The Internet Protocol Crosspoint (IPX) switch is a 10 Gigabit (Gb) Internet Protocol (IP) switch optimized for video-over-IP traffic (compressed or uncompressed). The IPX builds on the capabilities of the existing Evertz line of video routing switches.
\r\nThe IPX cards, associated Small Form-Factor Pluggable transceivers (SFP), their mounting frames and the frames’ controllers and power supplies make up an IPX installation.
\r\nThe EMX frames are passive (except for the door-mounted fans, which are the only powered equipment permanently attached to the frame). The frames mount power supplies, frame controllers and IPX cards. The frame controllers serve as a pass-through proxy to distribute Ethernet-based control connections to the individual IPX cards within the EMX frame chassis.
\r\nThe SFP ports are unencrypted. Sites requiring enclave-based data security will deploy physical security controls to isolate the video network enclave. Where an operational mission requires that video needs to cross a logical enclave boundary, Evertz stipulates a network architecture deploying third-party software or hardware encryption at the video transmitting and video receiving endpoints.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Evertz IPX was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 4. Acumen Security determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 1. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the MMA10G-IPX Series-CC (Common Criteria) User Manual, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile V2.7 Security Target. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in October 2017. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\nThe NDcPP-compliant TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
\r\n1. Security audit
\r\n2. Cryptographic support
\r\n3. Identification and authentication
\r\n4. Secure Management
\r\n5. Protection of the TSF
\r\n6. TOE access
\r\n7. Trusted path/channels
\r\nThese features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE’s Audit security function supports audit record generation and review. The TOE provides date and time information that is used in audit timestamps. Very broadly, the Audit events generated by the TOE include:
\r\n· Establishment of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
\r\n· Failure to Establish a Trusted Path or Channel Session
\r\n· Termination of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
\r\n· Failure of Trusted Channel Functions
\r\n· Identification and Authentication
\r\n· Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate
\r\n· Any update attempt
\r\n· Result of the update attempt
\r\n· Management of TSF data
\r\n· Changes to Time
\r\nThe TOE can store the generated audit data on itself and it can be configured to send syslog events to a syslog server, using a TLS protected collection method. Logs are classified into various predefined categories. The logging categories help describe the content of the messages that they contain. Access to the logs is restricted to only Security Administrators, who has no access to edit them, only to copy or delete (clear) them. Audit records are protected from unauthorized modifications and deletions.
\r\nThe logs can be viewed by using the Syslog tab in the web browser. The log records the time, host name, facility, application and “message” (the log details). The previous audit records are overwritten when the allocated space for these records reaches the threshold on a FIFO basis.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography support for secure communications and protection of information. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE include: symmetric encryption and decryption using AES; asymmetric key generation; cryptographic key establishment using RSA-based key establishment schemes and DH key establishment; digital signature using RSA; cryptographic hashing using SHA-256; random bit generation using DRBG and keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-SHA (SHA-1 and SHA-256). The TOE implements the secure protocols TLS/HTTPS on the server side and TLS on the client side. The algorithm certificate references are listed in the table below
\r\n\r\n
| \r\n Algorithm \r\n | \r\n\r\n Description \r\n | \r\n\r\n Mode Supported \r\n | \r\n\r\n CAVP Cert. # \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used for symmetric encryption/decryption \r\nFCS_TLSC_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_TLSS_EXT.2 \r\nFCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_COP.1(1) \r\n | \r\n\r\n CBC (128 and 256 bits) \r\n | \r\n\r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n SHS (SHA-256) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Cryptographic hashing services \r\nFCS_TLSC_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_TLSS_EXT.2 \r\nFCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_COP.1(1) \r\nFCS_COP.1(3) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Byte Oriented \r\n | \r\n\r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Keyed hashing services and software integrity test \r\nFCS_TLSC_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_TLSS_EXT.2 \r\nFCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_COP.1(1) \r\nFCS_COP.1(4) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Byte Oriented \r\n | \r\n\r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n DRBG \r\n | \r\n\r\n Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 \r\nFCS_TLSC_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_TLSS_EXT.2 \r\nFCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_RBG_EXT.1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n CTR_DRBG (AES 256) \r\n | \r\n\r\n
| \r\n
| \r\n RSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n Signature Verification and key transport \r\nFCS_TLSC_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_TLSS_EXT.2 \r\nFCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 \r\nFCS_CKM.1 \r\nFCS_CKM.2 \r\nFCS_COP.1(2) \r\n | \r\n\r\n FIPS PUB 186-4 Key Generation (2048-bit key) \r\n | \r\n\r\n
| \r\n
Identification and Authentication
\r\nAll Administrators wanting to use TOE services are identified and authenticated prior to being allowed access to any of the services other than the display of the warning banner. (“Regular” IPX users do not access IPX directly; they control IP video switching through the IPX using a switch control system, such as Evertz’ Magnum. The switching of those IP video transport stream is outside the scope of the TOE.) Once an Administrator attempts to access the management functionality of the TOE, the TOE prompts the Administrator for a user name and password for password-based authentication. The identification and authentication credentials are confirmed against a local user database. Only after the Administrator presents the correct identification and authentication credentials will access to the TOE functionality be granted. The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS/HTTPS connections.
\r\nThe TOE provides the capability to set password minimum length rules. This is to ensure the use of strong passwords in attempts to protect against brute force attacks. The TOE also accepts passwords composed of a variety of characters to support complex password composition. During authentication, no indication is given of the characters composing the password.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure session or a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to perform the following actions:
\r\n· Administer the TOE locally and remotely
\r\n· Configure the access banner
\r\n· Configure the cryptographic services
\r\n· Update the TOE and verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates
\r\n· Specify the time limits of session inactivity
\r\nAll of these management functions are restricted to an Administrator, which covers all administrator roles. Administrators are individuals who manage specific type of administrative tasks. In IPX only the only admin role exists, since there is no provision for “regular” users to access IPX directly (as described above), and the portion of IPX they access and control are outside the scope of the TOE.
\r\nPrimary management is done using the Webeasy web-based interface using HTTPS. This provides a network administration console from which one can manage various identity services. These services include authentication, authorization and reporting. All of these services can be managed from the web browser, which uses a menu-driven navigation system.
\r\nThere is also a very simple serial-based connection (RS-232) that provides a simple menu interface. This is used to configure the IP interface (IP address, etc.). It is password-protected, and is typically only used once, for initial set-up.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE will terminate inactive sessions after an Administrator-configurable time period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE provides protection of TSF data (authentication data and cryptographic keys). In addition, the TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records. This time is set via an external NTP server. The TOE also ensures firmware updates are from a reliable source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation.
\r\nIn order for updates to be installed on the TOE, an administrator initiates the process from the web interface. IPX automatically uses the digital signature mechanism to confirm the integrity of the product before installing the update.
\r\n\r\nAside from the automatic Administrators session termination due to inactivity describes above, the TOE also allows Administrators to terminate their own interactive session. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
\r\nThe TOE will display an Administrator-specified banner on the web browser management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE allows the establishment of a trusted path between a video control system (such as Evertz’ Magnum) and the IPX. The TOE also establishes a secure connection for sending syslog data to a syslog server using TLS and other external authentication stores using TLS-protected communications.
","features":[]}