The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
Validation Body	A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VR	Validation Report
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network

14. Bibliography

The evaluation team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.0, 28 February 2020.
- Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017.
- PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019.
- PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.1, 05 October 2017.
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Client, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016.
- Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.0, 2021-05-25.

- Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target Version 1.5, 2021-08-31
- Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.2, 2021-08-31