The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00 family of products.
\r\nThe TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The embedded software is a version of Brocades' proprietary Multi-Service IronWare software. The software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances. The TOE includes a card (BR-MLX-10GX4-IPSEC-M) that supports IPsec processing on the appliances.
\r\nAll TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate use of the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration (using the Multi-Service IronWare Federal Information Processing Standards and Common Criteria Guide) prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using IPsec. Once configured following the Common Criteria specific guidance, the TOE also offers an encrypted Web Management Interface using IPsec. All of the remote management interfaces are protected using encryption as explained later in this ST.
\r\nThe hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware characteristics:
\r\nThe Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade MLXe® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00, including the following series and models
\r\n\r\n
· Brocade NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms with the BR-MLX-10GX4-IPSEC-M Card
\r\no BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
\r\no BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-X
\r\no BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-DC
\r\n§ With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-X
","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00 family of products was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in Brocade NetIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide Supporting Multi-Service Ironware R05.9.00a, 53-1003826-01, 18 December 2015 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00 (NDPP11E3/VPNGEP11) Security Target, Version 0.5, 12/16/15. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in December 2015. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10657-2015) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe logical boundaries of the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00 TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity Audit -- The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using IPsec to protect the logs while in transit on the network
\r\nCryptographic support -- The TOE is a FIPS-validated cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including IPsec.
\r\nUser data protection – The TOE performs a wide variety of network switching and routing functions, passing network traffic among its various network connections. While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic routing, the TOE is carefully designed to ensure that it does not inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic. This is accomplished primarily by controlling the size of all buffers, fully overwriting buffer contents, and zero-padding of memory structures and buffers when necessary
\r\nIdentification and authentication – The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
\r\nSecurity management – The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands and an HTTPS over IPsec Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system
\r\nPacket Filtering – The TOE provides extensive packet filtering capabilities for IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP. The authorized administrator can define packet filtering rules that apply to most every field within the identified packet types. The authorized administrator can define each rule to permit, deny, and log each decision.
\r\nProtection of the TSF – The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
\r\nIt protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nNote that the TOE is a single appliance, and as such, no intra-TOE communication is subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE access – The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted path/channels – The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using IPsec for CLI access or for Web graphical user interface access (HTTPS over IPsec). In each case, the both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, the attempted connection will not be established.
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using IPsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs
","features":[]}