CC Certificate 

Security Target 

Validation Report 

Assurance Activity 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Catalyst 9200CX/9300X/9300LM/9500X Series Switches CC Configuration Guide 

Administrative Guide: Security Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9200 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Command Reference, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Command Reference, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Command Reference, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9200 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Software Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Software Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9200 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Catalyst 9300 Series Switches Hardware Installation Guide 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Catalyst 9500 Series Switches Hardware Installation Guide 

Administrative Guide: Security Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Security Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: System Message Guide for Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Catalyst 9200 Series Switches Hardware Installation Guide 

Administrative Guide: Software Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: Release Notes for Cisco Catalyst 9500 Series Switches, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x 

Administrative Guide: Release Notes for Cisco Catalyst 9300 Series Switches, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x 

Administrative Guide: Release Notes for Cisco Catalyst 9200 Series Switches, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference 

Administrative Guide: Troubleshoot MACsec on Catalyst 9000 

The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst 9200CX/9300X/9300LM/9500X Series Switches all running Internetworking Operating System (IOS)-XE 17.9. The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with Open System Interconnection (OSI) Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE also supports Media Access Control Security (MACsec) encryption for switch-to-switch (inter-network device) security.

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the switch models as follows: Catalyst 9200CX/9300X/9300LM/9500X Series Switches running Cisco IOS-XE 17.9.

The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.  The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Catalyst 9200CX/9300X/9300LM/9500X Series Switches CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.5, 11/16/2023 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Catalyst 9200CX/9300X/9300LM/9500X Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.9 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 0.9, 11/29/2023.  The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in December 2023.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.

The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.

Security audit:

Auditing allows Security Administrators to discover intentional and unintentional issues with the TOE’s configuration and/or operation.  Auditing of administrative activities provides information that may be used to hasten corrective action should the system be configured incorrectly.  Security audit data can also provide an indication of failure of critical portions of the TOE (e.g. a communication channel failure or anomalous activity (e.g. establishment of an administrative session at a suspicious time, repeated failures to establish sessions or authenticate to the TOE) of a suspicious nature.  The TOE provides extensive capabilities to generate audit data targeted at detecting such activity.  The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event.  Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. 

The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using TLS 1.2 and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server.

The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE 17.9 commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.

Cryptographic support:

The TOE provides cryptographic functions to implement TLS, SSH, and MACsec protocols.  The cryptographic algorithm implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance.  This includes key generation and random bit generation, key establishment methods, key destruction, and the various types of cryptographic operations to provide AES encryption/decryption, signature verification, hash generation, and keyed hash generation.  All cryptography is implemented using the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) and CiscoSSL FOM cryptographic modules. IC2M applies to SSH and MACsec and CiscoSSL FOM applies to TLS 1.2.  The entropy source for both IC2M and CiscoSSL cryptographic modules is model dependent as listed below:

9200CX:  ACT2Lite (ACT2) processor

9300X/9300LM/9500X:  Cisco TRNG Core (CTC)

With the exception of C9500X-28C8D, the TOE supports MACsec using the proprietary Unified Access Data Plane (UADP) Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) (CAVP Cert. #4769)

The C9500X-28C8D supports MACsec using the CDR5M PHY embedded within the Cisco hardware platform.  The CDR5M PHY uses the Marvell Alaska C 88X7121M MACsec engine (CAVP Cert. #A1929).

The TOE provides cryptographic support for TLS 1.2, which is used to securely transmit generated audit data to an external IT entity.

The TOE authenticates and encrypts packets between itself and a MACsec peer. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.

Identification and authentication:

The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. For TLS 1.2 connections to a remote syslog server, the secure channel is established only after the TOE authenticates the remote syslog server using X.509v3 certificate-based authentication.

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure Command Line Interface (CLI) Administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 8 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides Administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.

The TOE also provides authentication failure management when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed authentication attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the account will not be granted access until the time period has elapsed.

Security management:

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local serial console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:

·       Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely

·       Ability to configure the access banner

·       Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking

·       Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates

·       Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters

·       Generate a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device

·       Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants as specified in 802.1X, sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipantEntry) and section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA())

·       Specify a lifetime of a CAK

·       Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using CLI management commands

·       Configure the number of failed Administrator authentication attempts that will cause an account to be locked out Configure the time interval for administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures

·       Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity

·       Ability to manage the cryptographic keys

·       Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality

·       Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying

·       Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps

·       Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer

·       Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors

·       Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store

·       Ability to manage the trusted public keys database

The TOE supports two separate Administrator roles: non-privileged Administrator and privileged Administrator. Only the privileged Administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions. The privileged Administrator is the Authorized Administrator of the TOE who can enable, disable, determine, and modify the behaviour of the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.

Protection of the TSF:

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.

The TOE can verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

The TOE detects replay of information received via secure channels (MACsec). The detection is applied to network packets that terminate at the TOE, such as trusted communications between the TOE and an IT entity (e.g., MACsec peer). If replay is detected, the packets are discarded.

The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time information is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a reliable timestamp.

Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the cryptographic module.

TOE access:

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.

The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

Trusted path/channels:

The TOE allows a trusted path to be established to itself from remote Administrators over SSHv2 and initiates outbound TLS trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. 

The TOE supports MACsec secured trusted channels between itself and MACsec peers and TLS 1.2 between itself and a remote syslog server.

Vendor Information