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Compliant Product - Cisco FTD 6.4 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv

Certificate Date:  2021.05.04

Validation Report Number:  CCEVS-VR-VID11101-2021

Product Type:    Network Device

Conformance Claim:  Protection Profile Compliant

PP Identifier:    collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e
  Extended Package for Intrusion Prevention Systems Version 2.11

CC Testing Lab:  Gossamer Security Solutions

CC Certificate [PDF] Security Target [PDF] Validation Report [PDF]

Assurance Activity [PDF]

Administrative Guide [PDF]

Administrative Guide [PDF]

Administrative Guide [PDF]

Product Description

Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:

TOE Configuration

Hardware Configurations

Software Version

FP 4110

FP 4115

FP 4120

FP 4125

FP 4140

FP 4145

FP 4150

·         The Firepower 4100 chassis contains the following components:

o    Network module 1 with eight fixed SFP+ ports (1G and 10G connectivity), the management port, RJ-45 console port, Type A USB port, PID and S/N card, locator indicator, and power switch

o    Two network modules slots (network module 2 and network module 3)

o    Two (1+1) redundant power supply module slots

o    Six fan module slots

o    Two SSD bays

·         FXOS release 2.6 and FTD release 6.4

FP 9300

·         The Firepower 9300 chassis contains the following components:

o    Firepower 9300 Supervisor—Chassis supervisor module

o    Management port

o    RJ-45 console port

o    Type A USB port

o    Eight ports for 1 or 10 Gigabit Ethernet SFPs (fiber and copper)

o    Firepower 9300 Security Module—Up to three security modules

o    800 GB of solid state storage per security blade (2 x 800 GB solid state drives running RAID1)

o    Firepower Network Module—Two single-wide network modules or one double-wide network module

o    Two power supply modules (AC or DC)

o    Four fan modules

·         FXOS release 2.6 and FTD release 6.4







·         The FMC models all run the same software image,  but have differing hardware characteristics which affect only non-security relevant functionality such as throughput, processing speed, number and type of network connections supported, number of concurrent connections supported and amount of storage.

·         FMC release 6.4


·         FMCv running on ESXi 6.0 or 6.5 on the Unified Computing System (UCS) UCSB-B200-M4, UCSC-C220-M4S, UCSC-C240-M4SX, UCSC-C240-M4L, UCSB-B200-M5, UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, UCS-E160S-M3 and UCS-E180D-M3

·         FMCv release 6.4

Security Evaluation Summary

The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.  The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.  The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco FXOS 2.6 on Firepower 4100/9300 for FTD Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified Configuration, Version 0.8, April 30, 2021, the FTD v6.4 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC and FMCv Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide, Version 0.5, April 28, 2021 and the FTD v6.4 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC and FMCv Common Criteria User Guide Supplement IPS & VPN Functionality, Version 0.9, April 30 2021 documents, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco FTD 6.4 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target, Version 1.6, April 30, 2021.  The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in May 2021.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.

Environmental Strengths

The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.

Security audit:

The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions.  The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event.  The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage.  The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail where the TOE overwrites the oldest audit record with the newest audit record when space is full.  Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel to an external audit server.


The TOE allows authorized administrators to control which Sensor is managed by the FMC. This is performed through a registration process over TLS. The administrator can also de-register a Sensor if he or she wish to no longer manage it through the FMC.

Cryptographic support:

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality.  The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source.

Identification and authentication:

The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE.  Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.  The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.  Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based authentication or pre-shared key methods.

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces.  The TOE requires authorized administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality.  The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism when the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the configured threshold.

The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database.  Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH and HTTPS interfaces.  The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.

Security management:

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.  All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console connection.  The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality and the timestamps maintained by the TOE. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.

When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner.  This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator.  After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.

Protection of the TSF:

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration to authorized administrators.  The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.

Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.

The TOE internally maintains the date and time.  This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE.  Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually via FXOS or FMC or can configure the TOE (FXOS) to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.

TOE access:

When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner.  This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator.  After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator sessions will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also protects against threats related to those client connections.

Trusted path/channels:

The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI access.  The TOE supports use of TLS and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers and IPsec for connections with NTP server. The SSH and TLS remote administer communications can be tunneled in IPsec.

Intrusion Prevention System:

The TOE provides intrusion policies consisting of rules and configurations invoked by the access control policy. The intrusion policies are the last line of defense before the traffic is allowed to its destination. All traffic permitted by the access control policy is then inspected by the designated intrusion policy. Using intrusion rules and other preprocessor settings, these policies inspect traffic for security violations and, in inline deployments, can block or alter malicious traffic.

If the vendor-provided intrusion policies do not fully address the security needs of the organization, custom policies can improve the performance of the system in the environment and can provide a focused view of the malicious traffic and policy violations occurring on the network. By creating and tuning custom policies, the administrators can configure, at a very granular level, how the system processes and inspects the traffic on the network for intrusions.

Using Security Intelligence, the administrators can blacklist—deny traffic to and from—specific IP addresses, URLs, and DNS domain names, before the traffic is subjected to analysis by the access control rules. Optionally, the administrators can use a “monitor-only” setting for Security Intelligence filtering.

Vendor Information

Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cert Team
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