The Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 Series TOE are full-featured, modular aggregation platforms. They are designed for the cost-effective delivery of converged mobile, residential, and business services. The TOE provides scalable feature set of layer 2 switching and layer 3 routing services, redundancy, low power consumption, and high service scale in routers optimized for small aggregation and remote point-of-presence (POP) applications.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 series routers were evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. Acumen Security determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 1. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 series Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 series Security Target. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in February 2015. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Security audit
\r\nThe Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 Series provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event. Auditable events include: failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of an IPsec SA; establishment, termination and failure of an SSH session; modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized administrator roles; all use of the user identification mechanism; any use of the authentication mechanism; any change in the configuration of the TOE, changes to time, initiation of TOE update, indication of completion of TSF self-test, maximum sessions being exceeded, termination of a remote session and attempts to unlock a termination session; and initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
\r\nThe TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be configured to block new permit actions.
\r\nThe logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the authorized administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
\r\nCryptographic support
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 900 Series security functionality.
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative management via SSHv2.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from the TOE.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE optionally supports use of a RADIUS or TACACS+ AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
\r\n• All TOE administrative users;
\r\n• All identification and authentication;
\r\n• All audit functionality of the TOE;
\r\n• All TOE cryptographic functionality;
\r\n• The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
\r\n• Update to the TOE; and
\r\n• TOE configuration file storage and retrieval.
\r\nThe TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions.
\r\nAdministrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
\r\nThe TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.
\r\nThe TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of Authorized Administrator software.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
\r\nThe TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\nTrusted path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server.
","features":[]}