CC Certificate 

Security Target 

Validation Report 

Assurance Activity 

Administrative Guide: CC Configuration Guide 

Administrative Guide: Release Notes 

Administrative Guide: Troubleshoot MACsec on Catalyst 9000 

Administrative Guide: Command Reference, Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches) 

Administrative Guide: IP Routing Configuration Guide, Cisco Catalyst IE3x00 Rugged, IE3400 Heavy Duty, and ESS3300 Series Switches 

Administrative Guide: Access Control List Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17 (Cisco ASR 900 Series) 

Administrative Guide: Security and VPN Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17.x 

Administrative Guide: System Message Guide for Cisco IOS XE Cupertino 17.9.x 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Catalyst IE9300 Rugged Series Switch Hardware Installation Guide 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands A to C 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands D to L 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands M to R 

Administrative Guide: Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z 

Administrative Guide: Security Configuration Guide, Cisco Catalyst IE9300 Rugged Series Switches 

Administrative Guide: System Management Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17.x 

Administrative Guide: FlexVPN and Internet Key Exchange Version 2 Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17 

The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches all running Internetworking Operating System (IOS)-XE 17.9. The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with Open System Interconnection (OSI) Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE also supports Media Access Control Security (MACsec) encryption for switch-to-switch (inter-network device) security.

The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware.  The software is comprised of the IOS software image Release IOS-XE 17.9.  The hardware is comprised of the following models:

·       IE-9310-26S2C

·       IE-9320-26S2C

The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.  The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target.  The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.  The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.9 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.5, November 6, 2023 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.9 Security Target, Version 0.6, November 6, 2023.  The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in November 2023.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11395) prepared by CCEVS.

The logical boundaries of the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.9 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.

Security audit:

The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches provide extensive auditing capabilities.  The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event.

Auditable events include:

·       failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections

·       creation and update of Secure Association Key

·       modifications to the group of users that are part of the Authorized Administrator roles

·       all use of the user identification mechanism

·       any use of the authentication mechanism

·       Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures

·       any change in the configuration of the TOE

·       changes to time

·       initiation of TOE update

·       indication of completion of TSF self-test

·       maximum sessions being exceeded

·       termination of a remote session

·       attempts to unlock a termination session

·       initiation and termination of a trusted channel

The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server.

The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE 17.9 commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.

Cryptographic support:

The TOE provides the cryptography to support all security functions.  All algorithms claimed have Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates running on the processors specified.

The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M), firmware version Rel5a (CAVP cert. #A1462).  The IOS software calls the IC2M Rel5a cryptographic module that is validated for conformance to the requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 Level 1.

The TOE supports MACsec using the proprietary UAPD MSC MACsec embedded in ASICs v1.1 (CAVP Cert. #4848).

The TOE provides cryptographic support for IPsec, which is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.

The TOE authenticates and encrypts packets between itself and a MACsec peer. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.

Identification and authentication:

The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure Command Line Interface (CLI) Administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides Administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI. The connection to the remote authentication server is secured using IPsec.

The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed authentication attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an Authorized Administrator can reenable the user account.

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec connections.

Security management:

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.  All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local serial console connection.  The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:

·       Administration of the TOE locally and remotely

·       Configuration of warning and consent access banners

·       Configuration of session inactivity thresholds

·       Updates of the TOE software

·       Configuration of authentication failures

·       Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE

·       Configuration of the TOE provided services

·       Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE

·       Generate, install, and manage Pre-Shared Key (PSK)

·       Manage the Key Server, Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and MKA participants

·       Configure lockout time interval for excessive authentication failures

The TOE supports two separate Administrator roles: non-privileged Administrator and privileged Administrator.  Only the privileged Administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions.  The privileged Administrator is the Authorized Administrator of the TOE who can enable, disable, determine, and modify the behavior of the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.

Protection of the TSF:

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.

The TOE can verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

The TOE detects replay of information received via secure channels (MACsec). The detection is applied to network packets that terminate at the TOE, such as trusted communications between the TOE and an IT entity (e.g., MACsec peer). If replay is detected, the packets are discarded.

The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time information is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a reliable timestamp.

Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the cryptographic module.

TOE access:

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.

The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

Trusted path/channels:

The TOE allows a trusted path to be established to itself from remote Administrators over SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used as a trusted channel between the TOE and the remote authentication servers.

The TOE supports MACsec secured trusted channels between itself and MACsec peers.

Vendor Information