Compliant Product - MMA10G EXE Series
Certificate Date: 2020.06.02CC Certificate Security Target Validation Report
Validation Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11055-2020
Product Type: Network Device
Conformance Claim: Protection Profile Compliant
PP Identifier: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.1
CC Testing Lab: Acumen Security
The MMA10G-EXE switches are 10 Gigabit (Gb) Internet Protocol (IP) switches optimized for video-over-IP traffic (compressed or uncompressed), while the EXE2.0 switches are 25Gb IP switches optimized for video-over-IP traffic. The ten models of the EXE included in the evaluation provide identical functionality. The only differences between them are the supported speed, the physical size, and the number of physical interfaces supported.
The TOE is classified as a network device (a generic infrastructure device that can be connected to a network). The TOE hardware devices are the Evertz MMA10G-EXE16, MMA10G-EXE26, MMA10G-EXE36, MMA10G-IPX128, EXE2.0-16-10G-A1, EXE2.0-16-25G-A, EXE2.0-26-10G-A1, EXE2.0-26-25G-A1, EXE2.0-36-10G-A1, and EXE2.0-36-25G-A1 running EXE v1.2.
Security Evaluation Summary
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target (ST). The criteria against which the MMA10G-EXE Series was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the EXE/IPX CC Security Guide, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the MMA10G-EXE Series Security Target v1.1, May 5, 2020. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in June 2020. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11055-2020) prepared by CCEVS.
The TOE’s Audit security function supports audit record generation and review. The TOE provides date and time information that is used in audit timestamps. The Audit events generated by the TOE include:
· Establishment of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
· Failure to Establish a Trusted Path or Channel Session
· Termination of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
· Failure of Trusted Channel Functions
· Identification and Authentication
· Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate
· Changes to trust anchors in the TOE’s trust store
· Any update attempts
· Result of the update attempt
· Management of TSF data
· Changes to time
· Session termination for inactivity
· Power-on self tests verification
· Changes to audit server configuration
· Users locked out due to failed authentication attempts
The TOE can store the generated audit data on itself and it can be configured to send syslog events to a syslog server, using a TLS protected collection method. Logs are classified into various predefined categories. The logging categories help describe the content of the messages that they contain. Access to the logs is restricted to only Security Administrators, who are authorized to edit them, copy or delete (clear) them. Audit records are protected from unauthorized modifications and deletions. The previous audit records are overwritten when the allocated space for these records reaches the threshold on a FIFO basis.
The TOE includes an EXE Cryptographic Module that implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms. The TOE provides cryptography support for secure communications and protection of information. The cryptographic services provided include: symmetric encryption and decryption using AES; asymmetric key generation; cryptographic key establishment using ECDH key establishment; digital signature using RSA; cryptographic hashing using SHA-256; random bit generation using DRBG and keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-SHA (SHA-256). The TOE implements the secure protocols TLS/HTTPS on the server side and TLS on the client side.
Identification and Authentication
All Administrators wanting to use TOE services are identified and authenticated prior to being allowed access to any of the services other than the display of the warning banner. (“Regular” EXE users do not access EXE directly; they control IP video switching through the EXE using a switch control system, such as Evertz’s Magnum. The switching of those IP video transport stream is outside the scope of the TOE.) Once an Administrator attempts to access the management functionality of the TOE, the TOE prompts the Administrator for a username and password for password-based authentication. The identification and authentication credentials are confirmed against a local user database. Only after the Administrator presents the correct identification and authentication credentials will access to the TOE functionality be granted. If the user fails to provide the correct authentication credentials, the user will be locked out after a configurable threshold until the user is manually unlocked by an Administrator.
The TOE provides the capability to set password minimum length rules. This is to ensure the use of strong passwords in attempts to protect against brute force attacks. The TOE also accepts passwords composed of a variety of characters to support complex password composition. During authentication, no indication is given of the characters composing the password.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS/HTTPS connections.
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure session or a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to perform the following actions:
· Administer the TOE locally and remotely
· Configure the access banner
· Configure the cryptographic services
· Update the TOE and verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates
· Specify the time limits of session inactivity
All of these management functions are restricted to an Administrator, which covers all administrator roles. Administrators are individuals who manage specific type of administrative tasks. In EXE only the admin role exists, since there is no provision for “regular” users to access EXE directly (as described above), and the portion of EXE they access and control are outside the scope of the TOE.
Primary management is done using the web-based interface using HTTPS. This provides a network administration console from which one can manage various identity services. These services include authentication, authorization and reporting. All of these services can be managed from the web browser, which uses a menu-driven navigation system.
There is also a very simple serial-based connection (RS-232) that provides a simple menu interface. This is used to configure the IP interface (IP address, etc.). It is password-protected.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE will terminate inactive sessions after an Administrator-configurable time period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE provides protection of TSF data (authentication data and cryptographic keys). In addition, the TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records. The TOE also ensures firmware updates are from a reliable source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation.
An administrator initiates update processes from the web interface for all update installation. EXE automatically uses the RSA digital signature mechanism to confirm the integrity of the product before installing the update.
Aside from the automatic Administrators session termination due to inactivity describes above, the TOE also allows Administrators to terminate their own interactive session. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
The TOE will display an Administrator-specified banner on the web browser management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
The TOE allows the establishment of a trusted channel between a video control system (such as Evertz’ Magnum) and the EXE. The TOE also establishes a secure connection for sending syslog data to a syslog server using TLS. The TOE also provides a trusted path to Security Administrators via HTTPS/TLS.
Evertz Microsystems, Ltd.