The ForeScout CounterACT is a network device that enables network access control, threat protection, and compliance of the entire enterprise based on network security policies. The ForeScout CounterACT type is justified because the ForeScout CounterACT provides an infrastructure role in internetworking of different network environments across an enterprise.
","evaluation_configuration":"\r\n\r\nThe TOE is ForeScout CounterACT that runs the CounterACT software version 7.0.
\r\nIn its evaluated configuration, the TOE is configured to directly communicate with the following environment components:
\r\nAdditionally, the following environment component was required for trusted update functionality:
\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. CounterACT was evaluated against the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. The product, when installed and configured per the instructions provided in the preparative guidance, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the ForeScout CounterACT Security Target Version 1.0. The evaluation underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in March 2018. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report, CCEVS-VR-VID10728-2018 prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nSecurity Audit
\r\nThe TOE contains mechanisms to generate audit data to record predefined events on the TOE. The audit logs are stored in an internal database on the TOE’s local hard drive. An authorized administrator has the ability to enable/disable the forwarding of events to a syslog server. When enabled, the audit data is also securely transmitted to the syslog server using a TLS v1.1 or 1.2 communication channel.
\r\nCryptographic Support
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of SSH, and TLS (v1.1 and 1.2) trusted communications. RSA key generation is implemented in accordance with FIPS 186-4 and RSA key establishment is implemented in accordance with NIST SP 800-56B. Diffie-Hellman group 14 (FFC) key generation is implemented in accordance with RFC 3526, Section 3 and Diffie-Hellman group 14 key establishment is implemented in accordance with RFC 3526, Section 3. Keys are destroyed when no longer used. AES, SHA, HMAC, RSA are all used by the TOE for encryption, hashing, message authentication and digital signatures, respectively. The TOE uses a hash DRBG to provide the random bit generation services with 256 bits of entropy. The cryptographic implementation has been validated to ensure that the algorithms are appropriately strong for use in trusted communications.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE provides local password authentication as well as providing the ability to securely connect to an Active Directory server for the authentication of users. Communications over this interface is secured using TLS in which the TOE is acting as a client. The TOE enforces X.509 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections. The only available function available to an unauthenticated user is the ability to acknowledge a warning banner.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE can be administered locally and remotely and uses role based access control to prevent unauthorized management. The TOE enforces role based access control (RBAC) to prevent/allow access to TSF data and functionality. The NDcPP scopes the management capabilities to: manually download an update, manually initiate an update which verifies the digital signature before installation, configure inactivity time, and configuring the access banner.
\r\nA pre-defined set of permissions is called a role. The TOE has one pre-defined role: “Admin”. The user permissions for the “Admin” role cannot be modified or customized. A user assigned the “Admin” role is the TOE administrator (Security Administrator) and has access to all Console tools and features. All other users that do not have the full set of administrative permissions are categorized as a “Console User”. A Console User’s set of permissions are set during creation and can be customized by adding and subtracting specific permissions to allow/disallow the user TOE functionality.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE is expected to ensure the security and integrity of all data that is stored locally and accessed remotely. Passwords are not stored in plaintext. The cryptographic module prevents the unauthorized disclosure of secret cryptographic data. The TOE does not support automatic updates. An administrator has the ability to query the TOE for the currently executing version the TOE software and is required to manually initiate the update process from the Console. The TOE automatically verifies the digital signature of the software update prior to installation. If the digital signature is found to be invalid for any reason the update is not installed. If the signature is deemed invalid, the administrator will be provided a warning banner and allow an administrator to continue with the installation or abort. There is no means for an administrative override to continue the installation if the signature is completely missing. The TOE implements a self-testing mechanism that is automatically executed during the initial start-up and can be manually initiated by an administrator after authentication, to verify the correct operation of product and cryptographic modules. The TOE provides its own time via its internal clock.
\r\nTOE Access
\r\nThe TOE displays a configurable warning banner prior to its use. Inactive sessions will be terminated after an administrator-configurable time period. Users are allowed to terminate their own interactive session. Once a remote session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. Local and remote sessions are terminated after the administrator configured inactivity time limit is reached.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nUsers can access a CLI for administration functions remotely via SSH (remote console) or a local physical connection (local console) to the TOE. The TOE provides the SSH server functionality. The main administrator interface is the ClounterACT Console GUI application which is running on a separate Windows PC. The CounterACT Console initiates a TLS connection to the TOE appliance, which is acting as a TLS server, for this connection.
","features":[]}