The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Samsung Z with Tizen version 2.3.
\r\nThe TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke through the use of an MDM Server or through a dedicated administrative application. The TOE must be configured as follows in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to CC mode.
\r\n· Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, or facial recognition screen locks are not allowed).
\r\n· The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to ten.
\r\n· Device encryption must be enabled.
\r\n· SDCard encryption must be enabled.
\r\n· Revocation checking must be enabled.
\r\nWhen CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows.
\r\n· The TOE sets the system wide Tizen CC mode property to “Enabled”.
\r\n· The TOE performs FIPS 140-2 power-on self-tests.
\r\n· The TOE performs self-tests for the key management.
\r\n· The TOE performs secure boot integrity checking of the kernel and key system executables.
\r\n· The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur through FOTA (Samsung’s Firmware Over The Air firmware update method)
\r\n· The TOE uses FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic ciphers when joining and communicating with wireless networks.
\r\n· The TOE utilizes FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
\r\n· The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).
","evaluation_configuration":"\r\n\r\nThe TOE is a mobile device running the Tizen version 2.3 operating system (based on Linux 3.4) and is being evaluated on the Samsung Z (SM-Z910) hardware platform containing the MSM8974 model processor of the Snapdragon 800 chipset that has the following specifications:
\r\n| \r\n Component \r\n | \r\n\r\n Details \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n\r\n Quad-core Krait 400 CPU at up to 2.3 GHz per core \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n GPU \r\n | \r\n\r\n Qualcomm® Adreno™ 330 GPU \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Modem \r\n | \r\n\r\n · Integrated 4G LTE Advanced World Mode, supporting LTE FDD, LTE TDD, WCDMA (DC-HSPA+, DC-HSUPA), CDMA1x, EV-DO Rev. B, TD-SCDMA and GSM/EDGE \r\n· 3rd generation integrated LTE modem, with support for LTE-Broadcast \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n RF \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4th generation LTE multimode transceiver with Qualcomm RF360™ Front End solution for world mode bands, lower power and PCB reduction \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n USB \r\n | \r\n\r\n USB 2.0 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Bluetooth \r\n | \r\n\r\n BT4.0 integrated digital core \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n WiFi \r\n | \r\n\r\n 1-stream 802.11n/ac Integrated digital core \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Memory/Storage \r\n | \r\n\r\n LPDDR3 800MHz Dual-channel 32-bit (12.8GBps)/eMMC 5.0 SATA3 SD 3.0 (UHS-I) \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. Samsung Z with Tizen Version 2.3 was evaluated against the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. The product, when installed and configured per the instructions provided in the preparative guidance, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Samsung Z with Tizen Version 2.3 Security Target Version 1.0. The evaluation underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in August 2015. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report, (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10612-2015) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nCryptographic Support
\r\nThe TOE includes a cryptographic module with FIPS 140-2 certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS and IPsec, and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many if these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is design to protect user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display. The frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occur, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Several of these functions are accessible by the TOE’s users while others are only accessible through the MDM Server and require administrative permissions. Once an enrolled TOE has been un-enrolled, all MDM policies are removed and CC mode is disabled.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. The TOE provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another via sandboxing.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious software or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nLocking the TOE will obscure its display, which can be manually done by the user or automatically by the TOE after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when a user unlocks the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE allows an administrator to specify (via the MDM Server) wireless networks to which the user can have the TOE connect.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
","features":[]}