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Compliant Product - Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices

Certificate Date:  2020.11.06

Validation Report Number:  CCEVS-VR-VID11036-2020

Product Type:    Mobility

Conformance Claim:  Protection Profile Compliant

PP Identifier:    PP-Module for MDM Agent Version 1.0
  PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.1
  Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1
  Extended Package for Wireless LAN Client Version 1.0

CC Testing Lab:  atsec information security corporation


CC Certificate [PDF] Security Target [PDF] Validation Report [PDF]

Assurance Activity [PDF]

Administrative Guide [PDF]


Product Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad   Mobile Devices using the A8/A8X processor (iPad mini 4), A9/A9X processor (iPhone 6s, iPhone 6s Plus, iPhone SE, iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen), iPad Pro 9.7-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch), A10 Fusion/A10X Fusion processor (iPhone 7, iPhone 7 Plus, iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen), iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 10.5-inch), A11 Bionic processor (iPhone 8, iPhone 8 Plus, iPhone X), A12 Bionic/A12X Bionic/A12Z Bionic processor (iPhone Xs, iPhone Xs Max, iPhone XR, iPad mini (5th gen), 10.5-inch iPad Air (3rd gen), 11-inch iPad Pro, 12.9-inch iPad Pro (3rd gen), 11-inch iPad Pro (2nd gen), 12.9-inch iPad Pro (4th gen), and A13 Bionic processor (iPhone 11, iPhone 11 Pro, iPhone 11 Pro Max, iPhone SE (2nd gen)).


Evaluated Configuration

Devices Covered by the Evaluation

Processor

Device Name

Model Number

A8

iPad mini 4

A1538

A1550

A8X

iPad Air 2

A1566

A1567

A9

iPhone 6s

A1633

A1688

A1691 (China)

A1700 (China)

iPhone 6s Plus

A1634

A1687

A1690 (China)

A1699 (China)

iPhone SE

A1662

A1723 (China)

A1724 (China)

iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen)

A1822

A1823

A9X

iPad Pro 12.9-inch

A1584

A1652

iPad Pro 9.7-inch

A1673

A1674

A1675

A10 Fusion

iPhone 7

 

A1660

A1779 (Japan)

A1780 (China)

A1778

iPhone 7 Plus

A1661

A1785 (Japan)

A1786 (China)

A1784

iPad 9.7-inch
(6th gen)

A1893

A1954

iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen)

A2199

A2200

A2198 (Hong Kong)

A10X Fusion

iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen)

A1670

A1671

A1821 (China)

iPad Pro 10.5-inch

A1701

A1709

A1852 (China)

A11 Bionic

iPhone 8

 

A1863

A1906 (Japan)

A1907

A1905 (GSM)

iPhone 8 Plus

A1864

A1898 (Japan)

A1899

A1897 (GSM)

iPhone X

A1865 (Japan)

A1902 (Japan)

A1903 (Japan)

A1901

A12 Bionic

iPhone XS

A1920 (US/CA/HK)

A2097

A2098 (Japan)

A2099 (Global)

A2100 (China)

iPhone XS Max

A1921 (US/CA)

A2101 (Global)

A2102 (Japan)

A2103 (Global)

A2104 (China/HK)

iPhone XR

A1984 (US/CA)

A2105 (Global)

A2106 (Japan)

A2107 (US/CA)

A2108 (HK/China)

iPad mini (5th gen)

A2133

A2125 (China)

A2126

10.5-inch iPad (3rd gen)

A2152

A2154 (China)

A2123

A2153

A12X Bionic

11-inch iPad Pro

A1934 (US/CA)

A1979 (China)

A1980

A2013 (US/CA)

12.9-inch iPad Pro

A2014 (US/CA)

A1876

A1895

A1983 (China)

A12Z Bionic

11-inch iPad Pro (2nd gen)

A2068

A2228

A2230

A2231 (China)

12.9-inch iPad Pro (4th gen)

A2069

A2229

A2232

A2233 (China)

A13 Bionic

iPhone 11

A2111

A2221

A2222

A2223

iPhone 11 Pro

A2160

A2215

A2217

A2216        

iPhone 11 Pro Max

A2161

A2218

A2220

A2219

iPhone SE (2nd gen)

A2275 (US/CA)

A2296 (Global)

A2298 (China)

 


Security Evaluation Summary

The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process. The criteria against which the Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 R5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, R5. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices Common Criteria Configuration Guide, meets the requirements of the PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients Version 1.0 (which is comprised of  the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1, the PP-Module for MDM Agents Version 1.0, and the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients  Version 2.1); the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients Version 1.0.

Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices

Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices Common Criteria Configuration Guide document satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Apple iOS 13 on iPhone and Apple iPadOS 13 on iPad Mobile Devices Security Target, version 1.7. The evaluation was subject to CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in November 2020. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report number CCEVS-VR-VID11036-2020, prepared by CCEVS.


Environmental Strengths

Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data-at rest, for secure communication channels, and for use by applications. In addition, the TOE implements a number of cryptographic protocols that can be used to establish a trusted channel to other IT entities.

As noted in the Security Target, section 1.5.2.1 the TOE provides cryptographic services via the following cryptographic modules.

·         Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module for ARM, v10.0 (User Space)

·         Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Kernel Module for ARM, v10.0 (Kernel Space)

·         Apple Secure Key Store Cryptographic Module, v10.0

Identification and Authentication

Except for making emergency calls, answering calls, accessing Medical ID information, using the cameras, and using the flashlight, users need to authenticate using a passcode or a biometric (fingerprint or face). The user is required to use the passcode authentication mechanism when turn on or restart the device, press the Home button or swipe up to unlock your device (configurable), update software, erase the device, view or change passcode settings, or install iOS or iPadOS Configuration Profiles.

The passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode policies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the frequency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed attempts of entering the passcode.

The TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity and the user is required to either enter his passcode or use biometric authentication (fingerprint or face) to unlock the TOE.

External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPsec) can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.

Security Management

The security functions listed in the Security Target can be managed either by the user or by an authorized administrator through a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system. The Security Target identifies the functions that can be managed and indicates if the management can be performed by the user, by the authorized administrator, or both.

TOE Security Functionality (TSF) Protection

Some of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are:

·         Protection of cryptographic keyskeys used for TOE internal key wrapping and for the protection of data-at-rest are not exportable. There are provisions for fast and secure wiping of key material.

·         Use of memory protection and processor states to separate apps and protect the TSF from unauthorized access to TSF resourcesin addition, each device includes a separate system called the SEP which is the only system that can use the Root Encryption Key (REK). The SEP is a separate CPU that executes a stand-alone operating system and has separate memory.

·         Digital signature protection of the TSF imageall updates to the TSF need to be digitally signed.

·         Software/firmware integrity self-test upon start-upthe TOE will not go operational when this test fails.

·         Digital signature verification for apps

·         Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked

TOE Access

The TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request and after an administrator-configurable time of inactivity.

Access to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by user/administrator defined policy.

Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product:

·         IEEE 802.11-2012

·         IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)

·         IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6)

·         IEEE 802.1X

·         EAP-TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)

·         TLS (1.2)

·         IPsec

·         Bluetooth (4.0, 4.2, 5.0)

Security Audit

The TOE provides the ability for responses to be sent from the MDM Device Agent to the MDM Server. These responses are configurable by the organization using a scripting language given in the Over-the-Air Profile Delivery and Configuration document.


Vendor Information


Apple Inc.
Fiona Pattinson
+1-737-219-4141
security-certifications@apple.com

apple.com
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