The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is VDX Product Series (i.e., VDX switches) operating with Network Operating System (NOS) version 7.3.0aa. The VDX Product Series operating with NOS version 7.3.0aa are hardware appliances with embedded software installed on a management processor. VDX switches, featuring embedded automation capabilities of Extreme data center fabrics, deliver high performance, capacity, and reliability in data center spine and leaf deployments. Optionally, a number of co-located VDX appliances can be connected in order to work as a unit with a common security policy. The embedded software is a version of Extreme Network’s proprietary Multiservice NOS. The NOS controls the switching and routing of network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances. These switch/routers include virtual cluster switch (VCS), which allows users to create flatter, virtualized and converged data center networks. These VCS fabrics are scalable, permitting users to expand at their own pace, and simplified, allowing users to manage the fabric as a single entity. VCS-based Ethernet fabrics are convergence-capable.
\r\nAll TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters and an admin and user account with default passwords. Users must login to access the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text-based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. Administrators can also use REST APIs (over HTTPS) or NetConf (over SSH) for configuring the TOE. The TOE uses SCP to download/compare software images.
\r\nThe TOE includes the following models with accompanying CPUs:
\r\n| \r\n Model \r\n | \r\n\r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n VDX- 6740, 6740-T, 6740T-1G, \r\nVDX-6940-36Q \r\n | \r\n\r\n Freescale P3041 four e500mc core processors at 1.5 Ghz \r\n\r\n | \r\n
| \r\n VDX6940-144S, \r\nVDX8770-4 and VDX8770-8 \r\n(including 8770-MM-1) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Freescale P4080 four e500mc core processors at 1.5 Ghz \r\n\r\n | \r\n
The evaluated version is the VDX Product Series running NOS version 7.3.0aa. The VDX Product Series operating with NOS version 7.3.0aa are hardware appliances with embedded software installed on a management processor. The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
\r\n• VDX 6740
\r\n• VDX 6740-T
\r\n• VDX 6740T-1G
\r\n• VDX 6940-36Q
\r\n• VDX 6940-144S
\r\n• VDX 8770-4 w/ 8770-MM-1 management module
\r\n• VDX 8770-8 w/ 8770-MM-1 management module
","security_evaluation_summary":"\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in Configuration Guide, Network OS Common Criteria, Supporting Network OS v7.3.0aa, January 2019 satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in Extreme Networks, Inc.VDX Product Series operating with NOS version 7.3.0aa (NDcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.5, 1/4/2019. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in January 2019. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10928-2019) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\nThe logical boundaries of the Extreme Networks, Inc.VDX Product Series operating with NOS are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity Audit: The TOE generates audit events for numerous activities including policy enforcement, system management and authentication. A syslog server in the environment is relied on to store audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE generates a complete audit record including the IP address of the TOE, the event details, and the time the event occurred. The time stamp is provided by the TOE appliance hardware.
\r\nCryptographic support: The TOE contains CAVP-tested cryptographic implementations that provide key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS.
\r\nIdentification and authentication: The TOE authenticates administrative users. In order for an administrative user to access the TOE, a user account including a user name and password must be created for the user, and an administrative role must be assigned. The TOE performs the validation of the login credentials
\r\nSecurity management: The TOE provides CLI commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. The TOE also provides REST APIs (protected by TLS) and NetConf (protected by SSH) to configure the TOE. Security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) and available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Authorized Administrator role can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management.
\r\nProtection of the TSF: The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
\r\nIt protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nNote that the TOE is a single appliance or a closely grouped (e.g., in the same rack) collection of appliances acting as a unit. As such, no intra-TOE communication is subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE Access: The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted path/channels: The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI and NetConf access, ensuring both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established. The TOE also provides a REST API interface for security management that is protected with TLS.
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs. SSHv2 is used to support SCP which the TOE uses for download of TOE updates.
","features":[]}