The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900, 5920, 5930, 10500, 12500, and 12900 Series Switches, as follows:
\r\n| \r\n Series \r\n | \r\n\r\n Software Identification \r\n | \r\n\r\n Hardware Identification \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HP 5900 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 2423 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP 5900AF-48XG-4QSFP+ Switch (JG772A) \r\nHP 5900AF-48XGT-4QSFP+ Switch (JG336A) \r\nHP 5900AF-48G-4XG-2QSFP+ Switch (JG510A) \r\nHP FlexFabric 5900CP-48XG-4QSFP + Switch (JG838A) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HP 5920 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 2423 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP 5920AF-24XG Switch (JG296A) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HP 5930 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 2423 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP FlexFabric 5930-32QSFP+Switch (JG726A) \r\nHP FlexFabric 5930-4Slot Switch (JH179A) \r\nHP FlexFabric 5930 2QSFP+ 2-slot Switch (JH178A) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HP 10500 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 7170 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP 10504 Switch Chassis (JC613A) \r\nHP 10508 Switch Chassis (JC612A) \r\nHP 10508-V Switch Chassis (JC611A) \r\nHP 10512 Switch Chassis (JC748A) \r\nEach chassis requires a compatible Main Processing Unit. The following are included in the evaluated configuration: \r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n HP 12500 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 7376 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP 12504 (AC) Switch Chassis (JC654A) \r\nHP 12504 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC655A) \r\nHP 12508 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF421C) \r\nHP 12508E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG782A) \r\nHP 12508 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC652A) \r\nHP 12508E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG783A) \r\nHP 12518 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF430C) \r\nHP 12518E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG784A) \r\nHP 12518 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC653A) \r\nHP 12518E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG785A) \r\nEach chassis requires one of the following: \r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n HP 12900 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Comware V7.1.045 Release 1138 P02 \r\n | \r\n\r\n HP FlexFabric 12910 Switch AC Chassis with 12910 Main Processing Unit (JG621A) \r\nHP FlexFabric 12916 Switch AC Chassis with 12916 Main Processing Unit (JG634A) \r\n | \r\n
Each device in the TOE is a stand-alone gigabit Ethernet switch that implements network layers 2 and 3 switching, service and routing operations.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900, 5920, 5930, 10500, 12500, and 12900 Series Switches were evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in Preparative Procedures for CC NDPP Evaluated HPE 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900 Series Switch Modules based on Comware V7.1, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900 Series Switches Security Target. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in February 2016. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Security Audit
\r\nThe TOE is able to generate audit records of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the audit records locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the audit records to a designated external log server.
\r\nCryptographic Support
\r\nThe TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms that provide key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols, including IPsec and SSHv2. Note that in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured in FIPS mode, which ensures the TOE uses only FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE performs network switching and routing functions, passing network traffic among its various physical and logical network connections. While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic forwarding, the TOE ensures that it does not inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE requires administrators to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console and a network accessible interface (SSHv2) for interactive administrator sessions.
\r\nThe TOE supports on device definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. Additionally, the TOE can be configured to utilize the services of trusted RADIUS and TACACS+ servers in the operational environment to support, for example, centralized user administration. The TOE supports the use of text-based pre-shared keys for IKE peer authentication.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE provides a Command Line Interface to access its security management functions. Security management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
\r\nIt protects data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nThe TOE uses cryptographic means to protect communication with remote administrators. When the TOE is configured to use the services of a syslog server or authentication servers in the operational environment, the communication between the TOE and the operational environment component is protected using encryption.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to authentication when accessing the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access. Using SSHv2, both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as audit and authentication servers, using IPsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of data.