The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa.
\r\nThe TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The embedded software is a version of Extreme’s proprietary Multi-Service IronWare software. The software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.
","evaluation_configuration":"\r\nThe Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa including the following series and models:
\r\nWhile there are different models in the TOE, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. There are some functional differences among the families, but they each provide the same security characteristics as claimed in this security target.
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Configuration Guide, Extreme NetIron Configuration guide for Common Criteria NDcPP 2.1, 06.3.00aa, Supporting NetIron OS 06.3.00aa, September 2019 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.4, September 9, 2019. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in September 2019. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID10998-2019) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"\r\nThe logical boundaries of the Extreme Networks, NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE has CAVP-tested algorithms that provide key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes. The TOE utilizes x509.3 certificates to authenticate TLS services providing service to the TOE, and performs certificate status verification using OCSP protocol.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE Access:
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted channels:
\r\nThe TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access. In each case, both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, the attempted connection will not be established.
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with a log server and authentication server (TACACS+ and RADIUS) using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification.
","features":[]}