

National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in July 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 24 October 2022 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-VPNC-WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP: Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDF33) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11); the PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10); the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022 (VPNC24); the PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10); plus the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKGTLS11).

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring.

The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring Security Target, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring (Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 24 October 2022 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-VPNC-WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP: Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDF33) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11) • PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10) • PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022 (VPNC24)

Item	Identifier
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKG TLS11)
ST	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring Security Target, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators	Swapna Katikaneni, J David Thompson, Seada Mohammed

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

The TOE are the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring.

3.1 TOE Description

The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 15 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile staff with enterprise connectivity.

The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke using an MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to and remain in the CC configuration.

- Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility (direction), screen locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics are fingerprint for each device.
- The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
- A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
- Security and audit logging must be enabled.
- External storage must be encrypted.

- When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
 - The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
 - The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur through FOTA.
 - The TOE utilizes ACVP/CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.

The TOE includes the ability to create separate profiles part of the Knox Platform. A profile provides a way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort, the TOE was evaluated both without and with profiles created. Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-specific claims that apply when these profiles are created. The TOE also requires loaded applications must be implemented utilizing the NIAPSEC library.

There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15, and these models differ in their internal components (as described in the table below). All devices are A64 architecture.

3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms

Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.

3.3 TOE Architecture

The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation does not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces the risks inherent in any mobile deployment.

Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung File-Based Encryption (FBE) that utilizes ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.

The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for work environments. With Knox Platform for Enterprise, it is possible to segment the device into two separate areas, by convention called the personal profile and the work profile. In creating a work profile, the Enterprise establishes a completely separate workspace, with its own authentication, applications and services, and ensure they are kept separate from anything the user may do in the personal profile. Another option for deployment is Knox Separated Apps, a folder where the Enterprise can isolate a group of applications from the rest of the device, restricting access to shared information, while maintaining seamless access to the isolated applications for the user.

The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to more than

600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application allow and block listing.

3.4 Physical Boundaries

The TOE is a multi-user capable mobile device based on Android 15 that incorporates the Samsung Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE includes an IPsec VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable application). Within an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise can manage the configuration of the mobile device, including the VPN client, through a compliant device management solution.

The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.

4 Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels

4.1 Security audit

The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.

4.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.

4.3 User data protection

The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The functionality provided by work profiles and Knox Separated Apps enhance the security of user data by providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of apps and data while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.

4.4 Identification and authentication

The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or Biometric Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In addition, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password or re-enroll the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also be configured to utilize a biometric authentication factor (fingerprints), to unlock the device (Note: This only works after the primary authentication method, password, has been entered after the device powers on).

The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or server in an authenticated Bluetooth pairing.

4.5 Security management

The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including the VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.

4.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application

flaws. It also protects itself from modification by applications as well as isolates the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.

4.7 TOE access

The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.

The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.

4.8 Trusted path/channels

The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.

5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope

Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:

- Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDF33)
- collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11)
- PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10)
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022 (VPNC24)
- PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10)
- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKGTLS11)

That information has not been reproduced here and the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

Clarification of scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the Biometric, Bluetooth, VPNC, and WLAN Clients Modules plus the TLS Package and performed by the evaluation team).
- This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Mobile Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.

6 Documentation

The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:

- Samsung Android 15 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 9.0.4, July 1, 2025

Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.

7 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring, Version 0.2, July 1, 2025 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).

7.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document and ran the tests specified in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKG TLS11 including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:

Device Name	Chipset Vendor	SoC	Arch	Kernel	Build Number
Galaxy S25 Ultra 5G	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 8 Elite (SM8750)	ARMv8	6.6	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S24 Ultra 5G	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 8 Gen 3	ARMv8	6.1	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S24 5G	Samsung	Exynos 2400	ARMv8	6.1	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S23 Ultra 5G	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform	ARMv8	5.15	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G	Samsung	Exynos 2200	ARMv8	5.10	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S22 5G	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 Mobile Platform	ARMv8	5.10	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G	Samsung	Exynos 2100	ARMv8	5.4	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 888	ARMv8	5.4	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy XCover6 Pro	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 778G	ARMv8	5.4	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy Tab Active5 Pro	Qualcomm	Snapdragon 7s Gen 3	ARMv8	6.1	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy Tab Active5	Samsung	Exynos 1380	ARMv8	5.15	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy A36 5G	Samsung	Snapdragon 6 Gen 3	ARMv8	6.6	UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy A56 5G	Samsung	Exynos 1580 (S5E8855)	ARMv8	6.6	UP1A.231005.007

Evaluated Devices

In addition to the evaluated devices, the following are claimed as equivalent:

Evaluated Device	SoC	Equivalent Devices	Differences
Galaxy S25 Ultra 5G	Snapdragon 8 Elite	Galaxy S25+ 5G Galaxy S25 5G	S25 Ultra > S25+ > S25 in terms of display size
Galaxy S24 Ultra 5G	Snapdragon 8 Gen 3	Galaxy S24+ 5G Galaxy S24 5G Galaxy Z Fold6 5G Galaxy Z Fold SE Galaxy Z Flip6 5G	S24 Ultra > S24+ > S24 in terms of display size Z Fold6 & Z Fold SE & Z Flip6 have power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S24 5G	Exynos 2300	Galaxy S24+ 5G Galaxy S23+ 5G Galaxy S23 5G Galaxy Z Fold5 5G Galaxy Z Flip5 5G	S24 Ultra > S24+ > S24 in terms of display size S23 Ultra > S23+ > S23 in terms of display size Z Fold5 5G & Z Flip5 5G have power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S23 Ultra 5G	Snapdragon 8 Gen 2	Galaxy Tab S9 Ultra Galaxy Tab S9+ Galaxy Tab S9	Tab S9 devices are tablets (no voice calling) with S Pen Tab S9 Ultra > Tab S9+ > Tab S9 in terms of display size Tab S9 Ultra & Tab S9+ have under screen image fingerprint sensor Tab S9 has power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G	Exynos 2200	Galaxy S22+ 5G Galaxy S22 5G Galaxy S23 FE Galaxy S22 5G	S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip S22 Ultra > S23 FE in terms of display size S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S22 5G	Snapdragon 8 Gen 1	Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Galaxy S22+ 5G Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra Galaxy Tab S8+	S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice calling) with S Pen Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S8 in terms of display size

Evaluated Device	SoC	Equivalent Devices	Differences
		Galaxy Tab S8	Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under screen image fingerprint sensor Tab S8 has power button fingerprint sensor
		Galaxy Z Flip4 5G	Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have 2 displays & folding display
		Galaxy Z Fold4 5G	Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have power button fingerprint sensor
		Galaxy S23 FE	S23 FE > S22 in terms of display
		Galaxy S22+ 5G	S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip
		Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra	Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice calling) with S Pen
		Galaxy Tab S8+	Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S7 in terms of display size
		Galaxy Tab S8	Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under screen image fingerprint sensor Tab S8 has power button fingerprint sensor
		Galaxy Z Flip4 5G	Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have 2 displays & folding display
		Galaxy Z Fold4 5G	Z Fold4 > Z Flip4 in terms of display size
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G	Exynos 2100	Galaxy S21+ 5G	S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of display size
		Galaxy S21 5G	S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G	Snapdragon 888	Galaxy S21+ 5G	S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of display size
		Galaxy S21 5G	S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
		Galaxy S21 5G FE	Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have 2 displays & folding display
		Galaxy Z Fold3 5G	Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have power button fingerprint sensor
		Galaxy Z Flip3 5G	Z Fold3 & Z Flip3 have S22 Ultra Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy XCover6 Pro	Snapdragon 778G	Galaxy Tab Active4 Pro	Tab Active4 Pro is tablet and have bigger screen size
Galaxy Tab Active5	Exynos 1380	N/A	
Galaxy Tab Active5 Pro	Snapdragon 7s Gen 3	Galaxy XCover7 Pro	Tab Active5 Pro is tablet and have bigger screen size

Evaluated Device	SoC	Equivalent Devices	Differences
Galaxy A56 5G	Exynos 1580 (S5E8855)	Galaxy Tab S10 FE Galaxy Tab S10 FE Plus	Tab S10 FE and Tab S10 FE Plus are tablets and have bigger screen size
Galaxy A36 5G	SM6475	N/A	

Equivalent Devices

The evaluated configuration consists of the specified hardware and software when configured in accordance with the guidance documents listed in the Documentation Section.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKG TLS11.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKG TLS11 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.

The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search>) and Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>) with the following search terms on 6/27/2025 (from

10/1/2024) with the following search terms: "Galaxy S25", "SM-S938", "SM-S931", "Galaxy S25+", "SM-S936", "Galaxy S24", "SM-S928", "SM-S921", "SM-S721", "Galaxy S24+", "SM-S926", "Galaxy S23", "SM-S918", "SM-S911", "SM-S711", "Galaxy S23+", "SM-S916", "Galaxy S22", "SM-G908", "SM-G901", "Galaxy S22+", "SM-G906", "Galaxy S21", "SM-G998", "SM-G991", "SM-G990", "Galaxy S21+", "SM-G996", "Galaxy Z Fold6", "SM-F956", "Galaxy Z Fold5", "SM-F946", "Galaxy Z Fold4", "SM-F936", "Galaxy Z Fold3", "SM-F926", "Galaxy Z Flip6", "SM-F741", "Galaxy Z Flip5", "SM-F731", "Galaxy Z Flip4", "SM-F721", "Galaxy Z Flip3", "SM-F711", "Galaxy Tab S9", "SM-X916", "SM-X910", "SM-X716", "SM-X710", "Galaxy Tab S9+", "SM-X818", "SM-X816", "SM-X810", "Galaxy Tab S8", "SM-X900", "SM-X708", "SM-X706", "SM-X700", "Galaxy Tab S8+", "SM-X808", "SM-X806", "SM-X800", "Galaxy XCover6", "SM-G736", "Galaxy XCover7", "SM-G766", "Galaxy Tab Active5", "SM-X350", "SM-X356", "SM-X358", "SM-X300", "SM-X306", "SM-X308", "Galaxy Tab Active4", "SM-T636", "SM-T638", "SM-T630", "Galaxy A36", "SM-A366", "Galaxy A56", "SM-A566", "Galaxy Tab S10", "SM-X520", "SM-X526", "SM-X528", "SM-X620", "SM-X626", "Knox", "BoringSSL", "strongswan", "charon", "Android", "SCrypto", "Samsung Crypto", "Samsung Kernel Crypto", "Exynos", "Qualcomm Snapdragon".

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Samsung Android 15 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 9.0.4, July 1, 2025.

No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later are covered by the scope of this evaluation. The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the MDF33/BIO11/BT10/VPNC24/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the Security Target.

Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further

conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. The excluded functionality is specified in section 5 of this report. All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere in this document.

11 Annexes

Not applicable

12 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring Security Target, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025.*

13 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [4] Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDF33).
- [5] collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11).
- [6] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10).
- [7] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022 (VPNC24).
- [8] PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10).
- [9] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKGTLS11).
- [10] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring Security Target, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025 (ST).
- [11] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring, Version 0.2, July 1, 2025 (AAR).
- [12] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring, Version 0.2, July 1, 2025 (DTR).
- [13] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 15 - Spring, Version 0.4, July 1, 2025 (ETR).