The Apriva MESA VPN server is an IPsec VPN gateway designed to provide mobile devices with a secure connection to a protected network.
\r\n","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Apriva MESA VPN server TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 3. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the Apriva MESA VPN NIAP Guidance, Version 1.0, July 16, 2015 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Apriva MESA VPN Security Target, Version 0.10, July 15, 2015. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in July 2015. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report, (report number CCEVS-VR-10602-2015, dated 7 August 2015) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe security functions that define the logical boundaries of the Apriva MESA VPN server TOE are summarized below.
\r\nAudit
\r\nThe TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The TOE maintains a local audit log as well as sending the audit records to a remote Syslog server. Audit records sent to the remote server are protected by a TLSv1.2 connection. Each audit record includes identity (username, IP address, or process), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event. The TOE prevents modification to the local audit log.
\r\nCryptographic Operations
\r\nThe TOE implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms for random bit generation, encryption/decryption, authentication, and integrity protection/verification. These algorithms are used to provide security for the SSH, TLS, and IPsec (IKEv2 and ESP) protocols.
\r\nThe TOE zeroizes all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs once they are no longer required.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE ensures that previous content of network packets is not reused in subsequent network packets. The TOE zeroizes IPsec buffers when the packet has been transmitted. The TOE ensures that all other network buffers are zeroized upon allocation of the buffer.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password combination or a username/SSH_RSA key combination. The TSF does not allow access to any administrative functions prior to successful authentication. The TOE has the capability to lock a remote user’s account if that user exceeds the configured number of failed authentication attempts.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE implements a limited command line interface (CLI) to allow authorized administrators to configure the TOE. This interface restricts the administrator to executing commands required to configure and administer the TOE.
\r\nPacket Filtering
\r\nThe TOE filters packets received on the physical interfaces and virtual interfaces (IPsec tunnels). The TOE reads each packet’s header and can be configured to allow or deny the packet based on IPv4 source address, IPv4 destination address, Transport Layer Protocol (if specified in an IPv4 header), TCP or UDP source port, and TCP or UDP destination port.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE protects itself through a number of features. The CLI does not provide commands for the administrator to display secret and private keys. The TOE ensures timestamps and timeouts are accurate by maintaining a real-time clock for measuring time as well as polling an NTP server to mitigate drift.
\r\nThe TOE implements self-tests to verify its correct operation prior to offering protected services (VPN functionality). If the initial self-tests fail or the ongoing health tests fail, the TOE shuts down the VPN functionality and blocks all traffic to or from the network interfaces that were running VPN tunnels.
\r\nThe TOE automatically verifies the authenticity and integrity of updates by requiring the updates to be digitally signed. The TOE verifies that every update is signed by RedHat or Apriva prior to installing the update.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display a warning and consent banner when an administrator attempts to establish an interactive session. The TOE also enforces a configurable inactivity timeout for remote administrative and IPsec sessions.
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to deny establishment of a VPN client session based on the time, day, and/or remote client’s IP address.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE uses IPsec or TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and all authorized IT entities. The trusted channels utilize X.509 certificates to perform mutual authentication. The TOE initiates the TLS trusted channel with the Syslog server while the TOE allows the remote VPN clients to initiate the IPsec trusted channel.
\r\nThe TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrative users.
","features":[]}