The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Security Gateway Appliances R77.30. The product is a VPN Gateway and packet filtering firewall appliance. The product provides controlled connectivity between two or more network environments. It mediates information flows between clients and servers located on internal and external networks governed by the firewalls.
\r\nThe TOE is a network device with firewall capabilities for filtering traffic based on packet rules. It is a distributed system with support for a security management server, allowing remote administration over a protected IPsec connection. The TOE includes the following components:
\r\nCheck Point Security Gateway R77.30 Security Gateway software is installed on a hardware platform in combination with an operating system (OS), in accordance with TOE guidance, in a FIPS 140-2 compliant mode. The OS supports the TOE by providing storage for audit trail, an IP stack for in-TOE routing, NIC drivers and an execution environment for daemons and security servers.
\r\nCheck Point’s virtual machine engine supports the definition of separate execution domains for Virtual Systems. Incoming IP packets bind to an appropriate VS corresponding to the logical interface (i.e. physical or virtual LAN interface) on which they are received, and the VS that is defined to receive the packet from that interface. The packets are labeled with the VSID, and are handled in the context of that VS’s execution domain, until they are dropped, forwarded out of the gateway, or handed to another VS according to administrator-defined rules. While the packet filtering based upon VSIDs is included in the scope of the evaluation, the architectural aspects of domain separation is not covered.
\r\nThe product additionally imposes traffic-filtering controls on mediated information flows between clients and servers according to the site’s security policy rules. By default, these security policy rules deny all inbound and outbound information flows through the TOE. Only an authorized administrator has the authority to change the security policy rules.
\r\nSecurity Management is performed using the SmartConsole Management GUI software. One or more Security Gateway appliances are managed by a Security Management server installation that maintains security policy information for the gateways, and collects audit records from the gateways for review by TOE administrators.
","evaluation_configuration":"\r\n\r\nBelow is a list of hardware platforms included in the evaluation. All platforms are x86 based hardware.
\r\nNote: The models identified using the ‘**’ convention use a zero-justified numbering system for the licensed software blades, e.g. the ‘Check Point 21412 Appliance’ would support up to 12 software blade licenses, whereas the ‘Check Point 21407’ Appliance’ would be the same hardware model supporting up to 7 blades
\r\n· Check Point 22** Appliances
\r\n· Check Point 42**, 44**, 46**, 48** Appliances
\r\n· Check Point 122**, 124**, 126**, 135**, 138** Appliances
\r\n· Check Point 214**, 216**, 217**, 218** Appliances
\r\nThe following commodity hardware platforms are included in the evaluated configuration for Security Gateway and Security Management software, running the GAiA R77.30 operating system.
\r\n| \r\n Check Point IAS appliances \r\n | \r\n\r\n D1, D2, D6, D8, R2, R6, R8 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Fujitsu \r\n | \r\n\r\n Primergy RX100 S6, S7 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n \r\n | \r\n\r\n Primergy RX200 S6, S7 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n \r\n | \r\n\r\n Primergy RX300 S6, S7 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HP \r\n | \r\n\r\n ProLiant DL120 G7 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n ProLiant DL320e G8 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n ProLiant DL360 G7 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n ProLiant DL380 G7 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n ProLiant DL360p G8 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n ProLiant DL380p G8 \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
The following Check Point security appliance models are included in the evaluated configuration for the Security Management software, running the GAiA R77.30 operating system:
\r\n· Smart-1 5
\r\n· Smart-1 25
\r\n· Smart-1 50
\r\n· Smart-1 150
\r\n· Smart-1 205
\r\n· Smart-1 210
\r\n· Smart-1 225
\r\n· Smart-1 3050
\r\n· Smart-1 3150
","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, July 2012. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Check Point Software Technologies LTD. R77.30 Installation Guide, Version 0.2, December 29, 2015 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. Security Gateway Appliances R77.30 (NDPP11e3/VPN/FW) Security Target, Version 0.91, December 29, 2015. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in January 2016. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10652-2015) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe logical boundaries of the Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. Security Gateway Appliances R77.30 appliance are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity Audit: The Gateway Appliances can be configured to store logs locally, forward logs to the Security Management Server, or both. If configured to send logs to the Security Management Server, in the event of a loss of network connectivity to the Security Management Server, then the Gateway Appliance will store locally until the connection is restored. The TOE can be configured to send audit logs to a syslog server as well. The connection between the TOE and remote server is protected with IPsec. Finally, note that the Gateway Appliances can be configured such that if they run out of disk space for local logs, they can block all connections.
\r\nCryptographic Support: The TOE uses a Check Point cryptographic module that has received Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates for all cryptographic functions claimed in this ST. Cryptographic services include key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing.
\r\nUser Data Protection: The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
\r\nStateful Traffic Filtering Firewall/VPN Packet Filtering: The TOE supports many protocols for packet filtering including icmpv4, icmpv6, ipv4, ipv6, tcp and udp. The firewall rules implement the SPD rules (permit, deny, bypass). Each rule can be configured to log status of packets pertaining to the rule. All codes under each protocol are implemented. The TOE supports FTP for stateful filtering.
\r\nThe TOE mediates the information flows according to an administrator-defined policy. Some of the traffic may be either silently dropped or rejected (with notification to the presumed source).
\r\nThe TOE's firewall and VPN capabilities are controlled by defining an ordered set of rules in the Security Rule Base. The Rule Base specifies what communication will be allowed to pass and what will be blocked. It specifies the source and destination of the communication, what services can be used, at what times, whether to log the connection and the logging level.
\r\nIdentification and authentication: The TOE implements a password based authentication mechanism that identifies operators via usernames. Passwords are stored obfuscated, and passwords for local login are stored Unix hashed. The TOE supports passwords with lengths 15 or greater characters and all special characters as required by the Protection Profiles.
\r\nSecurity Management: The TOE allows both local and remote administration for management of the TOE’s security functions. The TOE creates and maintains profiles for configured administrators. An administrator can log in locally to the TOE using a serial connection. The administrator is greeted with a console environment, where configuration is mainly done through command-line syntax. The local login operates in a Unix shell. There are two remote administration interfaces. The first remote administration interface is executed through a Graphical User Interface using TLS over IPsec. Though the connections from a browser to the TOE are TLS connections, the TOE requires an IPSec connection to wrap the TLS connection. The second remote administration interface is a command line interface (CLI) using SSH over IPsec.
\r\nProtection of the TSF: The TOE includes capabilities to protect itself from unwanted modification as well as protecting its persistent data.
\r\nThe TOE does not store passwords in plaintext. They are obfuscated, and UNIX shell login passwords are stored as a UNIX hash. The TOE does not support any command line capability to view any cryptographic keys generated or used by the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE only allows updates after their signature is successfully verified. The TOE update mechanism uses ECDSA with SHA-512 and P-521 to verify the signature of the update package.
\r\nThe TOE’s FIPS executables are signed using ECDSA with SHA-512 and P-521. For other executables a hash is computed during system installation and configuration and during updates.
\r\nDuring power-up the integrity of all executables is verified. If an integrity test fails in the cryptographic module, the system will enter a kernel panic and will fail to boot up. If an integrity test fails due to a non-matching hash, a log is written. Also during power-up, algorithms are tested in the kernel and user-space. If any of these test fail, the TOE is not operational for users.
\r\nThe TOE is able to terminate interactive sessions if the session is inactive for a set period of time. The time can be configured via the TOE configuration. Also, the TOE can lock a user out based on the number of failed logins. This can also be configured via the TOE configuration.
\r\nTOE Access: Access to the TOE is mainly through a Security Management Server. The connection between the Security Management Server and the TOE is secured via IPsec. The second remote administration interface is CLI and is also protected with IPsec. The TOE also provides a local login console, which is a Unix shell environment.
\r\nTrusted path/channels: The TOE protects all communications with outside entities using IPsec communications only. This is mainly to fulfill a Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) requirement for communications. Any other protocol (such as SSH or TLS) is wrapped in an IPsec tunnel.
","features":[]}