CC Certificate 

Security Target 

Validation Report 

Assurance Activity 

Administrative Guide 

The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of an industry standard small form factor cards which provide a compact, module, and customizable solution. The hardware model included in the evaluation is: ESS-3300-NCP, ESS-3300-CON, ESS-3300-24T-NCP, ESS-3300-24T-CON and ESS-9300-10X-E. The software is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE 17.9.

The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:

·       ESS-3300-NCP

·       ESS-3300-CON

·       ESS-3300-24T-NCP

·       ESS-3300-24T-CON

·       ESS-9300-10X-E

The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.  The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target.  The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.  The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Embedded Services 3300 Series and 9300 Series Switches (ESS3300 & ESS9300) CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.7, September 29, 2023 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Embedded Services 9300 & 3300 Series Switches (ESS9300 & ESS3300) Security Target, Version 0.7, September 29, 2023.  The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in September 2023.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11394) prepared by CCEVS.

The logical boundaries of the Cisco Embedded Services 9300 & 3300 Series Switches are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.

Security audit:

The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail. The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server over an encrypted channel.

Cryptographic support:

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operational Environment – ARM A53).  The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a.  In addition, the ESS3300 supports MACsec using the Broadcom BCM54194 processor and the ESS9300 supports MACsec using the embedded MACsec controller in the ASICs.

The TOE provides cryptographic support for remote administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server.  In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.

The TOE authenticates and encrypts packets between itself and a MACsec peer.  The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.

Identification and authentication:

The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.  Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.  The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.  Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication.  The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface.  The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality.  The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 8 characters.  The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database.  Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces.  The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.  The TOE supports the use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.

The TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information.  After a defined number of authentication attempts exceeding the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user account.

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec connections.

Security management:

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.  All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection.  The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:

·       Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;

·       Configuration of warning and consent access banners;

·       Configuration of authentication failures;

·       Generate, install, and manage Pre-Shared Key (PSK);

·       Manage the Key Server, Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and MKA participants;

·       All identification and authentication;

·       All audit functionality of the TOE;

·       Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE;

·       Configure lockout time interval for excessive authentication failures;

·       Update to the TOE and verification of the updates;

·       Configuration of IPsec functionality.

The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator.  Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions.  Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators.  The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE is restricted to authorized administrators.

Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.

Protection of the TSF:

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators.  The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.  Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.

The TOE internally maintains the date and time.  This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE.  Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually.  Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.

The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

Whenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from the TOE and reloads.

TOE access:

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period.  Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.  Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters the “exit” command.

The TOE can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

Trusted path/channels:

The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers.  In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.  The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions.  The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server, as well as to protect communications with a CA or remote administrative console.  The TOE also supports MACsec secured trusted channels between itself and MACsec peers.

Vendor Information