



***Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise and TCG Opal
SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Common Criteria
Configuration Guide***

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Introduction

This Seagate Common Criteria (CC) configuration guide provides the information necessary to configure a Seagate CC certified SED or FIPS SED drive for Common Criteria mode. Seagate SED drives communicate with a host system using the standard protocol defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) or by using ATA security mode commands. TCG stands for Trusted Computing Group and is an organization sponsored and operated by companies in the computer, storage and digital communications industry.

In addition to device setup and configuration, there are Operational Environment requirements that must be met for a Seagate CC certified SED or FIPS SED drive (storage device) to be used in Common Criteria mode.

Operational Environment

The following Operational Environment requirements must be met for a Seagate CC certified SED or FIPS SED drive (storage device) to be used in Common Criteria mode.

Authorized administrators and users must ensure that the communication channel between the host and the storage device is sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure. For example, extremely long unprotected interface cables from the host to the device are not permitted.

An authorized administrator must ensure that a newly provisioned or initialized storage device is free of protected data in areas not targeted for encryption.

An authorized administrator must be responsible for ensuring that the allowed passphrase authorization factors configuration conforms to the local storage device environment requirements.

Administrators must ensure that guidance is given to users regarding the amount of time it takes for the storage device volatile memory to clear after entering the Compliant power saving state (power off in this case) so memory remnant attacks are infeasible.

Authorized administrators must ensure that authorized users are trained in the proper storage of external tokens that contain authorization factors and that they will be used for no other purpose than to store the external token authorization factor.

Authorized administrators and users must ensure that the storage device is used in a secure physical computing space such that an adversary is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the storage device itself.

Authorized administrators must ensure that authorized users are properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the storage device and the proper use of authorization factors.

Setup and Configuration

General Setup & Configuration

Seagate CC certified SED and FIPS SED drives need to be configured to run in Common Criteria CC mode. It is the case that anyone that buys SED drives has TCG or ATA infrastructure in place to set up, control and communicate with the drives in a secure manner. The examples provided in this Configuration Guide work with internal Seagate TCG and ATA mode libraries. Customers should treat these examples as pseudocode. They will have to be modified to work with any customer specific TCG / ATA libraries.

TCG Enterprise Setup & Configuration

The following are the security rules for the initialization and operation of a CC certified Seagate SED or FIPS SED TCG Enterprise drive in a CC compliant manner. For the purposes of this document CC mode and FIPS 140-2 mode are equivalent. The minimum pin length requirement for FIPS 140-2 is 4 bytes. Some CC environments may require the use of full 32 byte PIN values. Seagate supports this and it can be enforced by setting the minimum PIN length value `'_MinPINLength'` to 32. The `'_MinPINLength'` is not part of the TCG specification. There is a `'_MinPINLength'` value associated with each credential and they must be set independently. At the end of these steps, the SED will be in the CC Approved Mode of operation. This can be verified with Show Status service. If the SED drive is a FIPS SED drive, the FIPS/CC mode bit will be set.

NOTE: The Firmware Download Port is a non-standard TCG port that has been added by Seagate to control access to the firmware download function and to prevent unauthorized firmware updates. All Seagate drives ship with the Firmware Download port in the default unlocked state, which allows firmware updates. The Firmware Download port is set to the locked state and set to lock on reset as part of FIPS/CC configuration.

Steps:

1. **Transition to TCG Enterprise security operating mode by authenticating the Locking SP as BandMaster 0, BandMaster 1 or EraseMaster. For this example we will use BandMaster 1**

Commands to authenticate to BandMaster1

```
b1 = locking_sp.get_lba_band("Band1")           # get band 1 object
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)           # locking sp - open session - enable
                                              writes
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(b1)         # authenticate to BandMaster1
locking_sp.end_session()                     # locking sp - end session
```

2. **Set drive owner SID credential to private value of 32 bytes in length.**

Commands to set Drive Owner (SID) credential

```
sid=admin_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "SID")   # get SID object
admin_sp.open_session(write=True)            # admin sp - open session - enable
                                              writes
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID", credential=iv.raw_msid.tostring())
sid.call_set(("PIN", "WWWWRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
                                              # set new SID PIN value
admin_sp.end_session()                      # admin sp - end session
```

3. **Set EraseMaster credential to private value of 32 bytes in length**

Commands to EraseMaster credential

```
em=locking_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "EraseMaster")
                                              # get Erase Master object
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)         # locking sp - open session - enable
                                              writes
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(em)        # authenticate to Erase Master (EM)
em.call_set(("PIN", "XXXXRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
                                              # set new EM PIN value
locking_sp.end_session()                   # locking sp - end session
```

4. **Set BandMaster(s) credential(s) to private value(s) of 32 bytes in length. We will use BandMaster0 in this example.**

Commands to set BandMaster0 credential

```
cred = locking_sp.get_linked_credential("BandMaster0")
                                              # get credential obj for authority
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)         # locking sp - open session - enable
                                              writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate("BandMaster0") # authenticate to BandMaster1
```

```
cred.do_set_value("DEADBEEES11112222DEADBEEES33334444")
# set new credential value
locking_sp.end_session()
# locking sp - end session
```

5. Optionally set BandMaster1 PIN length to 32 bytes (Needs to be done for each credential)

Commands to set BandMaster1 credential

```
cred = locking_sp.get_linked_credential("BandMaster1")
# get credential obj for authority
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)
# locking sp - open session - enable
# writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate("BandMaster1")
# authenticate to BandMaster1
cred.call_set(("_MinPINLength", 32))
# set minimum pin length to 32 bytes
locking_sp.end_session()
# locking sp - end session
```

6. Set BandMaster(s) credential(s) to private value(s) of 32 bytes in length. We will use BandMaster1 in this example.

Commands to set BandMaster1 credential

```
cred = locking_sp.get_linked_credential("BandMaster1")
# get credential obj for authority
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)
# locking sp - open session - enable
# writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate("BandMaster1")
# authenticate to BandMaster1
cred.do_set_value("DEADBEEF11112222DEADBEEF33334444")
# set new credential value
locking_sp.end_session()
# locking sp - end session
```

7. Set BandMaster1 band range and enable lock on reset

Commands Set BandMaster1 band range and enable lock on reset

```
cred = locking_sp.get_linked_credential("BandMaster1")
# get credential obj for authority
locking_session = locking_sp.open_session(write=True)
# locking sp - open session – enable
# writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate("BandMaster1",
credential="DEADBEEF11112222DEADBEEF33334444")
# authenticate
band1 = locking_sp.get_lba_band("Band1")
band1.do_set_band_range(rangestart=0, rangelength=400)
band1.do_set_lock_state(state=0)
band1.do_set_lock_enabled_state(state=1)
# Set lock enabled to True for Band1
locking_sp.end_session()
# locking sp - end session
```

8. Disable the Makers authority

Commands to disable makers authority

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
                                   writes
makers_auth = admin_sp.get_authority("Makers") # get makers authority
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="WWWWRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
makers_auth.do_set_enabled_field(enabled=False) # disable makers authority
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

9. Set firmware download port to lock on reset

Commands to set firmware download port to lock on reset

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
                                   writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload") # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="WWWWRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
port.call_set(("LockOnReset", [0])) # set firmware download port to lock
                                     on reset
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

10. Lock firmware download port

Commands to lock firmware download port

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
                                   writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload") # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="WWWWRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
port.call_set(("PortLocked", 1)) # lock firmware download port
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

11. Power cycle the device.

TCG Opal Setup & Configuration

The following are the security rules for the initialization and operation of a CC certified Seagate SED or FIPS SED TCG Opal drive in a CC compliant manner. For the purposes of this document CC mode and FIPS 140-2 mode are equivalent. The minimum pin length requirement for FIPS 140-2 is 4 bytes. Some CC environments may require the use of full 32 byte PIN values. Seagate supports this and it can be enforced by setting the minimum PIN length value

'_MinPINLength' to 32. The '_MinPINLength' is not part of the TCG specification. There is a '_MinPINLength' value associated with each credential and they must be set independently. At the end of these steps, the SED will be in the CC Approved Mode of operation. This can be verified with Show Status service. If the SED drive is a FIPS SED drive, the FIPS/CC mode bit will be set.

Steps:

1. **Transition to TCG Opal security operating mode by executing the activate method of the Locking SP.**

Commands to run the Locking SP activate method

```
admin_sp.do_session_activate_locking() # run Locking SP activate method
```

2. **Set drive owner SID credential to private value of 32 bytes in length.**

Commands to set Drive Owner (SID) credential

```
sid=admin_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "SID") # get SID object
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
# writes
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID") # authenticate to SID
sid.call_set(("PIN", "321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
# set new SID PIN value
sid.call_set(("_MinPINLength", 32)) # set minimum pin length to 32 bytes
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

3. **Optionally set User1 PIN length to 32 bytes (Needs to be done for each credential)**

Commands to set User 1 credential minimum pin length to 32 bytes

```
u1=locking_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "User1") # get User1 object
locking_sp.open_session(write=True) # locking sp - open session - enable
# writes
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(u1) # authenticate to User1
u1.call_set(("_MinPINLength", 32)) # set minimum pin length to 32 bytes
locking_sp.end_session() # locking sp - end session
```

4. **Set User credentials to private value(s) of 32 bytes in length. We will use User1 in this example.**

Commands to set User1 credential

```
u1=locking_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "User1") # get User1 object
locking_sp.open_session(write=True) # locking sp - open session - enable
# writes
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(u1) # authenticate to User1
u1.call_set(("PIN", "321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
# set new U1 PIN value
locking_sp.end_session() # locking sp - end session
```

5. **Set Admin1 credential to private value of 32 bytes in length**

Commands to set Admin1 credential

```
am=locking_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "Admin1") # get Admin1 object
locking_sp.open_session(write=True) # locking sp - open session - enable
writes
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(am) # authenticate to Admin1
am.call_set(("_MinPINLength", 32)) # set minimum pin length to 32 bytes
am.call_set(("PIN", "321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
# set new Admin1 PIN value
locking_sp.end_session() # locking sp - end session
```

6. **Set Locking Range credentials to private value(s) of 32 bytes in length. We will use Locking Range 1 in this example.**

Commands to set Locking Range 1 credential

```
r1 = locking_sp.get_lba_band("Locking_Range1") # get Range 1 object
auth = locking_sp.get_minimum_authorities_to_access(r1, method_identifier="Set")
# get auth obj
auth = auth[0] # we want the first authority
cred = auth.linked_credential # get credential for authority
locking_sp.open_session(write=True) # locking sp - open session - enable
writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate(auth,
credential="321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
cred.call_set(("PIN", "321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210"))
locking_sp.end_session() # locking sp - end session
```

7. **Disable the Makers authority**

Commands to disable makers authority

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
writes
makers_auth = admin_sp.get_authority("Makers") # get makers authority
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
makers_auth.do_set_enabled_field(enabled=False) # disable makers authority
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

8. **Set firmware download port to lock on reset**

Commands to set firmware download port to lock on reset

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload") # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
port.call_set(("LockOnReset", [0])) # set firmware download port to lock
on reset
```

```
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

9. Lock firmware download port

Commands to lock firmware download port

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True) # admin sp - open session - enable
writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload") # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID",
credential="321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
port.call_set(("PortLocked", 1)) # lock firmware download port
admin_sp.end_session() # admin sp - end session
```

10. Set BandMaster1 band range and enable lock on reset

Commands Set BandMaster1 band range and enable lock on reset

```
cred = locking_sp.get_linked_credential("Admin1") # get credential obj for authority
locking_session = locking_sp.open_session(write=True) # locking sp - open session –
enable writes
locking_sp.call_authenticate("Admin1",
credential="321SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA9876543210")
band1 = locking_sp.get_lba_band("Locking_Range1")
band1.do_set_band_range(rangestart=0, rangelength=400)
band1.do_set_lock_state(state=0)
band1.do_set_lock_enabled_state(state=1) # Set lock enabled to True for Band1
locking_sp.end_session() # locking sp - end session
```

11. Power cycle the device.

TCG Opal Setting Try Limits

TCG Opal products allow the Try Limit to be set for some TCG Opal mode credentials. The following code is an example of how to set a new Try Limit value for the 'Admin1' credential. See the 'Validation - Try Limits and Persistence Settings' section below for the list of TCG Opal credentials where the Try Limit is settable.

Steps:

1. Transition to TCG Opal security operating mode by executing the activate method of the Locking SP.

Commands to set Drive Owner (SID) credential

```
u1=locking_sp.get_credential("C_PIN", "Admin1")
```

```
locking_sp.open_session(write=True)
locking_sp.do_batch_authenticate(u1)
u1.call_set(("TryLimit", 1024))          #1024 is the new try limit value
locking_sp.end_session()
```

ATA Mode Setup & Configuration

The following are the security rules for the initialization and operation of a CC certified Seagate SATA SED or FIPS SED drive in ATA mode in a CC compliant manner. For the purposes of this document CC mode and FIPS 140-2 mode are equivalent. The minimum pin length requirement for FIPS 140-2 is 4 bytes. Some CC environments may require the use of full 32 byte PIN values. Seagate supports this and it can be enforced by setting the minimum PIN length value ‘_MinPINLength’ to 32. The ‘_MinPINLength’ is not part of the TCG specification. There is a ‘_MinPINLength’ value associated with each credential and they must be set independently. At the end of these steps, the SED will be in the CC Approved Mode of operation. This can be verified with Show Status service. If the SED drive is a FIPS SED drive, the FIPS/CC mode bit will be set.

Steps:

1. **Transition to ATA security operating mode by setting User credential to private value of 32 bytes in length**

Command to set User credential and transition to ATA security operating mode
tper.security_set_password("VWXYZFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789")

any credential

2. **Set Master credential to private value of 32 bytes in length.**

Commands to set Master credential

```
tper.security_set_password("WXYZFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789",
set_user_password=False, master_password_identifier=0x1234)
```

master pwd id is arbitrary

3. **Power cycle the device.**

4. **Disable the Makers authority**

Commands to disable Makers authority

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True)
```

admin sp - open session - enable writes

```
makers_auth = admin_sp.get_authority("Makers")
```

get makers authority

```
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID", "VWXYZFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789")
```

auth to SID

```
makers_auth.do_set_enabled_field(enabled=False)
```

disable makers authority

```
admin_sp.end_session()
```

admin sp - end session

5. Set firmware download port to lock on reset

Commands to set firmware download port to lock on reset

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True)           # admin sp - open session - enable
                                             writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload")       # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID", "VWXYEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789")
                                             # auth to SID
port.call_set(("LockOnReset", [0]))        # set firmware download port to lock
                                             on reset
admin_sp.end_session()                     # admin sp - end session
```

6. Lock the firmware download port

Commands to lock firmware download port

```
admin_sp.open_session(write=True)           # admin sp - open session - enable
                                             writes
port=admin_sp.get_port("FWDownload")       # get port object
admin_sp.call_authenticate("SID", "VWXYEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789")
                                             # auth to SID
port.call_set(("PortLocked", 1))          # lock firmware download port
admin_sp.end_session()                     # admin sp - end session
```

7. Power cycle the device.

CC Operational Guidance

Cryptographic Symmetric Key Sizes and Key Generation

Seagate TCG Enterprise and TCG Opal HDD SED drives internally generate all AES keys necessary for the operation of the device. The size of the AES keys is not configurable. Intermediate AES keys are always 256 bits and the AES XTS data encryption key is always 512 bits in length. This also applies to TCG Enterprise SATA and TCG Opal SATA drives using the ATA security modes of operation.

Seagate TCG Enterprise SSD SED drives internally generate all AES keys necessary for the operation of the device. The size of the AES keys is not configurable. Intermediate AES keys are always 256 bits and the AES XTS data encryption key is always 512 bits in length.

Seagate TCG Opal Hybrid HDD SED drives internally generate all AES keys necessary for the operation of the device. The size of the AES keys is not configurable. Intermediate AES keys are always 256 bits and the AES XTS data encryption key is always 512 bits in length. This also applies to TCG Opal SATA HDD Hybrid SED drives when operating using the ATA security modes of operation.

Power Saving States and Timing of Power Saving States

The TOE supports a single Compliant power state of device full off (D3). The TOE SEDs have two possible transitions: power off to on; and on to off. Only the transition from on to off applies to this requirement. The device changes to off when the system removes power to the drive. This can happen immediately or when the user initiates a system shutdown request. After power is removed, it takes approximately 2 seconds for DRAM volatile memory and about 30 mS for SRAM volatile memory to completely power down.

Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)

All Seagate Self Encrypting Drives support only two power states power ON and power OFF. When an SED drive transitions from power ON to power OFF all cryptographic key material in volatile memory (DRAM and SRAM) is cleared automatically as the RAMs lose power. This applies equally to SED drives using TCG Enterprise, TCG Opal or ATA security modes of operation. It is not possible for a Seagate Self Encrypting Drive to end up in a non-compliant power saving state.

Cryptographic Key Destruction

Seagate TCG Enterprise SSD and TCG Opal Hybrid HDD SED drives implement a NAND flash wear leveling algorithm. A side effect of this algorithm is that when a key value is overwritten in the NAND system area the original block is unmapped. At this point the old key value is logically inaccessible but does persist physically in the unmapped block. The wear levelling algorithm will eventually recycle and remap the original block. During this process the contents of the original block will be erased to 0xFF and the original block will be mapped to a different logical address. In addition to the wear leveling algorithm Seagate SSD and Hybrid HDD drives also support a read/write encoding scheme such that a read to a unmapped physical block produces random results. With this method, the old key material is unavailable immediately after the block is unmapped.

Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

All Seagate Self Encrypting Drives use the SHA-2 256 hash algorithm. It is not configurable.

Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

All Seagate SED drives support multiple AES data encryption/decryption modes for different security functions. For each function the specific AES encryption/decryption mode is fixed and not configurable. The AES key sizes used for each function is also fixed to either 512 bits for AES XTS mode or 256 bits for all others.

Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

All Seagate SED drives automatically instantiate an 800-90A compliant DRB that is seeded with entropy from an 800-90B compliant entropy system. Neither the DRBG or the entropy system are configurable.

Validation - Try Limits and Persistence Settings

Seagate SED drives have a separate counter for each credential which keeps track of the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for each credential. The Try Limit sets an upper bound to this counter. This becomes the number of times the drive will accept an invalid password before shutting the drive down against further attacks.

The Persistence setting determines whether the count persists through a power cycle. If the counter does not persist through a power cycle, it will be reset to zero on power cycle and another round of authentication attempts can be made until the Try Limit is once again reached. If the count persists through a power cycle it is not reset to zero on power cycle and once the Try Limit is reached, the drive will lock out all further authentication attempts whether the drive is power cycled or not. Regardless of the Persistence setting, if a successful authentication is made at any time before the Try Limit is reached, the counter is reset to zero.

| Credential Name | Credential Type | Try Limit | Try Limit Settable | Persistent |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------------|------------|
| SID | ATA | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| PSID | ATA | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| ATA Master Password (BEV) | ATA | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| ATA User Password (BEV) | ATA | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| SID | TCG Enterprise (SAS) | 1024 retries | NO | YES |
| SID | TCG Enterprise (SATA) | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| PSID | TCG Enterprise | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| Band Masters 1-32 (BEV) | TCG Enterprise (SAS) | 1024 retries | NO | YES |
| Band Masters 1-32 (BEV) | TCG Enterprise (SATA) | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| Erase Master (BEV) | TCG Enterprise (SAS) | 1024 retries | NO | YES |
| Erase Master (BEV) | TCG Enterprise (SATA) | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| SID | TCG Opal | 5 retries | YES | NO |
| PSID | TCG Opal | 5 retries | NO | NO |
| Locking SP Admin 1-4 Passwords (BEV) | TCG Opal | 5 retries | YES | NO |
| Admin SP Admin 1-4 Passwords (BEV) | TCG Opal | 5 retries | YES | NO |
| User 1-16 Passwords (BEV) | TCG Opal | 5 retries | YES | NO |

Protection of Data on Disk & Specification of Management Functions

All Seagate Self Encrypting Drives (SED) Drives are manufactured and delivered with the encryption on and the drive unlocked. The initial value for SID and various other PINs is a 32-byte manufactured SID (MSID), public drive-unique value that is used as the default PIN. The drives also include a physical SID (PSID) public drive unique 32-byte value on the drive label. The drive must be “personalized” to change the initial value of the SID to private values. Once the administrator takes ownership of the drive the SID value is set to the administrator configured value. Names of Authentication PINs are tied to Enterprise and Opal SSC self encrypting drives. This applies to all user PINs (Admins and Users (Opal) and Bandmaster (Enterprise)). The PSIDs and MSIDs are never going to be a BEV.

An SED gets Authentication PIN from host Authorization Acquisition (AA) component, which could be whatever form or content the AA allows. The Seagate SEDs support Authentication PINs with length up to 32 bytes. This is the password that allows the SED drive to be accessible. All of the drives are open-access until this key and the locking settings are established.

Seagate SEDs support subdividing user storage using logical block addressing (LBA). The storage ranges are called bands and can be configured to support up to 32 user bands. Each band is secured with its own authentication key. User roles have identity-based authentication. For example, the Drive Owner has only one ID and one PIN. In TCG Security Mode, the SED can support up to 32 User operators. Each of these operators is assigned a unique ID to which a PIN is associated, thus this provides identity-based authentication.

After power is removed from drive or a user locks the band, the Password/ TCG Pin is no longer needed and is removed from volatile memory.

Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted for storage on / retrieval from the drive media, the data can be erased using cryptographic methods. The data is erased by zeroizing the Media Encryption Key (MEK).

TCG Enterprise, TCG Opal and ATA Enhanced Mode Security Mode Services

The following tables represent the CC Security services for each CC Approved Mode in terms of the Approved Security Functions and operator access control. Note the following:

- Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved mode.
- Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g., hashing as part of asymmetric key)
- Operator authentication is not represented in this table.
- Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs.
- Service input and output details are defined by the TCG and ATA standards.

- Unauthenticated services (e.g., Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs.
 - Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock services used by an authenticated operator; e.g., User data read / write.
 - If the Operator value contains “optional” then the access is dependent on the module setup.
-

Non-Security Mode Services

In the uninitialized state, the module supports the following services:

1. Services required to transition the SED to TCG Security or Enhanced ATA Security modes of operation.
2. Services related to firmware update.
3. Services related to unauthenticated encryption/decryption of user data.
4. Services related to cryptographic erase of user data.
5. Module reset.
6. Services related to status reporting.

All cryptographic algorithms used in TCG and ATA security operating modes are also available in the security uninitialized state.

Table 4.1 - ATA Enhanced Security Mode Authenticated Services

| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Set PIN | Change operator authentication data. Note: Setting the User PIN also sets the Drive Owner PIN. | Master*, User*, Drive Owner | PBKDF, Symmetric Key | ATA SECURITY SET PASSWORD, TCG Set Method |
| Lock / Unlock FW Download | Enable / Disable FW Download Service | Drive Owner* | None | TCG Set Method |
| Firmware Download | Load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code. | None** | Asymmetric Key | ATA DOWNLOAD MICROCODE |
| Unlock User Data | Enable user data read/write and Set PIN services. | User (optional. Master) | Symmetric Key (to unwrap MEK) | ATA SECURITY UNLOCK |
| User Data Read / Write | Encryption / decryption of user data. | None* | Symmetric Key | ATA Read / Write Commands |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Cryptographic Erase | Erase user data through cryptographic means: by zeroizing the encryption key and the User PIN. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state. | Master, User | RNG | ATA SECURITY ERASE PREPARE + ATA SECURITY ERASE UNIT |
| Sanitize | Disables ATA Security commands until POR | None* | DRBG | ATA CRYPTO SCRAMBLE |
| Exit CC Security Mode | Exit ATA Enhanced Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state. | User*(optional. Master*) | RNG, Hashing, Symmetric Key | ATA SECURITY ERASE PREPARE + SECURITY ERASE UNIT |

| Table 4.2 - ATA Enhanced Security Mode Unauthenticated Services | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
| Unblock PIN | Reset Master and User password attempt counter. | None | None | POR |
| Show Status | Reports if CM satisfies Security Rules (Section 7.1) | None | None | TCG Level 0 Discovery: CC Security Operating Mode Indicator (Byte 30, Bit 0) = 1 |
| Reset Module | Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP RAM storage. | None | None | POR |
| Disable Services | Disables ATA Security commands until POR | None* | None | ATA SECURITY FREEZE LOCK |
| Exit CC Security Mode | Exit ATA Enhanced Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state. | None (using PSID) | None | TCG AdminSP.RevertSP() |

*Security has to be Unlocked

**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

Table 4.3 - TCG Opal Security Mode Authenticated Services

| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Set PIN | Change operator authentication data. Note: Locking SP Admins can set PINs for any non-SUDR User or Locking SP Admin. | Locking SP Admin1-4, User1-16 (unless previously disabled by "Disable User Set PIN"), Drive Owner | PBKDF, Symmetric Key | TCG Set Method |
| Disable User Set PIN | Disable a non-SUDR User's ability to change its own PIN. | Locking SP Admin1-4 | None | TCG Set Method |
| Enable / Disable Single User Data Range (SUDR) | Enable / Disable Single User Data Range (SUDR) classification for a data range | Locking SP Admin1-4 | None | TCG Reactivate Method |
| Lock / Unlock FW Download | Enable / Disable FW Download Service | Drive Owner | None | TCG Set Method |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Firmware Download | Load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code. | None** | Asymmetric Key | ATA DOWNLOAD MICROCODE |
| Enable / Disable Admin SP Admin(s) | Enable / Disable an Admin SP Admin. | Drive Owner | None | TCG Set Method |
| Enable / Disable Locking SP Admin(s), non-SUDR User(s) | Enable / Disable a Locking SP Admin or non-SUDR User Authority. | Locking SP Admin1-4 | None | TCG Set Method |
| Set Range Attributes for non-SUDR | Set the location, size, locking and User access rights of the non-SUDR. | Locking SP Admin1-4 | None | TCG Set Method |
| Set Range Geometry for SUDR | Set the location and size of the SUDR. | User1-16 (if User Ownership) , Locking SP Admin1-4 (if Admin Ownership) | None | TCG Set Method |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Lock / Unlock User Data Range for Read and/or Write | Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data in a range. | User1-16, Locking SP Admin1-4 (for non-SUDRs) | None | TCG Set Method, ATA SECURITY UNLOCK |
| User Data Read / Write | Encryption / decryption of user data to/from a LBA range. Access control to this service is provided through Lock / Unlock User Data Range. | None* | Symmetric Key | ATA Read / Write Commands |
| Cryptographic Erase of non-SUDR | Erase user data in a non-Single User Data Range by cryptographic means: changing the encryption key. | User1-16, Locking SP Admin1-4 | RNG, Symmetric Key | TCG GenKey Method |
| Cryptographic Erase of SUDR | Erase user data in a Single User Data | Locking SP Admin1-4 | RNG, Symmetric Key | TCG Erase Method |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| | Range by cryptographic means: changing the encryption key. | User1-16 | | TCG GenKey Method, TCG Erase Method |
| Exit CC Security Mode | Exit TCG Opal Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state. | Drive Owner | RNG, Hashing, Symmetric Key | TCG LockingSPObj.Revert() , TCG AdminSPObj.Revert() |
| | | Admin SP Admin1-4 | | TCG AdminSPObj.Revert() |
| | | Locking SP Admin1-4 | | TCG LockingSP.RevertSP() |

*Data Range has to be Unlocked

**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

Table 4.4 - TCG Opal Security Mode Unauthenticated Services

| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Unblock PIN | Resets password attempt counters. | None | None | POR |
| Show Status | Reports if CM satisfies Security Rules (Section 7.1) | None | None | TCG Level 0 Discovery: CC Security Mode Operating Mode Indicator (Byte 30, Bit 0) = 1 |
| Reset Module | Runs POSTs and zeroizes keys & CSPs in RAM | None | None | POR |
| DRBG Generate Bytes | Returns a SP800-90 DRBG Random Number of 32 bytes | None | None | TCG Random() |
| Exit CC Security Mode | Exit TCG Opal Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state. | None (using PSID) | None | AdminSP.RevertSP() AdminSPObj.Revert() |

Table 4.5 - TCG Enterprise Security Mode Authenticated Services

| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Set PIN | Change operator authentication data. | EraseMaster, BandMasters, Drive Owner | PBKDF, Symmetric Key | TCG Set Method |
| Firmware Download | Enable / Disable FW Download and load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code. | Drive Owner** | Asymmetric Key | TCG Set Method, SCSI Write Buffer |
| Enable / Disable BandMasters | Enable / Disable a User Authority. | EraseMaster | None | TCG Set Method |
| Set Range Attributes | Set the location, size, and locking attributes of the LBA range. | BandMasters | None | TCG Set Method |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Lock / Unlock User Data Range for Read and/or Write | Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data in a range. | BandMasters | None | TCG Set Method |
| User Data Read / Write | Encryption / decryption of user data to/from a LBA range. Access control to this service is provided through Lock / Unlock User Data Range. | None* | Symmetric Key | SCSI Read, Write Commands |
| Cryptographic Erase | Erase user data in an LBA range by cryptographic means: changing the Media encryption key (MEK). BandMaster PIN is also reset. | EraseMaster | RNG, Symmetric Key | TCG Erase Method |

*Security has to be Unlocked

**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

Table 4.6 - TCG Enterprise Security Mode Unauthenticated Services

| Service Name | Description | Operator Access Control | Security Function | Command(s)/Event(s) |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Show Status | Reports if the CM is operational in terms of CC services and approved mode of operation value. | None | None | TCG Level 0 Discovery, TCG Get Method CC Operating Mode indicator (Byte 30, bit 0) = 1. |
| Reset Module | Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP in RAM. | None | None | POR |
| DRBG Generate Bytes | Returns an SP800-90A DRBG Random Number. | None | None | TCG Random() |
| Exit CC Security Mode | Exit Approved Mode of Operation. Note: CM will enter non-CC Security mode. | None (using PSID) | None | TCG AdminSP.RevertSP() NOTE: Seagate's implementation of the TCG Enterprise SSC utilizes this method from the TCG Opal SSC specification. |

Firmware Access Control and Firmware Trusted Update

Seagate SED drives provide authorized users with the ability to query the current version of the SED firmware, the ability to initiate the SED firmware updates, and the ability to verify updates (prior to installing those updates) using the RSA digital signature algorithm (with a key size (modulus) of 2048 bits) provided by Seagate.

For SATA SED drives the SED firmware version is queried with the SATA Identify command. For SAS SED drives the SED firmware version is queried with the SAS Inquiry command.

This section assumes that the firmware download port is in the locked state. Seagate drives all ship with the firmware download port in the unlocked state. The firmware download port is placed into the locked state as part of the steps to enable the CC operating mode.

The SEDs Firmware Access Control requires the administrator to unlock the firmware download port. This requires authentication with the SID credential (password) in order for the firmware update to proceed. To enable firmware download an administrator performs the following steps:

1. Open session to Admin SP.
2. Authenticate with SID credential (password).
3. Set FW download _PortLocking Object PortLocked Column to FALSE.
4. Close Session.

To perform a firmware download, an administrator performs the following steps:

1. Unlock firmware download port.
2. Obtain a genuine Seagate Secure firmware update package from:
<https://www.seagate.com/support-home>
3. The signed firmware package is downloaded to the drive. It is received by the drive firmware and placed into DRAM.
4. The signature is verified using PKCS #1, v1.5 RSA signature algorithm and public key in ROM. If the verification fails an error is returned and the update is not performed. The RSA key/modulus size for all current generation Seagate products is 2048 bits.
5. The firmware update package is written to flash. This overwrites the original firmware.
6. The FW performs a soft reset which loads and runs the new firmware.
7. At this point the firmware download port is unlocked. It can be locked by either performing a power on reset or by resetting the _PortLocking Object PortLocked Column to TRUE.

An error code is returned if any part of the firmware update process fails. The SED only allows installation of an update if the digital signature has been successfully verified.

The firmware can only be updated using the authenticated update mechanism by an authorized user where the authorized source that signs the firmware updates is Seagate. The SED firmware authenticates the source of the firmware update using the RSA digital signature algorithm: with a key size (modulus) of 2048 bits. The mechanism uses the RTU Key Store that

contains the public key to verify the signature on an update image. An error code is returned if any part of the firmware update process fails. The SED only allows installation of an update if the digital signature has been successfully verified.

Firmware Update Error Messages:

| <u>Error Number</u> | <u>When</u> | <u>Message</u> |
|---------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0x0B740800 | Download | “Invalid Field Parameter” |
| 0x0B740806 | Download | “Attempt to download unsigned code” |
| 0x0B740804 | Boot | “FW inner signature key index does not match the outer index” |
| 0x0B740810 | Boot | “FW inner signature validation failed” |
| NONE | Boot | “Flash boot code Digital Signature Verification failure!” |

Firmware Rollback Protection

The evaluator ensures that a description is provided on how the user should interpret the error codes.

The SED supports the functional capability to assure that downgrading to a lower security version number is not possible. With this mechanism if a flaw in FW 1 is found then FW 2 is generated and downloaded to the drive. Using the firmware rollback mechanism, FW 1 will no longer be compatible with the drive and cannot be downloaded.

If a firmware update package is downloaded to the drive with an invalid firmware revision number, the rollback protection firmware in the SED generates and returns the error code below and the firmware update package is rejected.

Roll back Error Message:

| <u>Error Number</u> | <u>Message</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 0x0B740800 | “Invalid Field Parameter” |
| 0x05269920 | “Trying to download older firmware over newer firmware” |

Supplemental Information

For more information see the following documents:

1. The FIPS Security Policy documents for Seagate FIPS drives which also apply to CC drives can be found at:
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program/Validated-Modules>
2. More information regarding TCG Enterprise and TCG Opal can be found at:
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/storage/>
3. More information regarding the ATA command set can be found at:
www.t13.org/Documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2013/d2161r5-ATAATAPI_Command_Set_-_3.pdf