The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6. It is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with OSI Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. Cisco IOS software is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that provides for efficient and effective switching and routing.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\n\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the AGD, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Security Target. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in December 2017. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\n\r\n\r\nThe Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity that triggered the event and the outcome of the event. Auditable events include: failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections; Creation and update of Secure Association Key; modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized administrator roles; all use of the user identification mechanism; any use of the authentication mechanism; Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures; any change in the configuration of the TOE, changes to time, initiation of TOE update, indication of completion of TSF self-test, maximum sessions being exceeded, termination of a remote session and attempts to unlock a termination session; and initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
\r\nThe TOE is configured to transmit the audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected by using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be configured to block new permit actions.
\r\nThe audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the authorized administrator to clear (delete) audit data stored locally on the TOE.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment – Intel Xeon processor). All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment - Cavium Octeon CN6230, a MIPS64 processor).
\r\nThe IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5 (Firmware Version: Rel 5) certificate 2388 and has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
\r\nIdentification and authentication
\r\nThe TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
\r\nThe TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of authentication attempts fail has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user account.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the following functionality to securely manage the TOE:
\r\nThe TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions. The privileged administrator is the Authorized Administrator of the TOE who has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
\r\nThe TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
\r\nThe TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
\r\nThe TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\nTrusted path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the remote authentication servers.
\r\nThe TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server.
","features":[]}