



Cisco Jabber 15.2

Security Target

Version: 0.5

Date: June 23, 2026

Cisco Systems, Inc.

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Document Introduction

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This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Jabber 15.2. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged administrators, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document.

Revision History

Version	Date	Change
0.1	October 18, 2024	Initial Version
0.2	June 24, 2025	Lab Comments
0.3	February 11, 2026	Lab Comments
0.4	February 12, 2026	Validator Comments
0.5	June 23, 2026	Validator Comments
0.6		
0.7		
0.8		
0.9		
1.0		
1.1		
1.2		
1.3		

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1 Security Target Introduction

This Security Target contains the following sections:

- Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
- Conformance Claims [Section 2]
- Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
- Security Objectives [Section 4]
- Security Requirements [Section 5]
- TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]
- Supplemental TOE Summary Specification Information [Section 7]
- References

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 3, Chapter 4.

1.1 ST and TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.

Table 1. ST and TOE Identification

Name	Description
ST Title	Cisco Jabber 15.2 Security Target
ST Version	0.5
Publication Date	June 23, 2026
Vendor and ST Author	Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference	Cisco Jabber 15.2
TOE Software Version	Jabber 15.2
Keywords	VVoIP Client, Telephony

1.2 TOE Overview

Cisco Jabber provides users within an organization a number of features for collaborative communication:

Integrated Voice and Video Telephony – Securely make, receive, and control phone calls. Users have a variety of call control options including mute, call transfer, call forwarding, and impromptu conferencing.

Instant Messaging and Presence – View real-time availability of co-workers and securely chat in real time using instant messaging to save time and reduce phone tag.

Online Web Conferencing – Securely access online web conferencing services to collaborate in real-time.

Voicemail Services – Securely access voicemail and tools for managing messages.

The Common Criteria evaluation was limited to the Integrated Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP) telephony features of Cisco Jabber that it secures with SRTP and TLS 1.2. Video, Instant Messaging and Presence, Online Web Conferencing, and Voicemail Services is not covered by the evaluation. Additionally, call control options other than call placement and call receipt were not evaluated. Advanced features such as call transfer, call forwarding, and impromptu conferencing make use of SIP TLS 1.2, which is part of the evaluation.

1.3 TOE Product Type

The TOE is a software application that provides protected channels for interactive communication. Use case 3 (Communication) as described in [App], use case 2 (Software Application) as described in [VVoIP], and use case 3 (Client-Server Architecture) in [VVoIP] apply to the TOE.

1.3.1 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

The TOE has required environmental components to allow for operation and evaluation. The table below lists required IT environment components.

Table 2. IT Environment Component

Component	Required	Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Windows Platform	Yes	The TOE requires a Windows OS platform.
Enterprise Session Controller	Yes	The Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) is the SIP Server that provides the TOE with call control and management. CUCM also acts as the configuration server.
Remote VoIP Application	Yes	This is the peer VoIP Application that the TOE interacts with using Security Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP).
Certificate Authority	Yes	The Certification Authority provides X.509 certificates. The CA also provides a method to check the certificate revocation status of the CUCM Server.

1.4 TOE Description

Cisco Jabber allows users of an organization to securely make, receive, and control phone calls through Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM). Users have a variety of call-control options including mute, call transfer, call forwarding, and impromptu conferencing. Figure 1 depicts the TOE in relation to the IT environment.




Figure 1. TOE in Relation to the IT Environment

Note: In the test environment, only one instance of Jabber is considered the TOE (outlined in red above). The TOE is limited by the Protection Profile regarding what TLS version and ciphers may be claimed. However, the TOE only exchanges SIP messaging with the ESC (CUCM), and there is nothing requiring other endpoints use TLS 1.2 exclusively, so for non-TOE endpoints, there is no limitation placed on the TLS version.

1.5 TOE Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration is a single instance of Cisco Jabber operating in FIPS and CC mode. Refer to the Cisco Jabber 15.2 Common Criteria Configuration Guide for instructions on placing Cisco Jabber in FIPS and CC mode.

CUCM, release 12.0 or later, is the ESC (also referred to as the SIP Server) that serves as the call control component for voice and video. There are configuration settings the CUCM ‘pushes’ to the Cisco Jabber TOE, a form of management permitted in [VVoIP].

CUCM is required to be configured in the On-Premise deployment mode for softphones. Refer to the Cisco Jabber 15.2 Common Criteria Configuration Guide for specific information regarding configuring CUCM in the On-Premise deployment mode for softphones.

The specific software evaluated was 15.2.0.

1.6 Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a software-only client application that executes on a Windows 11 platform. For this evaluation, the Windows 11 device was a laptop with an Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake) CPU.

1.7 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.

- Communication
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Channels

These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.

1.7.1 Communication

The Cisco Jabber TOE transmits voice media using a constant bitrate (CBR) vocoder.

1.7.2 Cryptographic Support

The Cisco Jabber TOE provides cryptography in support of SIP connections via Security Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) established using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) and the Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) for SDP. The TOE also protects communications between itself and the CUCM SIP Server by using a Transport Layer Security (TLS)-protected signaling channel.

The TOE incorporates a CiscoSSL cryptographic module library (v7.2), and the algorithm implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance. See Table 17 in Section 7 for certificate references.

1.7.3 User Data protection

The TOE ensures that user data is not transmitted when a call is placed on hold, a call is placed on mute, or when the TOE is not registered with the SIP server. Additionally, the TOE restricts access to hardware resources and network communications to only those required.

1.7.4 Identification and Authentication

The TOE performs X.509 certificate authentication of remote components the TOE interacts with for SDDES/SRTP and TLS connections. The Cisco Jabber TOE relies upon the TOE Platform to validate certificates.

1.7.5 Security Management

The TOE is capable of registering with an Enterprise Session Controller (ESC) and specifying the termination period for idle calls.

1.7.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE leverages services and APIs provided by the platform in order to support anti-exploitation features and installation of authorized software updates.

1.7.7 Trusted Channels

The TOE's implementation of SDES-SRTP allows secure voice and video communication between itself and a remote VVoIP application and secure signaling communication between itself and a remote CUCM SIP Server using TLS.

1.8 Excluded Functionality

The following functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:

Table 3. Excluded Functionality and Rationale

Function Excluded	Rationale
Platforms other than Windows 11	The TOE was only evaluated on a Windows 11 Platform
Non-FIPS 140-2 and non-CC modes of operation	FIPS and CC modes of operation must be enabled in order for the TOE to be operating in its evaluated configuration.
SRTP with NULL cipher	SRTP with the NULL cipher does not provide encryption.
Jabber to Jabber calling. Jabber to Jabber calling provides basic voice and video calling capabilities between different Cisco Jabber clients without registering to Cisco Unified Communications Manager.	This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Profiles.
Cisco Instant Message and Presence Service (Instant Messaging and Presence)	This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Profiles.
Cisco Webex Meetings Server (Online Web Conferencing)	This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Profiles.
Cisco Unity Connection (Voicemail)	This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Profiles.

The functionality listed above is disabled in the TOE evaluated configuration.

2 Conformance Claims

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim

The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. For a listing of Assurance Requirements claimed see Section 5.4.

The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 extended conformant.

2.2 Protection Profile Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims

The TOE and ST are conformant with the Specifications listed in the table below:

Table 4. PP Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims

Specification	Version	Date	Short Name
PP-Configuration for Application Software and Voice/Video over IP (VVoIP) Endpoints	V1.1	2022-05-31	CFG_APP-VVOIP_v1.1
The PP-Configuration includes the following components:			
• Protection Profile for Application Software	V1.4	2021-10-07	PP_APP_v1.4
• PP-Module for Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP)	V1.0	2020-10-28	MOD_VVOIP_V1.0
Package Claim:			
Functional Package for TLS	V1.1	2019-03-01	PKG_TLS_V1.1

The following NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) have also been applied to the claims in this document. Each posted TD was reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims, and the security functional requirements claimed in this document.

Table 5. NIAP Technical Decisions Applied to This ST

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0965	Additional Option for FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 Test	MOD_VVOID_V1.0	FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 MOD_VVOID_V1.0-SD	12/22/2025	Yes
TD0964	Clarifications to FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Windows Test	PP_APP_V1.4	FMT_MEC_EXT.1	12/12/2025	Yes

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0945	Adding FIPS 186-5 in PP_APP_V1.4	PP_APP_V1.4	FCS_CKM.1.1/A K FCS_COP.1.1/Si g	08/26/2025	Yes
TD0938	Adding Support for Silence Packets When Muted	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	FDP_IFF.1, MOD_VVoIP_V1 .0-SD	01/07/2026	Yes
TD0931	Clarification when CTR_DRBG is Selected for FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 in PP_APP_V1.4	PP_APP_V1.4	FCS_RBG_EXT. 2.2	07/16/2025	No, FCS_RBG_EXT.2. 2 not claimed
TD0914	Addition of PKG_TLS_V2.0 to Conformance Claims	PP_APP_V1.4 PP_OS_V4.3 PP_MDF_V3.3 PP_MDM_V4.0	Section 2	11/05/2025	No, TD is optional and we are using PKG_TLS_V1.1
TD0865	Consistency of Cryptographic Key Sizes	PP_APP_v1.4	FCS_STO_EXT. 1.1, FCS_CKM.1.1/P BKDF, FCS_COP.1.1/S KC, FCS_CKM.1.1/S K	09/25/2024	Yes
TD0844	Addition of Assurance Package for Flaw Remediation V1.0 Conformance Claim	PP_ESM_AC_V2.1 PP_ESM_ICM_V2.1 PP_ESM_PM_V2.1 PP_PSD_V4.0 PP_CA_V2.1 PP_MDM_V4.0 PP_GPCP_V1.0 PP_BASE_VIRTUAL IZATION_V1.1 PP_APP_v1.4 PP_MDF_V3.3 PP_OS_V4.3 PP_HCD_V1.0	Conformance Claims	06/28/2024	Yes
TD0834	Aligning MOD_VVOIP 1.0 with NDcPP 3.0E	MOD_VVOIP_V1.0	Section 1.1, MOD_VVOIP_V1 .0-SD	04/25/2024	No, TOE not evaluated against NDcPPv3.0e
TD0823	Update to Microsoft Windows Exploit Protection link in FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3	PP_APP_v1.4	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 .3	04/10/2024	Yes

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0822	Correction to Windows Manifest File for FDP_DEC_EXT.1	PP_APP_v1.4	FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1, FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2	04/10/2024	Yes
TD0815	Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5	PP_APP_v1.4	FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5	02/13/2024	Yes
TD0798	Static Memory Mapping Exceptions	PP_APP_v1.4	FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1	11/29/2023	Yes
TD0785	Terminology Change in MOD_VVoIP: Extended to Functional Package	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	Conformance Claims, FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1	10/11/2023	Yes
TD0780	FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification	PP_APP_v1.4	FIA_X509_EXT.1	08/30/2023	Yes
TD0779	Updated Session Resumption Support in TLS package V1.1	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1	10/02/2023	No, No TLS Claims
TD0770	TLSS.2 connection with no client cert	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2	07/20/2023	No, No TLS Claims
TD0756	Update for platform-provided full disk encryption	PP_APP_v1.4	FDP_DAR_EXT.1	07/07/2023	Yes
TD0747	Configuration Storage Option for Android	PP_APP_v1.4	FMT_MEC_EXT.1	09/06/2023	No, TOE Not Evaluated on Android
TD0743	FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity	PP_APP_v1.4	FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1	06/07/2023	Yes
TD0739	PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication dates	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3, Test 1	05/22/2023	Yes
TD0736	Number of elements for iterations of FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	PP_APP_v1.4	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Server	05/16/2023	No, No HTTPS Claims
TD0730	Clarification on Trusted Update sources for VVoIP Applications	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 , MOD_VVoIP_V1.0-SD	04/10/2023	Yes

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0726	Corrections to (D)TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_DTLSS_EX T.1.4, FCS_TLSS_EXT. 1.3	03/17/2023	No, No DTLS or TLSS Claims
TD0719	ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4	PP_APP_v1.4 PP_APP_v1.3		01/23/2023	Yes
TD0718	Format changes for MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	FDP_IFF.1.2, FTP_ITC.1/Control, FTP_ITC.1.1/Media	01/23/2023	Yes
TD0717	Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4	PP_APP_v1.4	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.1/PB KDF, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/Key edHash, FCS_COP.1/Sig, FCS_COP.1/SKC	01/18/2023	Yes
TD0684	VVoIP PP-Module Updated to Allow for App PP v1.4 as Base PP	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	Section 1, Section 2, MOD_VVoIP_v1.0-sd	11/30/2022	Yes
TD0664	Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2	PP_APP_v1.4	FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2	08/26/2022	Yes
TD0650	Conformance claim sections updated to allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4	MOD_FE_V1.0 MOD_BT_V1.0 MOD_FEEM_V1.0 PP_MDM_V4.0 MOD_MDM_AGEN T_V1.0 PP_APP_v1.4 PP_MDF_V3.2	Section 2	06/17/2022	Yes
TD0628	Addition of Container Image to Package Format	PP_APP_v1.4	FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1	03/09/2022	Yes
TD0589	Reliable Time for VVoIP Software TOEs	MOD_VVoIP_V1.0	FPT_STM_EXT. 1/VVoIP	05/14/2021	Yes
TD0513	CA Certificate loading	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSC_EXT .1.3	05/26/2020	Yes

TD Identifier	TD Name	Protection Profiles	References	Publication Date	Applicable?
TD0499	Testing with pinned certificates	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2	02/04/2020	Yes
TD0469	Modification of test activity for FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1	11/20/2019	Yes
TD0442	Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package	PKG_TLS_V1.1	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.1	08/21/2019	Yes

3 Security Problem Definition

This section identifies the following:

- Significant assumptions about the TOE's operational environment
- IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE
- Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection
- Organizational Security Policies for the TOE as appropriate

This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with “osp” specifying a unique name.

3.1 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE's environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

Table 6. TOE Assumptions

Assumption	Assumption Definition
A.PLATFORM	The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER	The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN	The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.UPDATE_SOURCE	It is assumed that TOE software/firmware updates will be made available on either the call control server that the TOE connects to or a separate file server managed by the organization.

3.2 Threats

The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.

Table 7. Threats

Threat	Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or alter communications between the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK	An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS	An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
T.MEDIA_DISCLOSURE	An attacker can use the encrypted variable rate vocoder frames to their advantage to decode transmitted data.
T.UNDETECTED_TRANSMISSION	An attacker may cause the TOE to exfiltrate audio or video media over a remote channel while in a state where the user has a reasonable expectation that no media is being transmitted.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

There are no organizational security policies defined in [App], [VVoIP], or [TLS]

4 Security Objectives

This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE's IT environment in meeting the security needs.

This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with "objective" specifying a unique name. Objectives that apply to the IT environment are designated as OE.objective with "objective" specifying a unique name.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies identified. An explanation of the relationship between the objectives and the threats/policies is provided in the rationale section of this document.

Table 8. Security Objectives for the TOE

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition	Addressed By
O.INTEGRITY	Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and also leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and operating system vendors have developed execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism through compiler or linker options.	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1,
O.QUALITY	To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions of these services and APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.	FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.2, FPT_LIB_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2, FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition	Addressed By
O.MANAGEMENT	To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.	FMT_SMF.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPR_ANO_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/Sig
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.	FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1/Password, FCS_COP.1/SKC, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyHash
O.PROTECTED_COMMS	To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.	FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FDP_NET_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition	Addressed By
O.ENCRIPTION	To prevent data disclosure from decryption, conformant TOEs will transmit and store sensitive data using mechanisms that provide adequate protections.	FCS_NTP_EXT.1 (from NDcPP), FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (refined from NDcPP), FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 (refined from NDcPP), FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev (refined from NDcPP), FIA_X509_EXT.2 (refined from NDcPP), FIA_X509_EXT.3 (refined from NDcPP), FTP_ITC.1 (refined from NDcPP), FTP_DIT_EXT.1 (refined from App PP), FCO_VOC_EXT.1, FTP_ITC.1/Control, FTP_ITC.1/Media, FAU_STG_EXT.1 (optional for software-only TOEs), FCS_COP.1/SRTP (selection-based), FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 (selection-based), FDP_IFC.1/CallControl (selection-based), FDP_IFF.1/CallControl (selection-based), FPT_STM_EXT.1/VVoIP (selection-based), FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
O.NO_UNATTENDED_TRANSMISSION	To prevent undetected transmissions, conformant TOEs will not transmit unattended voice or video data when streaming media is not in use.	FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FTA_SSL.3/Media, FAU_GEN.1/CS-Admin (optional), FAU_GEN.1/CS-VVoIP (optional), FAU_GEN.1/P2P-Admin (selection-based), FAU_GEN.1/P2P-VVoIP (selection-based), FPT_STM_EXT.1/VVoIP (selection-based)
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION	To support the enforcement of other security functionality, a conformant TOE will provide a management capability that allows for configuration of the TSF.	FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP

4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

All of the assumptions stated in Section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are the non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.

Table 9. Security Objectives for the Environment

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PLATFORM	The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER	The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.UPDATE_SOURCE	The operational environment will have TOE software/firmware made available on either the call control server that the TOE connects to or a separate file server managed by the organization.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

Table 10. Security Objectives Rationale

Threats, Assumptions, or OSP	Security Objective	Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network	O.PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.

Threats, Assumptions, or OSP	Security Objective	Rationale
infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or alter communications between the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.	O.INTEGRITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the application to defend against network attack.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the application and other endpoints.	O.PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.
	O.QUALITY	The objective O.QUALITY ensures use of mechanisms that provide protection against network-based attack.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the application to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.	O.QUALITY	The objective O.QUALITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.	O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
A.PLATFORM	OE.PLATFORM	The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER	OE.PROPER_USER	The operational environment Objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.

Threats, Assumptions, or OSP	Security Objective	Rationale
A.PROPER_ADMIN	OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The operational environment Objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.
T.MEDIA_DISCLOSURE An attacker can use the encrypted variable rate vocoder frames to their advantage to decode transmitted data.	O.ENCRIPTION	The TOE transmits security-relevant data to environmental IT entities using cryptographic mechanisms that protect this data from unauthorized disclosure.
T.UNDETECTED_TRANSMISSION An attacker may cause the TOE to exfiltrate audio or video media over a remote channel while in a state where the user has a reasonable expectation that no media is being transmitted.	O.NO_UNATTENDED_TRANSMISSION	The TOE prevents transmission of all unattended voice or video data when the streaming media is not in use, thereby ensuring that data is only transmitted when affirmatively directed by the user. Auditing (optional for software only TOE's) further assists in detecting transmission of VVOIP data.
	O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION	The TOE defines management functions for VVoIP connectivity and optionally allows for configuration of the idle period for calls to minimize the risk of active unattended sessions and configuration of auditing to specify how transmissions are recorded.
A.UPDATE_SOURCE	OE.UPDATE_SOURCE	The objective satisfies the assumption by ensuring that TOE updates are made available in the intended location.

5 Security Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017 and all international interpretations.

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this section are derived from [APP], [VVoIP], [TLS], and NIAP TDs.

5.1 Conventions

The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions

Convention	Indication
Assignment	Indicated with italicized text (e.g., <i>assignment</i>).
Selection	Indicated with underlined text; (e.g., <u>selection</u>).
Iteration	Indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration. (e.g. "FCS_COP.1/Hash").
Refinement	Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... all objects ..." or "... some big things ...").
Extended Requirements	Are identified with "(_EXT)" in of the functional class/name and are those not found in Part 2 of the CC.
Other	Sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

Note that iterations in [App] are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)") and iterations in [VVoIP] are identified by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration. This ST will follow the convention defined in [VVoIP] for iteration. For clarity, a mapping between the two formats, for SFRs related to this ST, has been included in Annex D: Differing SFR Naming Conventions.

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.

Table 12. Security Functional Requirements

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name	Drawn From
FCO: Communications	FCO_VOC_EXT.1	Fixed-Rate Vocoder	[VVoIP]
FCS: Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM_EXT.1	Cryptographic Key Generation Services	[APP]
	FCS_CKM.1/AK	Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation	[APP]
	FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment	[APP]
	FCS_COP.1/SKC	Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption	[APP]
	FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic Operation – Hashing	[APP]
	FCS_COP.1/Sig	Cryptographic Operation – Signing	[APP]
	FCS_COP.1/KeyHash	Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication	[APP]
	FCS_COP.1/SRTP	Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption for SRTP	[VVoIP]
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client	HTTPS Protocol	[APP]
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation Services	[APP]
	FCS_STO_EXT.1	Storage of Credentials	[APP]
	FCS_SRTP_EXT.1	Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol	[VVoIP]
	FCS_TLS_EXT.1	TLS Protocol	[TLS]
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	TLS Client Protocol	[TLS] [VVoIP]
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication	[TLS] [VVoIP]
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.4	TLS Client Support for Renegotiation	[TLS]
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.5	TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension	[TLS]
FDP: User Data Protection	FDP_DEC_EXT.1	Access to Platform Resources	[APP]
	FDP_NET_EXT.1	Network Communications	[APP]
	FDP_DAR_EXT.1	Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data	[APP]
	FDP_IFC.1	Subset Information Flow Control	[VVoIP]

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name	Drawn From
	FDP_IFF.1	Simple Security Attributes	[VVoIP]
FIA: Identification and authentication	FIA_X509_EXT.1	X.509 Certificate Validation	[APP]
	FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication	[APP]
FMT: Security management	FMT_MEC_EXT.1	Supported Configuration Mechanism	[APP]
	FMT_CFG_EXT.1	Secure by Default Configuration	[APP]
	FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	[APP]
	FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP	Specification of Management Functions (VVoIP Communications)	[VVoIP]
FPR: Privacy	FPR_ANO_EXT.1	User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information	[App]
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FPT_API_EXT.1	Use of Supported Services and APIs	[App]
	FPT_AEX_EXT.1	Anti-Exploitation Capabilities	[App]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Integrity for Installation and Update	[App]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2	Integrity for Installation and Update	[App]
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries	[App]
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1	Software Identification and Versions	[App]
FTA: TOE Access	FTA_SSL.3/Media	Media TSF-Initiated Termination (Media Channel)	[VVoIP]
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_DIT_EXT.1	Protection of Data in Transit	[App] [VVoIP]
	FTP_ITC.1/Control	Control Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Signaling Channel)	[VVoIP]
	FTP_ITC.1/Media	Media Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Media Channel)	[VVoIP]

5.2.1 Class: Communications (FCO)

5.2.1.1 FCO_VOC_EXT.1 – Fixed-Rate Vocoder

FCO_VOC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall transmit voice media using a constant bit rate voice vocoder.

5.2.2 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)

5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation Services

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].

5.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/AK – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/AK The **application** shall [

- implement functionality

] to generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [

- [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
- [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-256 P-384 and [P-256, P-521]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4]

].

5.3.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [

- [RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”],
- [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]

].

Application Note: TLS connections related to CAPF make exclusive use of RSA-based key establishment schemes. The other evaluated TLS connections exclusively use elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes.

5.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/SKC – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption

FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The **application** shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
- AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,

] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].

5.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation – Hashing

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The **application** shall perform [*cryptographic hashing services*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- SHA-1,
- SHA-256,
- SHA-384
- SHA-512

]

and **message digest** sizes [

- 160,
- 256,
- 384
- 512

] **bits** that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].

5.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Sig – Cryptographic Operation – Signing

FCS_COP.1.1/Sig The **application** shall perform [*cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4 or FIPS 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4

].

5.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyHash – Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyHash The **application** shall perform [*keyed-hash message authentication*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- HMAC-SHA-256
- HMAC-SHA-384
- HMAC-SHA-512

] and [

- no other algorithms

] **with** key sizes [256, 384, 512 used in HMAC] and message digest sizes [256, 384, 512] and [no other size] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘*The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code* and FIPS Pub 180-4 *Secure Hash Standard*’].

5.3.2.8 FCS_COP.1/SRTP – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption for SRTP

FCS_COP.1.1/SRTP The TSF shall perform [*encryption/decryption to support SDES-SRTP*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CTR (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A), AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].

5.3.2.9 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client – HTTPS Protocol

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Client: The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Client: The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the Functional Package for TLS.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Client: The application shall [not establish the application-initiated connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

5.3.2.10 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation Services

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its cryptographic operations.

5.3.2.11 FCS_STO_EXT.1 – Storage of Credentials

FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [private keys, passwords]].

5.3.2.12 FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol

FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that complies with RFC 3711, and use Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) in compliance with RFC 4568 to provide key information for the SRTP connection.

FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement SDES-SRTP supporting the following ciphersuites [

- AEAD_AES_256_GCM, in accordance with RFC 7714].

FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure the SRTP NULL algorithm can be disabled.

FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall allow the SRTP ports to be used for SRTP communications to be specified by an Authorized Administrator.

5.3.2.13 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – TLS Protocol

FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement [

- TLS as a client

].

5.3.2.14 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the cipher suites [

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246.
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,

and also supports functionality for [session renegotiation].

Application Note: TLS connections related to CAPF exclusively use TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. The other evaluated TLS connections make use of only the two TLS_ECDHE_RSA cipher suites.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].

5.3.2.15 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 – TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

5.3.2.16 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 – TLS Client Support for Renegotiation

FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1 The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the “renegotiation_info” TLS extension in accordance with RFC 5746.

5.3.2.17 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 – TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension

FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1 The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1].

5.3.3 Class: User Data Protection (FDP)

5.3.3.1 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – Access to Platform Resources

FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [

- network connectivity.
- camera.
- microphone.
- USB.
- Bluetooth

].

FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [

- address book,
- calendar,
- [file-system, photo library]

].

5.3.3.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1 – Network Communications

FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [

- user-initiated communication for [Voice/Video calls (SIP over TLS,SRTP)].

- respond to [Voice/Video calls (SIP over TLS.SRTP)]

].

5.3.3.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 – Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data

FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.

5.3.3.4 FDP_IFC.1 – Subset Information Flow Control

FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *[media transmission policy]* on *[voice/video media transmitted by the TOE]*.

5.3.3.5 FDP_IFF.1 – Simple Security Attributes

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *[media transmission policy]* based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: *[TOE hook state, VVoIP call connection status, and VVoIP call control server status]*.

FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [

- *The TOE is [registered with a VVoIP call control server],*
- *A call has been established with a telephony device (VVoIP endpoint),*
- *The TOE is in the off-hook state,*
- *The TOE is not in the mute state,*
- *The TOE is in the mute state and only sending silence packets*
- *[The TOE is not in the hold state]*.

].

FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce *[no additional information flow control policy rules]*.

FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: *[no additional rules]*.

FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: *[all TCP and UDP ports used by the TOE are closed when not in active use]*.

5.3.4 Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)

5.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 – X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.

- The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field.
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, CRL as specified in RFC 8603].
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
 - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
 - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
 - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
 - Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

5.3.4.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS].

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the application shall [not accept the certificate].

5.3.5 Class: Security Management (FMT)

5.3.5.1 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Supported Configuration Mechanism

FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options.]

5.3.5.2 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – Secure by Default Configuration

FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with default credentials or no credentials.

FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.

5.3.5.3 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [no management functions].

5.3.5.4 FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP – Specification of Management Functions (VVoIP Communications)

FMT_SMF.1.1/VVoIP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Ability to [register the TOE to an ESC [manually]];
[
 - Ability to configure the termination period for idle calls].

5.3.6 Class: Privacy (FPR)

5.3.6.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information

FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].

5.3.7 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.3.7.1 FPT_API_EXT.1 – Use of Supported Services and APIs

FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.

5.3.7.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – Anti-Exploitation Capabilities

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.

5.3.7.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Integrity for Installation and Update

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].

5.3.7.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – Integrity for Installation and Update

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the [format of the platform-supported package manager].

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

5.3.7.5 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – Use of Third Party Libraries

FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only *[list of third-party libraries in table 13]*.

Table 13. Third-Party Libraries

Third-Party Libraries		
nghttp2	gssapi32	tiny-xml
libxml2	leveldb	plantronics software
chromium	openvino toolkit	icu
krbcc32	kfwlogon	ippsp legacy. Intel\™ integrated performance primitives. signal processing legacy.
angle	ippsc legacy. intel\™ integrated performance primitives. speech codecs legacy.	visual-studio-runtime
v8	microsoft\™ windows\™ operating system	openjpeg
libusb	leashw32	kerberos
microsoft edge embedded browser webview loader	krb5_32	skia
json-cpp	gloox	libvpx
opencore-amr	plantronics jabber plugin	debugging tools for windows\™
gststreamer	zlib	free-type
threading-building-blocks	oneapi threading building blocks (onetbb)	sqlite
websocketpp	ots	io-warrior-sdk

glib	re2	cyrus-sasl
libvorbis	pdfium	tidy
boringssl	libjpeg-turbo	direct3d
protobuf	open-ldap	expat
gsoap	libcxx	cef
json-c	libxslt	pcre
jansson	sql-cipher	xpprof32
blink	k5sprt32	boost
libjpeg	libphonenumbers	openssl
curl	opus	apr
libpng	safestring	libwebp
glew	hunspell	rapidxml
speexdsp	hunspell dynamic link library	comerr32

5.3.7.6 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions

FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [/sequence-based versioning control/].

5.3.8 Class: TOE Access (FTA)

5.3.8.1 FTA_SSL.3/Media – TSF-Initiated Termination (Media Channel)

FTA_SSL.3.1/Media The TSF shall terminate **voice/video transmission** after [inactivity longer than [300 seconds, an administrator-configurable interval]].

5.3.9 Class: Trusted Path (FTP)

5.3.9.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – Protection of Data in Transit

FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [

- encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as a client as defined in the Functional Package for TLS] and [Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)],

] between itself and another trusted IT product.

5.3.9.2 FTP_ITC.1/Control – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Signaling Channel)

FTP_ITC.1.1/Control The TSF shall **be capable of using [Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)]** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and a **VVoIP call control server** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_ITC.1.2/Control The TSF shall permit *[the TSF, the VVoIP call control server]* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/Control The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for *[establishment of call control]*.

5.3.9.3 FTP_ITC.1/Media – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Media Channel)

FTP_ITC.1.1/Media The TSF shall **be capable of using [SRTP]** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and **another VVoIP endpoint or other telephony device** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_ITC.1.2/Media The TSF shall permit *[the TSF, another VVoIP endpoint or other telephony device]* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/Media The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for *[transmission of voice/video media]*.

5.4 Security Assurance Requirements

5.4.1 SAR Requirements

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from [APP] and [VVoIP] which are derived from [CC_PART3]. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.

Table 14. SAR Requirements

Assurance Class	Components Description
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)

Assurance Class	Components Description
Development (ADV)	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
	Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

5.4.2 SAR Rationale

The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the [APP], [VVoIP], and [TLS]. As such, the [APP], [VVoIP], and [TLS] SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP themselves have been validated.

5.5 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.

Table 15. Assurance Measures

Assurance Component	How Requirement Will Be Met
ADV_FSP.1	No additional “functional specification” documentation was provided by Cisco to satisfy the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1	Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes: • instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and • instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment; and • instructions to provide a protected administrative capability. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided. Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.

Assurance Component	How Requirement Will Be Met
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMS.1	Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the Cisco and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1	Cisco will provide a Security Vulnerability Policy.
ATE_IND.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.

6 TOE Summary Specification

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures

The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.

Table 16. How TOE SFRs Measures Are Met

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
FCO_VOC_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE transmits voice media using a constant bitrate (CBR) vocoder which ensures packet length is the same. The constant bitrate voice codecs implemented by the TSF are: G.711A, G.711u, G.722, G.722.1 and G.729. • G.711 - The most commonly supported codec, used over the public switched telephone network. • G.722 - A wideband codec that is always preferred by Cisco Unified Communications Manager over G.711, unless G.722 is disabled. Audio codec often used in video conferences. • G.722.1 - A low-complexity wideband codec operating at 24 and 32 kb/s. The audio quality approaches that of G.722 while using at most half the bit rate. As it is optimized for both speech and music, G.722.1 has slightly lower speech quality than the speech-optimized iSAC codec. • G.729 - A Low-bit-rate codec with 8-kb/s compression that is typically used for calls across a WAN link because they use less bandwidth.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	The TOE implements asymmetric cryptography in support of TLS
FCS_CKM.1/Key-Gen	To support TLS, the TOE implements a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with RSA and ECC schemes that meet FIPS PUB 186-4. The key sizes are: • RSA scheme: 2048-bit • ECC using NIST curve of P-256, P-384, and P-521
FCS_CKM.2	To support TLS the TOE implements the following algorithms to perform key establishment: • RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet 800-56B • ECC key establishment schemes that meet SP800-56A TLS connections related to CAPF make exclusive use of RSA-based key establishment schemes. The other evaluated TLS connections exclusively use elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes.
FCS_COP.1/SKC	The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES as specified in ISO 18033-3 supporting the following modes: ○ CBC mode as specified in ISO 10116. ○ GCM mode as specified in ISO 19772. The TOE uses AES in the following protocol:

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	○ TLS: CBC mode with key size of 128 and 256 bits. GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.” SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are used in TLS to validate server certificates on establishing TLS connections. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are used when the TOE generates asymmetric keys for Elliptic curve-based key establishment. SHA-1 is used with SRTP. The hashing is used to support trusted updates where the TOE software is digitally signed using RSA 2048-bit key cryptography and SHA256 hashing.
FCS_COP.1/Sig	The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048.
FCS_COP.1/Key-Hash	The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-256 (key size – 256 bits, block size 512 bits), and HMAC-SHA-384 (key size – 384 bits, block size 1024 bits), and HMAC-SHA-512 (key size – 512 bits, block size 1024 bits).
FCS_COP.1/SRTP	For the STRP protocol, the TOE implements AES in CTR mode with a key size of 128 bits and GCM mode with a key size of 128 or 256 bits.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 /Client	The TOE implements HTTPS over TLS that complies with RFC2818. HTTPS is used to protect communications between the TOE and the CUCM server for authentication and configuration purposes. The HTTPS Client is implemented by the curl library which is bundled in the TOE. The curl library runs over the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) which is also bundled in the TOE. The curl library initiates a connection to the server on the appropriate port. When the TLS handshake has successfully finished, the curl library initiates the first HTTP request. The X.509 certificate presented by the server endpoint is validated before establishing the secure connection. The TOE will not establish an HTTPS connection when the peer certificate is deemed to be invalid. See section 5.3.4.1, X.509 Certificate Validation for details about certificate validation.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	The TOE invokes the BCryptGenRandom API on the platform when needed to generate a cryptographic key. This applies to the following SFRs: FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
FCS_STO_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE leverages the platform for securely storing persistent credentials. The TOE uses the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to store User password (secret). The TOE uses Windows Certificate Manager to store the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authentication
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1	The TOE implements secure RTP (SRTP) as defined in RFC 3711 to provide encryption and authentication of audio and video data streams between itself and a VVoIP endpoint. The TOE uses AES encryption/decryption supporting the following ciphersuites: • AEAD_AES_256_GCM

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	For incoming and outgoing calls, SRTP keys are exchanged as defined in section 4 of RFC 4568. The TOE uses the Session Description Protocol (SDP) within SIP signaling messages as the "inline" parameter within SDP packets. SRTP key exchange is accomplished through the "crypto" attribute (a=crypto) under the particular media type (m=video or m=audio) within the SDP. The format of the "crypto" attribute is shown below. a=crypto:<tag> <crypto-suite> <key-params> [<session-params>] The tag field is a decimal number used to uniquely distinguish multiple crypto attributes from each other. The crypto-suite field contains the cipher and message authentication algorithms for the particular crypto attribute. The key-params field itself has the format shown below. key-params = <key-method> ":" <key-info> The key-method field indicates the method by which keying material is exchanged and 'inline' indicates the keying information is contained within the SDP. An example of the use of SDP for SRTP is shown below: m=video 16386 RTP/SAVP 112 c=IN IP4 14.50.248.31 a=crypto:1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM inline:8V0Oj7duRGA1lxd1At5eYSpc8Q1qIR4o0Qq3Sr74ZR5+j3eFmro4CvPDvQQ= Since keying material is sent within SIP signaling, encryption of the SIP signaling is required to secure the key exchange. The TOE implements TLS to protect the SRTP key exchange between itself and the CUCM server. The CUCM SIP Server is responsible for the configuration of the policy regarding which ciphers are allowed. The TOE cannot override this configuration. The evaluated configuration requires the administrator of the CUCM SIP Server to configure only 'secure/encrypted' calls. By doing so attempts to call using SRTP NULL encryption fail.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE implements TLS 1.2 with the following ciphersuites: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS connections related to CAPF exclusively use TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. The other evaluated TLS connections make use of only the two TLS_ECDHE_RSA cipher suites.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5	The Cisco Jabber TOE implements secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 elliptic curve extensions in the supported_groups extension of the Client Hello packet. This is the behavior by default and is not configurable.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE restricts access to the following network connectivity resources: camera, microphone, USB, and Bluetooth. To function as a VVoIP product, access to network connectivity, the camera, and microphone resources are required. In addition, the TOE can access Bluetooth or USB hardware resources to control Bluetooth or USB audio devices.

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met																					
	The TOE restricts its access to the following repositories: ○ Address book and calendar – Needed to import contacts and for calling VVoIP users. ○ File-system – To import contacts, access to the file system is needed. ○ Photo Library – Users may import a photo from the photo library to be used on VVoIP calls.																					
FDP_NET_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE limits network communication to the following: ○ Initiation: Jabber allows initiation of Voice/Video (SIP over TLS/SRTP). ○ Jabber responds to: Voice/Video (SIP over TLS and SRTP communication initiated by a remote VoIP application via the ESC). Port/Protocol usage is listed in the table below: <table><tr><th>Port(s)</th><th>Protocol(s)</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>5061 (TCP)</td><td>SIP over TLS</td><td>Secure SIP signaling</td></tr><tr><td>16384 to 32766 (UDP)</td><td>SRTP</td><td>Cisco Unified Communications Manager media port range used for audio, video, and BFCP video desktop share.</td></tr><tr><td>443, 8443, 6972 (TCP)</td><td>HTTPS</td><td>HTTPS communications with CUCM for authentication and, Jabber configuration download.</td></tr><tr><td>3804 (TCP)</td><td>TLS</td><td>Cisco Certificate Authority Proxy Function.</td></tr><tr><td>80 (TCP)</td><td>HTTP</td><td>UDS Discovery. HTTP connection attempts are redirected to HTTPS.</td></tr><tr><td>1024-65535 (TCP)</td><td>HTTP</td><td>CRL and OCSP Revocation checking. TCP ports used are determined by the information within the certificate (AIA and/or CDP).</td></tr></table>	Port(s)	Protocol(s)	Description	5061 (TCP)	SIP over TLS	Secure SIP signaling	16384 to 32766 (UDP)	SRTP	Cisco Unified Communications Manager media port range used for audio, video, and BFCP video desktop share.	443, 8443, 6972 (TCP)	HTTPS	HTTPS communications with CUCM for authentication and, Jabber configuration download.	3804 (TCP)	TLS	Cisco Certificate Authority Proxy Function.	80 (TCP)	HTTP	UDS Discovery. HTTP connection attempts are redirected to HTTPS.	1024-65535 (TCP)	HTTP	CRL and OCSP Revocation checking. TCP ports used are determined by the information within the certificate (AIA and/or CDP).
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1024-65535 (TCP)	HTTP	CRL and OCSP Revocation checking. TCP ports used are determined by the information within the certificate (AIA and/or CDP).																				
FDP_DAR_EXT.1	Sensitive data in the TOE is defined as: • The private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authentication • User password (secret) Each is protected in accordance with FCS_STO.EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE leverages the platform for securely storing persistent credentials. Specifically, the TOE uses the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to store User password (secret), and TOE uses Windows Certificate Manager to store the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authentication.																					

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
FDP_IFC.1	The TOE enforces a media transmission policy that ensures media data is not transmitted unless it is in a streaming media state as defined in the rules for FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1	The TOE enforces a media transmission policy that ensures user voice and video data is not transmitted until the following is met: • The TOE is registered with the ESC • A call has been established with a telephony device (VVoIP endpoint), • The TOE is in the off-hook state, • The TOE is not in the mute state, • The TOE is not in the hold state When a call is placed on voice mute (silence), the voice stream is not stopped, but voice data from the microphone is no longer being sent. Silence or comfort noise packets are sent depending on the configuration settings by CUCM SIP Server. When on mute, the audio component is no longer transmitting a signal. Hold always results in the existing SRTP streams being stopped and new SRTP streams (with new keys) being negotiated over SIP/SDP with the Music on Hold service.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 FIA_X509_EXT.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	The Cisco Jabber TOE invokes platform functionality to perform the following certificate validation: • Certificate validation and certificate path validation according to RFC 5280. • The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate. • All CA certificates must have the basicConstraints extension present and be of type CA=TRUE. • The certificate must not be revoked. Revocation is validated via the client device platform by OCSP and CRL revocation status check. • The certificate must not be expired. • The extendedKeyUsage field must be valid based on the following rules: ○ Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ○ Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ○ Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ○ S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ○ OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ○ Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field The Cisco Jabber TOE compares the FQDN of the server it is establishing connectivity with against the Subject Alternate Name-dnsName attributes in the certificate. If Jabber determines there is a mismatch, it will not establish the TLS trusted channel. This applies to all TLS connections Note: If the server certificate does not contain a SAN, the CN of the certificate is used for comparison purposes instead.

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	The TOE does not support the use of wildcards within certificates and does not support certificate pinning. The TOE relies upon the client device platform to verify the certificate at the point in time when it receives the server certificate as part of the process of establishing a secure connection to any server. If the TOE platform is unable to connect to the revocation server for example due to a network error, the TOE will not allow the certificate to be accepted. This behavior applies to all trusted channels. To obtain a X.509 certificate, the Cisco Jabber TOE must securely enroll in the Certificate Authority Proxy Function (CAPF) as instructed in the AGD. CAPF runs on the Cisco Unified Communications Manager and provides the TOE with X.509 certificates. The CAPF process also determines the certificate the TOE will use to establish a TLS connection. TLS mutual authentication is supported for the SIP connection between the TOE and CUCM Server.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE reads its configuration stored remotely on the SIP Server.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE is not installed with any preset default credentials. Users can only access files that are associated to the installation that user performed.
FMT_SMF.1	There are no security management functions performed by the Cisco Jabber TOE. The TSF automatically operates in a manner that meets the SFRs by default.
FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP	The initial configuration of the TOE is in an unregistered state. The TSF provides the ability to register the TOE to an Enterprise Session Controller (ESC) and to specify the termination period for idle calls. The registration of the TOE to the ESC is a manual process which can be performed by the TOE once the Operational Environment is appropriately configured by following the configuration steps identified in the AGD. See additional detail in FTA_SSL.3/Media for the case of idle call timeout configuration.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE does not transmit PII.
FPT_API_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE uses the following Windows APIs: CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, pChainContext, &PolicyPara, &PolicyStatus) CertGetCertificateChain(NULL, pCert, NULL, caMemStore, &ChainPara, CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY, NULL, &pChainContext)) CryptAcquireContext(&hCryptProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET) CryptCreateHash(hCryptProv, CALG_SHA1, 0, 0, &hHash) CryptHashData(hHash, pbContent, cbContent, 0) CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bHash, &dwHashLen, 0) Also see FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which details the use of the BCryptGenRandom windows API.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1	The compiler flag used to enable ASLR when the Cisco Jabber TOE is compiled is /DYNAMICBASE. The compiler flag used to enable stack-based buffer overflow protection in the Cisco Jabber TOE is /GS.

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
FPT_IDV_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE uses a sequence-based versioning control system. The application uses the “major.minor. maintenance.build” format for versioning control. For example: 15.0.4.56553. - Major (15 in the example above) designates a release where significant new features are added. - Minor (0 in the example above) designates a release where minor new features are added. - Maintenance Release (4 in the example above). - Build (56553 in the example above) are typically patches for vulnerabilities or bugs.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE uses the third-party libraries defined in table 13
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 ALC_TSU_EXT.1	The TOE has specific versions that can be queried by a user. A TOE update is not a patch applied to the existing TOE; it is a new version of the TOE. When TOE updates are made available by Cisco, an administrator can obtain and install the update. TOE software is digitally signed using RSA 4096-bit key and SHA256 hash, which is in line with the claims made for FCS_COP.1/Hash and FCS_COP.1/Sig. The platform performs verification and performs an install/upgrade/update if verification is successful. The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc". In a production environment, distribution to end users is typically achieved by use of a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution. MDM solutions allow Administrators to deploy the TOE software in mass while maintaining control of software version, mode of operation, and feature selection. All Cisco communications relating to security issues are handled by the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT). Cisco aims to provide fixes in 30 days, but depending on the timing, it may be greater than 30 days though not more than 60 days for most security issues. Fixes may be delayed longer for low-risk security issues. Updates are then made available at Cisco Software Central at: https://software.cisco.com. Customers can subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service to receive important information regarding product updates. Full information is provided in the Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy available at https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html Customers may securely report security issues to Cisco Support. For details on engaging Cisco Support, please reference Annex E: Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request.
FTA_SSL.3/Media	The Administrator can specify a remote call disconnect timer parameter in the jabber-config.xml file. If the "CommonCriteriaEndCallTimeout" parameter is specified, the administrator can set a value from 1 to 480 minutes. By default, Jabber will automatically terminate the voice/video media transmission to the remote peer if it determines it is no longer receiving SRTP/SDES traffic after 300 seconds (5 minutes) when operating in CC mode.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1	The Cisco Jabber TOE uses TLS and SRTP to encrypt transmitted sensitive data.
FTP_ITC.1/Control FTP_ITC.1/Media	Each time the TOE initiates or receives a VVoIP call, TLS is used to protect the SIP session management communication between itself and the ESC. Communication between the TOE and the remote VVoIP endpoint is protected with SRTP.

7 Supplemental TOE Summary Specification Information

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Jabber security functionality. The Jabber software calls the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) v7.3a that has been validated in accordance with the specified standards to meet the requirements listed below and all the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates.

See table below for CAVP certificates.

Table 17. CAVP Certificates

Platform/CPU	SFR	Algorithm	CAVP Certificate Number
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen	RSA 2048 bits	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen	ECC P-256/384/521	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_CKM.2	RSA 2048 bits	Tested with a known good implementation
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_CKM.2	CVL-KAS-ECC P-256/384/521	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_COP.1/SKC	CBC, GCM 128, 256 bits	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_COP.1/SRTP	CTR, GCM 128, 256 bits	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_COP.1/Hash	SHS SHA- 1/256/384/512	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_COP.1/Sig	RSA 2048 bits	A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake)	FCS_COP.1/KeyHash	HMAC SHA-256/384/512	A4446

Note: For brevity purposes, the Operating Environment (OE) on certificate A4446 is listed as “Win 11 on Intel Core i5 (Tiger Lake)”, however expanding the OE shows the full processor name as “Intel Core i5-1135G7”.

Note: Additionally, the Microsoft Windows Next Generation Cryptographic algorithm implementation, which provides enhanced support for DRBG, is packaged into a library used by Microsoft and other third-party applications is certified by NIST certificate A2645. This certification includes Windows 11 with a 11th Gen Intel Core i5-1135G7 processor, consistent with the TOE evaluated as part of this certification. This NIST certificate is mentioned as the evaluated TOE claims to invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality.

8 Annex A: References

The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST.

Table 18. References

Identifier	Description
[CC_PART1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[CC_PART2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
[CC_PART3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[APP]	Protection Profile for Application Software, v1.4, October 7, 2021
[VVoIP]	PP-Module for Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP), v1.0, October 28, 2020
[TLS]	Functional Package for TLS, v1.1, March 1, 2019

9 Annex B: Acronyms

The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.

Table 19. Acronyms

Acronym/Term	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standards
API	Application Programming Interface
CBR	Constant bitrate
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CM	Configuration Management
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CUCM	Cisco Unified Communication Manager
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESC	Enterprise Session Controller
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OS	Operating System
PP	Protection Profile
RFC	Request For Comment
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SDES	Security Descriptions for Media Streams
SDP	Session Description Protocol
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol

SRTP	Security Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transport Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function
UCM	[Cisco] Unified Communications Manager
UDP	User datagram protocol
VoIP	Voice over IP
VVoIP	Voice and Video over IP

10 Annex C: Terminology

The following terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.

Table 20. Terms

Term	Definition
Authorized Administrator	Any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform all TSF-related functions.
Certificate Authority Proxy Function (CAPF)	Process by which supported devices can request locally significant certificates by using Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration.
CUCM	Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) serves as the software-based call-processing component of the Cisco Unified Communications family of products. The CUCM extends enterprise telephony features and functions to packet telephony network devices such as IP phones, media processing devices, voice-over-IP (VoIP) gateways, and multimedia applications. CUCM is an Enterprise Session Controller.
Certificate Trust List (CTL)	A file signed by the Cisco Site Administrator Security Token (security token), that contains a list of certificates for servers that the phone is to trust.
CUCM (Call Manger) Cluster	A cluster refers to a CUCM Publisher (first CUCM server installed) and any associated Subscribers (CUCM servers installed after the Publisher and included in the Publishers servers list). For purposes of redundancy, Cisco recommends deployment of at least a Publisher an one subscriber, however from a functional standpoint, Jabber clients only register to a single server at a time.
CUCM (Call Manager) Node	A node refers to a member of a CUCM cluster. The term is used in reference to a publisher or associated Subscribers.
Enterprise Session Controller (ESC)	A VVoIP infrastructure device that is used to set up and tear down calls between VVoIP endpoints
Peer	Another VVoIP device also in communication with the CUCM that is capable of exchanging media packets with the TOE as part of an establishes media session.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)	A communications protocol defined by IETF that is used for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions with multiple participants.
Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)	A protocol that is used to provide multimedia (voice/video) streaming services with added security of encryption, message authentication and integrity, and replay protection.
SIP Server	The SIP Server (in this evaluation it is the Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) interacts with a VoIP client (TOE) and provides registrar and proxy capabilities required for call-session management as well as establishing, processing, and terminating VoIP calls.
User	Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.

11 Annex D: Differing SFR Naming Conventions

Note that iterations in [App] are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)") and iterations in [VVoIP] are identified by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration. This table serves to map on format to another.

Table 21. SFR Naming Map

Component Name	Component Identification (Number) Format	Component Identification /Test Format
Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption	FCS_COP.1(1)	FCS_COP.1/SKC
Cryptographic Operation - Hashing	FCS_COP.1(2)	FCS_COP.1/Hash
Cryptographic Operation - Signing	FCS_COP.1(3)	FCS_COP.1/Sig
Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication	FCS_COP.1(4)	FCS_COP.1/KeyHash
SRTP Cryptographic Operation (Encryption/Decryption for SRTP)	FCS_COP.1(5)	FCS_COP.1/SRTP
Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation	FCS_CKM.1(1)	FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen
Password Conditioning	FCS_CKM.1(3)	FCS_CKM.1/Password

12 Annex E: Obtaining Documentation, Submitting a Service Request, and Contacting Cisco

The Cisco Jabber 15.2 Common Criteria Configuration Guide (AGD) should be obtained from the Product Listing on the NIAP site.

For information on obtaining other documentation, submitting a service request, and gathering additional information, see the monthly *What's New in Cisco Product Documentation*, which also lists all new and revised Cisco technical documentation at:

With CCO login: <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/docs/general/whatsnew/whatsnew.html>

Without CCO login: <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/whatsnew/whatsnew.html>

Subscribe to the *What's New in Cisco Product Documentation* as a Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed and set content to be delivered directly to your desktop using a reader application. The RSS feeds are a free service and Cisco currently supports RSS version 2.0.

You can access the most current Cisco documentation on the World Wide Web at the following site:

<http://www.cisco.com>

Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/offices>

Additionally, Cisco.com serves as a starting point for all technical assistance. Customers and partners can obtain documentation, troubleshooting tips, and sample configurations from online tools. For Cisco.com registered users, additional troubleshooting tools are available from the TAC website.

Cisco.com is the foundation of a suite of interactive, networked services that provides immediate, open access to Cisco information and resources at any time, from anywhere in the world. This highly integrated Internet application is a powerful, easy-to-use tool for doing business with Cisco.

Cisco.com provides a broad range of features and services to help customers and partners streamline business processes and improve productivity. Through Cisco.com, you can find information about Cisco and our networking solutions, services, and programs. In addition, you can resolve technical issues with online technical support, download and test software packages, and order Cisco learning materials and merchandise. Valuable online skill assessment, training, and certification programs are also available.

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To access Cisco.com, go to the following website:

<http://www.cisco.com>