The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the LG G5 Smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 820 (MSM8996) processor and the LG V10 and G4 Smartphones with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 808 (MSM8992) processor utilizing Android 6.
\r\nThe TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE mobile data networks). The TOE supports using client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2 networks with IEEE 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
\r\nThe TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including that provided by the Android framework and extensions to the MDM API by LG.
\r\nThe TOE is a mobile device designed to support enterprises and individual users alike. Based upon Android 6.0 and improved by LG, the TOE provides wireless connectivity and provides an execution environment for mobile applications.
","evaluation_configuration":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluated configuration for the LG G5 Smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 820 (MSM8996) processor and the LG V10 and G4 Smartphones with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 808 (MSM8992) processor is as follows:
\r\n| \r\n Product \r\n | \r\n\r\n Carrier \r\n | \r\n\r\n Security SW Version \r\n | \r\n\r\n OS version \r\n | \r\n\r\n Build number \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G5 H820 \r\n | \r\n\r\n AT&T \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0.1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MMB29M \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G5 VS987 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Verizon \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0.1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MMB29M \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G5 LS992 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Sprint \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0.1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MMB29M \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G5 H830 \r\n | \r\n\r\n T-Mobile \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0.1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MMB29M \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG V10 H900 \r\n | \r\n\r\n AT&T \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG V10 VS990 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Verizon \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG V10 H901 \r\n | \r\n\r\n T-Mobile \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G4 H810 \r\n | \r\n\r\n AT&T \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G4 VS986 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Verizon \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G4 LS991 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Sprint \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n LG G4 H811 \r\n | \r\n\r\n T-Mobile \r\n | \r\n\r\n MDF v2.0 Release 2 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 6.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n MRA58K \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, July 2012. Gossamer Security Solutions determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the TOE is EAL 1. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 6 devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation, Version 0.5, 2016/04/06 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the LG Electronics Inc. G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.8, April 14, 2016. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in April 2016. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10710-2016) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe logical boundaries of the LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nCryptographic support - The TOE includes cryptographic modules with FIPS certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
\r\nUser data protection - The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected.
\r\nIdentification and authentication - The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters are supported.
\r\nThe TOE can also serve as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
\r\nSecurity management - The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications, remove MDM policies, and disable CC mode.
\r\nProtection of the TSF - The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
\r\nTOE Access - The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using an MDM) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.
\r\nThe TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
\r\nTrusted path/channels - The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
","features":[]}