{"product_id":10610,"v_id":10610,"product_name":"Fidelis XPS version 8.0","certification_status":"Certified","certification_date":"2015-05-15T00:00:00Z","tech_type":"Network Device","vendor_id":{"name":"Fidelis Cybersecurity Inc.","website":"https://www.fidelissecurity.com"},"vendor_poc":"Gerald Mancini","vendor_phone":"301-652-7190","vendor_email":"jerry.mancini@fidelissecurity.com","assigned_lab":{"cctl_name":"Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory"},"product_description":"<p class=\"Default\">The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Fidelis XPS&trade; v8.0, a network security appliance solution for advanced threat detection. It detects inappropriate and malicious network data based on attributes of the network traffic, including content, source, destination, application, and aspects of the communication channel. Fidelis XPS&trade; v8.0 is used to prevent the intrusion of attacks and to prevent the transmission of sensitive data, either as a result of an attack or insider threat. It analyzes network activity and can issue alerts of significant events. Fidelis XPS&trade; v8.0 will also collect and store metadata from the network to allow an analyst to view the context associated with alerts and to analyze network activity. The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in <em>Protection Profile for Network Devices</em>, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012, as amended by Errata #3, dated 3 November 2014.&nbsp; The security functionality specified in the Protection Profile includes protection of communications between TOE components and with external IT entities, identification and authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, and ability to verify the source and integrity of updates to the TOE.</p>\r\n<p class=\"Body\">A TOE deployment comprises:</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>One or more Fidelis CommandPost&trade; v8.0 management console appliances, zero or more Fidelis XPS Collector v8.0 appliances and at least one of the following sensor appliances: Fidelis XPS Direct v8.0, Fidelis XPS Internal v8.0, Fidelis XPS Web v8.0, and Fidelis XPS Mail v8.0. </li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p class=\"Body\">OR</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Scout+ v8.0 (includes a CommandPost, a Direct Sensor, and a Collector in one box)</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p class=\"Body\">The specific appliance models (including virtual appliances) included in the scope of the evaluation are as follows:</p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>Fidelis CommandPost+ and Fidelis CommandPost PlusVM </li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Direct 50, Fidelis XPS Direct 100, Fidelis XPS Direct 250, Fidelis XPS Direct 500, Fidelis XPS Direct 1000, Fidelis XPS Direct 2500, and Fidelis XPS Direct VM </li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Internal 50, Fidelis XPS Internal 100, Fidelis XPS Internal 250, Fidelis XPS Internal 500, Fidelis XPS Internal 1000, Fidelis XPS Internal 2500, and Fidelis XPS Internal VM </li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Web and Fidelis XPS Web VM </li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Mail and Fidelis XPS Mail VM </li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Collector SA and Fidelis XPS Collector SA VM</li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Collector Cluster, which includes one Fidelis XPS Collector Controller, and multiple Fidelis XPS Collector XA nodes. A redundant Fidelis XPS Collector is optional</li>\r\n<li>Fidelis XPS Blade Array, which may include blades to implement either a Fidelis XPS Direct 2500 sensor or a Fidelis XPS Internal 2500 sensor on each blade. The blade array provides the same function as Direct or Internal sensors at up to 20Gbps throughput capability when fully loaded with blades.</li>\r\n</ul>\r\n<p class=\"Body\">The virtual appliances (designated by &ldquo;VM&rdquo; at the end of their names) were tested in a virtual environment&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; consistent with the requirements described in the Security Target, including an Intel i7-4770 processor in the host hardware system. More generally, the virtual appliances are supported on host hardware that includes Intel Core or Xeon processors based on the Ivy Bridge or Haswell microarchitecture, which implement Intel Secure Key.</p>","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"<p class=\"Default\">The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and policies. The criteria against which Fidelis XPS&trade; v8.0 was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4.&nbsp;The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4.&nbsp;The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the <em>Fidelis XPS Enterprise Setup and Configuration Guide</em>, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in <em>Fidelis XPS&trade; Security Target</em>, Version 1.0, 3 April 2015<em>.</em> The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.&nbsp; The evaluation was completed in April 2015.&nbsp; Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.</p>","environmental_strengths":"<p><strong><em>Security Audit</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE is able to generate logs of security relevant events, including the events specified in NDPP. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and can also be configured to send the logs to a designated external log server.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Cryptographic Support</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE is operated in FIPS mode and includes a NIST-validated OpenSSL cryptographic module.&nbsp; The module provides key generation, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication capabilities in support of higher level cryptographic protocols, including HTTP over TLS.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>User Data Protection</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE ensures resources used in processing network traffic are suitably cleared prior to allocation of the resource.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Identification and Authentication</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE requires users (i.e., administrators) to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security management functions provided by the TOE. The TOE offers a network accessible GUI (HTTP over TLS) for interactive administrator sessions.</p>\r\n<p>The TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. Additionally, the TOE can be configured to use the services of trusted LDAP/Active Directory servers in the operational environment.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Security Management</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE provides a GUI to access the security management functions. Security management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after the administrator has provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE.</p>\r\n<p>The TOE also provides a local management capability. All administrative functionality available from the GUI is also available via direct serial console connection using the special debug account. However, the TOE is intended to be managed from a remote HTTPS/TLS client via the GUI provided by the TOE&rsquo;s CommandPost component.&nbsp; Following the initial configuration, all changes should be performed by an authorized user from CommandPost. The TOE implements a System Administrator role that corresponds to the NDPP Security Administrator.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Protection of the TSF</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE implements a number of self-protection features intended to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.</p>\r\n<p>It protects sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).</p>\r\n<p>The TOE uses TLS and HTTPS to protect communications between distributed TOE components.</p>\r\n<p>The TOE implements a self-test integrity mechanism that verifies the integrity of each TOE process before it is started. It also includes mechanisms to verify the authenticity and integrity of software updates to ensure the updates do not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>TOE Access</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to an administrator being permitted to establish an interactive session. Prior to a user logging in, the user must indicate whether or not to continue with the authentication process. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated.</p>\r\n<p><strong><em>Trusted Path/Channels</em></strong></p>\r\n<p>The TOE protects interactive communications with remote administrators using HTTP over TLS. TLS ensures both integrity and disclosure protection.</p>\r\n<p>The TOE protects communications with network peers, such as log server, Fidelis Insight Server and authentication servers, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of the transferred data.</p>","features":[]}