The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Haivision Makito Video Encoders with firmware version 2.1.1-3. The following models were evaluated:
\r\n| \r\n Makito Video Encoders with firmware version 2.1.1-3. \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n Product Reference # \r\n | \r\n\r\n Description \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Blades \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n B-290E-DVI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-DVI H.264 Encoder blade \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n B-290E-DVI-S \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-DVI H.264 Encoder blade with serial port \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n B-290E-HDSDI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-SDI H.264 Encoder blade \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n B-280E-SDI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Barracuda SD-SDI H.264 Encoder blade \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Firmware Options \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n SW-290E-KLV \r\n | \r\n\r\n KLV metadata support, a licensable feature providing Key Length Value encoding functionality \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCO-SV-SW-CONFIG \r\n | \r\n\r\n A specific firmware version can be requested by including this part number in the purchase order. Please specify the 2.1.1-3 release as part of the configuration information in order to receive the firmware described in this Security Target. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Chassis \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n F-280-1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Single-slot Barracuda enclosure with AC power supply \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-290-1DH \r\n | \r\n\r\n Dual height, single-slot Makito enclosure with AC power supply \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-290-1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Single-slot Makito enclosure with AC power supply \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-MB6B-RAC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Second generation 6-slot chassis with redundant AC power supply (can hold any B- blade) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-MB6X-RAC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Same as F-MB6B-RAC, but with new power supplies for MakitoX series (can hold any B- blade) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-MB6B-DC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Second generation 6-slot chassis with DC power supply (can hold any B- blade) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-MB6B-MED \r\n | \r\n\r\n Second generation 6-slot chassis with medical-grade AC power supply (can hold any B- blade) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n F-MB21B-R \r\n | \r\n\r\n Second generation 21-slot chassis with redundant power supplies (can hold any B- blade) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Appliances \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n S-280E-SDI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Barracuda SD-SDI H.264 Encoder appliance (B-280E-SDI) in single-card enclosure (F-280-1) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n S-290E-HDSDI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-SDI H.264 Encoder appliance (B-290EHDSDI) in single-card enclosure (F-290-1) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n S-290E-DVI \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-DVI H.264 Encoder appliance (B-290EDVI) in single-card enclosure (F-290-1) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n S-290E-DVI-S \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito HD-DVI H.264 Encoder appliance (B-290EDVI-S) in single-card, dual-height enclosure (F-290-1DH) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n S-290E-AIR \r\n | \r\n\r\n Makito Air Ruggedized HD/SD H.264 Video Encoder with SW-290E-KLV \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
The TOE is a full-featured, high-performance IP audio/video encoder that is capable of encoding H.264 video at resolutions of up to 1080p60, with a latency of less than 55 milliseconds. The TOE can also support computer display input at resolutions up to 1920x1080@60 Hz or 1280x1024@75 Hz.
\r\nThe TOE can take any one of several forms, based on a combination of blades, firmware options, and chassis/appliances described in the tables below. Please note the following:
\r\n• Each blade is identical except for the number and type of physical interfaces.
\r\n• The KLV firmware option refers to non-TSF related functionality (factory installed).
\r\n• Firmware version is 2.1.1-3.
\r\n• Chassis serve only to enclose the blades and to provide power distribution.
\r\n• Appliances are a combination of one blade in a single-slot enclosure.
\r\nThe differences in the blades include the number of ports, interfaces, and throughput. Although these blades have different specifications (in terms of performance and capabilities), they all provide the same security functions described in the ST. They are therefore considered to be the same for the purposes of the ST description.
","evaluation_configuration":null,"security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Haivision Makito Video Encoders with firmware version 2.1.1-3 was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3. COACT, Inc. determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 1. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Haivision Makito 2.1 Hardening Guide, Document Number HVS-PD-IG-MAK211, May 29, 2013 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Haivision Makito 2.1 Security Target, Document Number: HVS-PD-ST-MAK211, Version 1.1, May 29, 2013. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in June 2013. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report, (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10501-2013, dated June 2013) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Makito Video Encoders with firmware version 2.1.1-3 TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
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Security audit - The TOE is designed to be able to generate audit logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE is configured in the evaluated configuration to send the logs to a designated syslog server.
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Cryptographic support – The TOE includes Cryptographic functions that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and asymmetric key generation features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including TLS, HTTPS, and SSH. The TOE algorithms were validated through the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP).
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User data protection - There is no private user data per se transiting through the TOE. Users of the TOE are passive viewers/listeners of common media streams (MPEG-TS, RTP, RTMP, or QuickTime) encoded in real-time from the TOE audio, video, and metadata inputs, and transmitted unprotected on the network.
\r\nThe input signal is the same for all viewers/listeners and is considered to be the organization’s data for which confidentiality, authenticity and integrity is not the responsibility of the TOE. Viewers/listeners of the media streams do not have to be identified users of the TOE. The knowledge of the multicast address (and the protocols) provides access to the content. If RTSP is enabled on the TOE, the knowledge of the URL of the media stream is enough to provide access to it.
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Identification and authentication - The TSF maintains local administrative user name/password/role databases for interactive management sessions.
\r\nSecurity Administrators manage all administrative users’ account with the CLI account command or the WCI Accounts page. Password policies are managed with the CLI policy (password) command or the WCI Policies page.
\r\nPassword policies are not enforced by the TSF when Security Administrators create accounts or reset the password of other users’ accounts. Instead, the password is forced to expire and the account owner is required to change its password upon next login.
\r\nAdministrative users can change their own password using the CLI passwd command or the WCI My Account page (or their own Account page for Security Administrators), constrained by the password policies.
\r\nAdministrative users can also manage their SSH authorized public keys using the CLI pubkey command or the WCI My Account page (or their own Account page for Security Administrators). Security Administrators can manage any administrative user’s public keys with the CLI account command or the WCI Accounts page.
\r\nSecurity management- The TOE Security Administrators can create login accounts and assign them to one of the following roles: Administrator, Operator, or Guest. The CLI account command or the WCI Accounts page is used to create an administrative user account and assign it a role.
\r\nThe TOE Administrator role maps to the Security Administrator role described in the security target and the applicable Protection Profile.
\r\nThe Administrators manage the TSF and the media streams. The Operators manage the media streams, and the Guests can only read the media stream configuration and monitor the status of the TOE.
\r\nAll roles are permitted to log on the TOE using the CLI or the web interface (WCI), but their actions on the TOE are limited by their role.
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Protection of the TSF- The TSF Data is mostly stored on a flash-memory based Linux file system, in files and databases that are readable and writable by the root user only.
\r\nThe root account is not used to log in to the TOE and is locked down at the factory.
\r\nThe ability to manage the TSF data is provided to the Security Administrators through the sudo Linux command for a limited set of operations.
\r\nThe TOE flash-memory based file system is supported by a micro-SD device that can be ejected if the TOE enclosure is opened. The environment shall then provide physical security to the TOE as stipulated by the A.PHYSICAL assumption.
\r\nThe firmware is based on the Linux operating system and proprietary applications that can be upgraded from digitally signed packages only.
\r\nTOE access - The TOE presents a warning and consent message before establishing an interactive session with any user role (Administrator, Operator, or Guest) and terminates the session if it remains idle for a configured period of time.
\r\nAn interactive session is established either via local CLI using the serial port, or remotely via CLI with SSH or a web browser using HTTPS.
\r\nTrusted path/channels - The TSF can be configured to transmit its audit records to a remote audit server. The TSF also supports remote interactive CLI and web interface sessions.
\r\nThe cryptographic support for the CC evaluated configuration is set with the CLI policy (crypto) command or WCI Policies page. Setting the crypto compliance policy to Makito21st (Makito 2.1 Security Target) sets, upon next reboot, the FIPS mode of operation of the cryptographic module, along with other cryptographic restrictions for TLS, SSH, and HTTPS.
","features":[]}