The IAS Routers are a family of ultra-portable routers that offer advanced routing capabilities and diverse WAN technology options which enables the users to leverage a wide array of WAN technologies (e.g. Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Cellular) to establish a VPN connection between the IAS Router and a secure LAN.
\r\nThe Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a VPN Gateway Network Device (router) and consists of the following hardware:
· IAS STEW Rev. 1.0
· IAS KG-RU Rev. 1.0
and
· IAS Router Micro Rev. 1.0
running:
· IASRouter-2015-11-24_50e8756_Release-x86-fips_cc. firmware
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target, based on the Security Functional Requirements of the Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, June 8, 2012, Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, November 3, 2014, and the Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1, April 12, 2013.
\r\nThe criteria for which the TOE was evaluated against, are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1. The methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is contained in the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1.
\r\nInfoGard Laboratories, Inc. determined that the TOE, configured as specified in the operational guidance, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Security Target.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation of the TOE provides assurance that the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) of the Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, June 8, 2012, Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, November 3, 2014, and the Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1, April 12, 2013, have been met. A summary of the SFRs are as follows:
\r\nThe TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The TOE maintains a local audit log as well as sending the audit records to a remote Syslog server. Audit records sent to the remote server are protected by an IPsec tunnel. Each audit record includes identity (username, IP address, or process), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event. The TOE prevents modification to the local audit log.
\r\nThe TOE implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms for random bit generation, encryption/decryption, authentication, and integrity protection/verification. These algorithms are used to provide security for the TLS and IPsec (IKEv1, IKEv2, and ESP) protocols.
\r\nThe TOE zeroizes all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs once they are no longer required.
\r\nThe TOE ensures that previous content of network packets is not reused in subsequent network packets. The TOE zeroizes packet buffers when each buffer is allocated.
\r\nThe TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password combination. The TSF does not allow access to any administrative functions prior to successful authentication. The TOE has the capability to lock a remote user’s account if that user exceeds the configured number of failed authentication attempts.
\r\nThe TOE implements a restrictive HTTPs based interface that allows authorized administrative users to manage the TOE. This interface does not allow the execution of arbitrary commands. The TOE also implements a local command line interface (CLI) to allow authorized administrators to reset the TOE to factory defaults and view logs. These interfaces restrict the administrator to executing well-defined commands that are required to configure and administer the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE filters packets received on the physical interfaces and virtual interfaces (IPsec tunnels). The TOE reads each packet’s header and can be configured to allow or deny the packet based on IP source address, IP destination address, Transport Layer Protocol (if specified in the IP header), TCP or UDP source port, and/or TCP or UDP destination port.
\r\nThe TOE protects itself through a number of features. The administrative interfaces do not allow the administrator to execute arbitrary binaries or provide commands for the administrator to display secret and private keys. The TOE ensures timestamps and timeouts are accurate by maintaining a real-time clock for measuring time as well as polling an NTP server to mitigate drift.
\r\nThe TOE implements self-tests to verify its correct operation prior to enabling networking. If the power-on self-tests fail or a fatal conditional self-test fails, the TOE enters an error state, disables network services, and disables all cryptographic operations.
\r\nThe TOE automatically verifies the authenticity and integrity of updates by requiring the updates to be digitally signed. The TOE verifies that every update is digitally signed prior to installing the update.
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display a warning and consent banner when an administrator attempts to establish an interactive session over the local CLI or remote HTTPs interface. The TOE also enforces a configurable inactivity timeout for remote administrative and IPsec sessions.
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to deny establishment of a VPN client session based on the time, day, and/or remote client’s IP address.
\r\nThe TOE uses IPsec to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and VPN peers. The trusted channels utilize X.509 certificates or pre-shared keys to perform mutual authentication. The TOE initiates the IPsec trusted channel with a remote peer to protect user data and protect communication with the syslog server.
\r\nThe TOE uses TLS/HTTPs to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrative users. The TOE does not implement any additional methods of remote administration. The administrator can configure the remote administration to be tunneled through IPsec in addition to using TLS/HTTPs.
","features":[]}