{"product_id":10503,"v_id":10503,"product_name":"Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router","certification_status":"Certified","certification_date":"2014-05-08T00:00:00Z","tech_type":"Network Device, Router, Sharing Switch","vendor_id":{"name":"Brocade Communications Systems LLC A Broadcom Inc. Company","website":"www.broadcom.com"},"vendor_poc":"Chris Marks","vendor_phone":"408-333-0480","vendor_email":"marksc@brocade.com","assigned_lab":{"cctl_name":"Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory"},"product_description":"<p>The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router products with IOS 5.3, including the following MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Hardware Platforms:</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Brocade MLX Series Hardware Platforms:  \r\n<ul>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-DC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-DC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-DC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-DC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-DC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-AC</li>\r\n<li>BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-DC</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n</li>\r\n<li>Each MLX Series device runs the following evaluated software (IOS 5.3), as displayed by the &lsquo;show version&rsquo; CLI command:  \r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Boot: Version 5.3.0T165 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Nov 16 2011 at 10:05:30 labeled as xmprm05300 (517880 bytes) from boot flash</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Monitor: Version 5.3.0T165 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Nov 16 2011 at 10:04:52 labeled as xmb05300 (524496 bytes) from code flash</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>IronWare: Version 5.3.0eT163 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Apr 22 2014 at 22:02:40 labeled as xmr05300ea (8116989 bytes) from Primary</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Brocade NetIron CER 2000 Series Hardware Platforms:  \r\n<ul>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2024C-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2024C-ADVPREM-DC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-DC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048C-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048C-ADVPREM-DC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048CX-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048CX-ADVPREM-DC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-DC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-AC</li>\r\n<li>NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-DC.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n</li>\r\n<li>Each NetIron CER 2000 Series device runs the following evaluated software (IOS 5.3), as displayed by the &lsquo;show version&rsquo; CLI command:  \r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Boot: Version 5.3.0T185 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Nov 16 2011 at 10:06:46 labeled as ceb05300 (447585 bytes) from boot flash</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Monitor: Version 5.3.0T185 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Nov 16 2011 at 10:06:46 labeled as ceb05300 (447585 bytes) from code flash</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>IronWare: Version 5.3.0eT183 Copyright (c) 1996-2009 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>Compiled on Apr 22 2014 at 22:30:18 labeled as ce05300ea (14496944 bytes) from Primary.</p>\r\n<p class=\"Body\">Each MLX and NetIron CER 2000 router comprises a hardware appliance running Brocade&rsquo;s proprietary IronWare Operating System (IOS). &nbsp;Each MLX and NetIron CER 2000 router appliance is designed to manage the flow of network information.</p>\r\n<p>In the context of this evaluation, the TOE is a network device that provides a secure base, primarily involving auditing, cryptographic support (for network communication and update integrity), user identification and authentication, and secure management and product updates, for its other operational functions primarily related to switching and routing IP network traffic.</p>","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"<p>The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. &nbsp;The criteria against which the Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3. &nbsp;The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3. Leidos Inc. (formerly Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)) determined that the TOE satisfies the requirements specified in <em>Protection Profile for Network Devices</em>, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012.&nbsp; The product, when installed and configured as identified in the product guidance documentation, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router Security Target, Version 1.0, 30 January 2014.</p>\r\n<p>A validation team on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body monitored the evaluation carried out by Leidos. &nbsp;The evaluation was completed in May 2014. &nbsp;Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10503-2014), prepared by CCEVS.</p>","environmental_strengths":"<p>The evaluation of the Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router TOE provides assurance that the security functions implemented by the TOE satisfy the security functional requirements specified in the Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router Security Target and that the guidance documentation describes how to use the TOE in a secure fashion. Assurance was achieved by the performance of the assurance activities specified in <em>Protection Profile for Network Devices</em>, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012.</p>\r\n<p>Brocade MLX and NetIron CER 2000 Series Router implements the following security functions:</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li><strong>Security Audit:</strong> The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs on the network. </li>\r\n<li><strong>Cryptographic Support:</strong> The TOE includes a cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols, including SSHv2 and TLSv1.0.</li>\r\n<li><strong>User Data Protection:</strong> The TOE performs a variety of network routing functions, passing network traffic among its various network connections. &nbsp;While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic routing, the TOE is designed to ensure that it doesn&rsquo;t inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic. &nbsp;This is accomplished primarily by controlling the size of all buffers, fully overwriting buffer contents, and zero-padding of memory structures and buffers when necessary.</li>\r\n<li><strong>Identification and Authentication:</strong> The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules.&nbsp; It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.</li>\r\n<li><strong>Security Management:</strong> The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. &nbsp;The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. &nbsp;Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management.  \r\n<ul>\r\n<li><strong>Protection of the TSF:&nbsp; </strong>The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.&nbsp; It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).&nbsp; Note that the TOE is a single appliance or a closely grouped (e.g., in the same rack) collection of appliances acting as a unit. As such, no intra-TOE communication subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).&nbsp; The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.</li>\r\n<li><strong>TOE acce</strong><strong>ss:&nbsp; </strong>The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.<strong></strong></li>\r\n<li><strong>Trusted path/chan</strong><strong>nels:&nbsp; </strong>The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access, for which both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured.&nbsp; If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, the attempted connection will not be established.&nbsp; The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n</li>\r\n</ul>","features":[]}