The TOE is classified as a VPN Gateway Network Device. The TOE employs Mesh networking, which allows multiple TOEs to network within the operational environment. Only VPN gateway functionality is evaluated in this Security Target. All WLAN functionality was evaluated in a separate Security Target.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target, based on the Security Functional Requirements of the Network Devices Protection Profile, Version 1.1, the Network Devices Errata #3, Version 1.0, November 3, 2014, and the Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1, April 12, 2013 documents.
\r\nThe criteria for which the TOE was evaluated against are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1. The methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is contained in the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1.
\r\nInfoGard Laboratories, Inc. determined that the TOE, configured as specified in the operational guidance, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Security Target.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation of the TOE provides assurance that the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) of the Network Devices Protection Profile, Version 1.1, and the Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1 have been met.
\r\nThe TOE consists of the following Security Functions:
\r\n· Security Audit (FAU)
\r\n· Cryptographic Support (FCS)
\r\n· User Data Protection (FDP)
\r\n· Identification and Authentication (FIA)
\r\n· Security Management (FMT)
\r\n· Protection of the TSF (FPT)
\r\n· TOE Access (FTA)
\r\n· Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
\r\n· Packet Filtering (FPF)
\r\nThe TOE will audit all events and information defined in [ST] Section 6.1.1, Table 8: Auditable Events. The TOE will also include the identity of the user that caused the event (if applicable), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event.
\r\nThe TOE protects storage of audit information from unauthorized deletion and prevents unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records. The TOE can transmit audit data to/receive data from an external IT entity using the IPsec protocol.
\r\nThe TSF performs the following cryptographic operations:
\r\nThe TSF zeroizes all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs once they are no longer required.
\r\nThe TSF shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects. The TOE can maintain user authentication and audit information.
\r\nThe TSF supports passwords consisting of alphanumeric and special characters. The TSF also allows administrators to set a minimum password length and supports passwords with 15 characters or more.
\r\nThe TSF requires all administrative users to authenticate before allowing the user to perform any actions other than:
\r\n· Viewing the warning banner
\r\n· Receiving and sending Mesh Viewer Protocol (MVP) packets every 30 seconds on port 4949
\r\nThe TOE maintains the Role of Authorized Administrator. This allows the administrator to administer the TOE either locally or remotely through a CLI/GUI. This includes the ability to:
\r\n· Configure the cryptographic functionality
\r\n· Configure the IPsec functionality
\r\n· Enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all the security functions of the TOE identified in this ST to the Administrator
\r\n· Configure all security management functions identified in other sections of this ST
\r\nThe TSF prevents the reading of secret and private keys. The TOE provides reliable time stamps for itself. The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during the initial start-up (upon power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF. The TOE provides a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and published hash prior to installing those updates.
\r\nThe TOE, for both local and remote interactive sessions, will terminate the session after an Authorized Administrator-specified period of session inactivity. The TOE allows Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive session. Before establishing an administrative user session, the TOE is capable of displaying an Authorized Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE permits the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF trusted channel provides assured identification of its endpoints, protects the channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data. This trusted channel is provided via IPsec, and protects RADIUS, syslog, and NTP. The TOE permits remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path. The TOE requires the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.
\r\nThe TOE performs Packet Filtering on network packets processed by the TOE. When the TOE starts-up, it takes the actions listed in the “Protection of the TSF (FPT)” paragraph listed above (self-tests). Those actions include tests at firmware boot time and tests at software boot time. No packets flow during firmware or software boot until all of the software known answers and entropy tests have passed.
","features":[]}