Compliant Product - Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500-X, Industrial Security Appliances (ISA) 3000 and Adaptive Security Appliances Virtual (ASAv) Version 9.16
Certificate Date: 2022.07.14CC Certificate Security Target * Validation Report
Validation Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11257-2022
Product Type: Firewall
Virtual Private Network
Conformance Claim: Protection Profile Compliant
PP Identifier: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e
collaborative Protection Profile Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls v1.4 + Errata 20200625
PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways Version 1.1
CC Testing Lab: Gossamer Security Solutions
* This is the Security Target (ST) associated with the latest Maintenance Release. To view previous STs for this TOE, click here.
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models are: ASA 5500 Series (5508-X, 5516-X); ISA 3000 Series (ISA 3000-4C and ISA 3000-2C2F); and ASAv running on ESXi (version 6.7 or 7.0) on the UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, UCSC-C480-M5, UCS-E160S-M3 and UCS-E180D-M3 installed on ISR. ASAv (ASAv5, ASAv10, ASAv30, ASAv50) running on NFVIS 4.4 on the ENCS 5406, 5408, and 5412. The software is comprised of the Adaptive Security Appliance software image Release 9.16.
The TOE is a firewall platform with VPN capabilities. For firewall services, the ASA 5500-X Series and ASAv all provide application-aware stateful packet filtering firewalls. The TOE also provides IPsec connection capabilities. The use of IPsec tunnels is to secure connectivity to and/or from the TOE, for example, gateway-to-gateway VPN or remote access VPN. The TOE can operate in a number of modes: as a transparent firewall with two interfaces connected to the same subnet when deployed in single context in transparent mode; or with one or more contexts connected to two or many IP subnets when configured in routed mode. For management purposes, the ASDM is included. ASDM allows the TOE to be managed from a graphical user interface.
 ISR is in the operational environment. Please see the table in section 1.3 for UCS-E and ISR compatibility.
The TOE consists of the following hardware models all running the ASA 9.12 software.
· ASA 5500 Series (Cisco ASA5508-X, Cisco ASA5516-X)
· ISA 3000 (ISA 3000-4C and ISA 3000-2C2F)
· ASAv (ASAv5, ASAv10, ASAv30, ASAv50) running on ESXi 6.7 or 7.0 on the Unified Computing System (UCS) UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, UCSC-C480-M5, installed on ISR.
· ASAv (ASAv5, ASAv10, ASAv30, ASAv50) running on ESXi 6.7 on the Unified Computing System (UCS) UCS-E160S-M3 and UCS-E180D-M3 installed on ISR.
· ASAv (ASAv5, ASAv10, ASAv30, ASAv50) running on NFVIS 4.4 on the ENCS 5406, 5408, and 5412.
Security Evaluation Summary
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, July 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified configuration, Version 0.4, March 30, 2022 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500, Industrial Security Appliances (ISA) 3000 and Adaptive Security Appliances Virtual (ASAv) Version 9.16 Security Target, Version 0.7, May 6, 2022. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in July 2022. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail where the newest audit record will overwrite the oldest audit record when the local storage space for audit data is full. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel to an external audit server, if so configured.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit generators (RBGs) are seeded by entropy noise source.
Full Residual Information protection:
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from the TOE.
Identification and authentication:
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based authentication or pre-shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 8-127 characters. The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism if the number configured for the unsuccessful threshold has been exceeded.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console, SSHv2, and HTTPS interfaces. The TOE optionally supports use of any AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE.
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE and the information flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of information flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When a secure session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator prior to logging in. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
Protection of the TSF:
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to authorized administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN client sessions will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports direct connections from VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client connections. The TOE disconnects sessions that have been idle too long and can be configured to deny sessions based on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network addresses.
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI/ASDM access. The TOE supports use of TLS and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers. The TOE can use IPsec to encrypt connections with remote authentication servers (e.g. RADIUS, TACACS+). The TOE can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN client tunnels using IPsec or TLS. Note that the VPN client is in the operational environment.
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering (for IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on source and/or destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet inspection is used to aid in the performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure that packets are only forwarded when they’re part of a properly established session. The TOE supports protocols that can spawn additional sessions in accordance with the protocol RFCs where a new connection will be implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an explicitly permitted session. The File Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol, where a data connection is created as needed in response to an explicitly allowed command connection. System monitoring functionality includes the ability to generate audit messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or denied) traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to configure permitted and denied traffic flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow control rules will be applied, and to apply rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map set.
Cisco Systems, Inc.