The Cisco 5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Router (ESR) running IOS 15.2(4)GC (herein after referred to as the 5915, 5940, ESR, the router, or the TOE). The TOE is a high-performance, ruggedized router designed for use in harsh environments-offering reliable operation in extreme temperatures and under shock and vibration conditions typical for mobile applications in rugged terrain.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco 5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Routers were judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. Leidos (formerly SAIC) determined that the product, when delivered configured as identified in the Cisco 5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Router, Common Criteria Operational User Guidance And Preparative Procedures document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco 5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Router Security Target Version 1.0, October 13, 2014. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in November 2014. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Security audit
\r\nThe Cisco 5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Router provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The Cisco ESR routers generate an audit record for each auditable event. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event. The administrator configures auditable events, backs-up, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the audit trail protection by providing remote backup to a syslog server over an encrypted channel. The audit messages include a timestamp that can be provided by the TOE or an optional NTP server in the operational environment.
\r\nCryptographic support
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco ESR security functionality. This cryptography has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative management via SSHv2.
\r\nFull residual information protection
\r\nThe TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from the TOE.
\r\nIdentification and authentication
\r\nThe TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules that includes special characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE optionally supports use of a RADIUS or TACACS+ AAA server (part of the IT Environment) to facilitate authentication (including single-use authentication, or password-based authentication) for administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
\r\nThe TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec and SSH connections.
\r\nSecurity management
\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
\r\nThe TOE supports two separate administrative roles: non-privileged Administrator and privileged Administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform all of the above security relevant management functions. The privileged Administrator is also considered to be the Authorized Administrator and Security Administrator.
\r\nAdministrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.
\r\nPacket Filtering
\r\nThe TOE provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map sets.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
\r\nUse of separate VLANs is used to ensure routing protocol communications between the TOE and neighbor routers including routing table updates and neighbor router authentication will be logically isolated from traffic on other VLANs.
\r\nThe TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
\r\nThe TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of malicious software.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
\r\nThe TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels. The peer-to-peer VPN tunnels can be used for securing the session between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server. In addition, the TOE can establish secure VPN tunnels with IPsec VPN clients. Remote VPN clients are able to securely connect into the ESR over an encrypted session in order to connect to an authorized internal private network.
\r\nThe TOE also supports direct connections from VPN clients, and protects against threats related to those client connections. The TOE disconnects sessions that have been idle too long, can be configured to deny sessions based on IP, time, and day, and can be configured to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network addresses.
","features":[]}