The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Hewlett-Packard 6125 Ethernet Blade Switch Series, comprising the 6125G and 6125G/XG Ethernet blade switches with Comware version 5.20.99, Release 2108. The HP 6125 Ethernet blade switches are c-class blade-system switches that can be installed in the HP BladeSystem c3000 and c7000 enclosures and provide network connectivity to HP servers.
\r\nThe TOE can be deployed as a single device or alternately as a group of 6125 Series devices connected using the HP Intelligent Resilient Framework (IRF) technology to effectively form a logical switch device. Using IRF, HP6125G and HP6125G/XG switches can be combined together at the enclosure, rack or datacenter level into a single virtual switch and managed through a single IP address for high bandwidth applications. The IRF technology does not require that switches be co-located, but can be attached using standard Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) for automatic load balancing and high availability.
\r\nThe HP 6125 Ethernet Blade Switch Series devices are Gigabit Ethernet switch appliances consisting of hardware and software components. The underlying hardware shares a similar architecture and has the same form factor. The software is identical for the 6125G and 6125G/XG blade switches.
\r\nThe HP 6125 Ethernet Blade Switch Series devices are used in network environments that include remote office applications, clustering, and virtual machine applications or wherever IPv6, full layer 3 routing and distributed trunking are required for 1GB applications.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Hewlett-Packard 6125 Ethernet Blade Switch Series were judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Preparative Procedures for CC NDPP Evaluated Hewlett-Packard 6125G & 6125G/XG Network Switches based on Comware V5 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Hewlett-Packard Company 6125 Ethernet Blade Switch Series Security Target, Version 2.3, 26 June 2014. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in June 2014. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Security Audit
\r\nThe TOE is able to generate audit records of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the audit records locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the audit records to a configured external audit server.
\r\nCryptographic Support
\r\nThe TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms that provide key management, random bit generation, symmetric encryption/decryption, digital signature services, secure hashing and keyed-hash message authentication capabilities in support of higher level cryptographic protocols, including IPsec and SSHv2. Note that in order to be in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured in FIPS mode, to ensure that the TOE is consistent with the FIPS 140-2 standard.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE performs network switching and routing functions, passing network traffic among its various physical and logical (e.g., VLAN) network connections. While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic forwarding, the TOE is designed to ensure that it doesn’t inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE requires users (i.e., administrators) to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console and a network accessible interface (CLI via SSHv2) for interactive administrator sessions. The TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. Additionally, the TOE can be configured to utilize the services of trusted RADIUS and TACACS servers in the operational environment to support, for example, centralized user administration.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE provides the CLI to access its security management functions. Security management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
\r\nIt protects sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nWhen deployed as an IRF group, all devices that are part of the IRF group are co-located and directly connected to form one instance of the TOE. IRF communication is not considered communication between distributed TOE components; rather, it is communication among co-located components that logically form an instance of the TOE. Since the IRF communication channels are not protected using mechanisms such as encryption, they need to be as protected as the TOE devices themselves.
\r\nThe TOE uses cryptographic means to protect communication with remote administrators. When the TOE is configured to use the services of a syslog server or authentication servers in the operational environment, the communication between the TOE and the operational environment component is protected using encryption.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display administrator-configured advisory banners. A login banner can be configured to display warning information along with login prompts. The banners will be displayed when accessing the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access. Using SSHv2, both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured.
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with network peers, such as an audit server, using IPsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
","features":[]}