Compliant Product - CNS4 Software Encryption Layer vA1
Certificate Date: 2019.04.15CC Certificate Security Target * Validation Report
Validation Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10968-2019
Product Type: Network Encryption
Conformance Claim: Protection Profile Compliant
PP Identifier: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201
CC Testing Lab: Gossamer Security Solutions
* This is the Security Target (ST) associated with the latest Maintenance Release. To view previous STs for this TOE, click here.
The CNS4 Software Encryption Layer (hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the CNS4 is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses four Flash Storage Modules (FSMs) that provides quick off load of data. The FSMs can be easily removed from one CNS4 and installed into any other CNS4 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to the software-based FDE layer provided by the CNS4, the CNS4 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drives within the FSMs. The hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.
Security Evaluation Summary
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Curtiss-Wright CNS4 CSfC Common Airborne Recorder CSfC Encrypted Data Storage User Guide Part Number: DDOC0108-000-A2 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Software Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.5, April 15, 2019. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in April 2019. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
User data protection:
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.
The TOE provides each of required management services to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.