{"product_id":10558,"v_id":10558,"product_name":"Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2) running IOS 15.0(2)SE4","certification_status":"Not Certified","certification_date":"2014-02-07T00:02:00Z","tech_type":"Network Device","vendor_id":{"name":"Cisco Systems, Inc.","website":"https://www.cisco.com"},"vendor_poc":"Ashit Vora","vendor_phone":"703-484-5118","vendor_email":"asvora@cisco.com","assigned_lab":{"cctl_name":"Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory"},"product_description":"<p>The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst Switches (including 2960S, 2960C, 3560V2, and 3750V2) &nbsp;running IOS 15.0(2)SE4. The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with OSI Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. As a Layer2 switch, it performs analysis of incoming frames, makes forwarding decisions based on information contained in the frames, and forwards the frames toward the destination.&nbsp; As a Layer3 switch, it supports routing of traffic based on tables identifying available routes, conditions, distance, and costs to determine the best route for a given packet.</p>","evaluation_configuration":null,"security_evaluation_summary":"<p>The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco Catalyst 3K Switches were judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3.&nbsp; The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3.&nbsp; Leidos (formerly SAIC) determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 1.&nbsp; The product, when delivered configured as identified in the <em>Cisco Catalyst 2960S, 2960C, 3560V2, and 3750V2</em> <em>Switches Common Criteria Operational User Guidance ad Preparative Procedures</em> document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the&nbsp;<em>Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2, and 3750V2) Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4 Security Target</em>&nbsp;(Version 1.0). The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.&nbsp; The evaluation was completed in February 2014.&nbsp; Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.</p>","environmental_strengths":"<p><strong><em>Security Audit</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail or a configurable audit trail threshold to track the storage capacity of the audit trail. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted IPSec channel to an external audit server.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Cryptographic Support</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure trusted path and channel connections with other IT entities via IPSec. This cryptography has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>User Data Protection</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE also ensures that packets transmitted from the TOE do not contain residual information from previous packets.&nbsp; Packets that are not the required length use zeros for padding so that residual data from previous traffic is never transmitted from the TOE.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Identification and Authentication</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of remote IT device peers and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the TOEs secure CLI administrative interface. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or remote interfaces. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database or optionally supports the use of a RADIUS or TACACS+ AAA server for authentication.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Security Management</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure session via IPsec, a terminal server directly connected to the Catalysis Switch (RJ45), or a local console connection (serial port). The TOE provides the ability to perform the following actions:</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>allows      authorized administrators to add new administrators, </li>\r\n<li>start-up      and shutdown the device, </li>\r\n<li>create,      modify, or delete configuration items,</li>\r\n<li>modify and      set session inactivity thresholds, </li>\r\n<li>modify and      set the time and date, </li>\r\n<li>and create,      delete, empty, and review the audit trail&nbsp; </li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p>All of these management functions are restricted to the authorized administrator of the TOE.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Protection of the TSF</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of malicious software. The TOE internally maintains the date and time. Administrators can update the TOE&rsquo;s clock manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE&rsquo;s clock with an external time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and that of the cryptographic module.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Resource Utilization</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE provides the capability of controlling and managing resources so that a denial of service will not occur.&nbsp; The resource allocations are configured to limit the number of concurrent administrator sessions</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>TOE Access</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an authorized administrator configurable time-period.&nbsp; Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.&nbsp; The TOE also provides the administrator with the ability to display a notification of use banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Trusted Path/Channels</em></strong><strong></strong></p>\r\n<p>Trusted path and channel connections to/from the TOE are protected using the standards defined within the Cryptographic Support section. The TOE establishes a trusted path or channel between itself and the remote management station, peer IT devices, syslog servers, RADIUS Servers, and TACACS+ Servers.</p>","features":[]}