The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 08.0.70. There are different models in six series which differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. The ICX Series possesses between 24 and 80 10/100/1000 Mbps RJ-45 ports, where the presence of “F” in the model number indicates 100/1000 Mbps SFP ports instead of RJ-45 ports and the presence of “P” indicates that the RJ-45 ports are PoE+.
","evaluation_configuration":"The TOE must be configured in accordance with the Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide 08.0.70, 7 August 2020. The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:
\r\na. ICX-7150 (ICX 7150-24, ICX 7150-24P, ICX 7150-48, ICX 7150-48P, ICX 7150-48PF, ICX 7150-48F, ICX 7150-C10ZP, ICX 7150-48ZP)
\r\nb. ICX-7250 (ICX 7250-24, ICX 7250-24P, ICX 7250-48, ICX 7250-48P)
\r\nc. ICX 7450 (ICX 7450-24, ICX 7450-24P, ICX 7450-48, ICX 7450-48P, ICX 7450-48F)
\r\nd. ICX 7650 (ICX 7650-48P, ICX 7650-48ZP, ICX 7650-48F)
\r\ne. ICX 7750 (ICX 7750-48F, ICX 7750-48C, ICX 7750-26Q)
\r\nThe different series have differing CPUs as described below:
\r\nThe evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 08.0.70, 7 Auggust 2020 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 8.0.70 (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.3, August 7, 2020. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in August 2020. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11088-2020) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity audit:
\r\nThe TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS. The TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication for NTP servers.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
\r\nIt protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
\r\nNote that the TOE is a single appliance or a closely grouped (e.g., in the same rack) collection of appliances acting as a unit. As such, no intra-TOE communication is subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access to ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established.
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
","features":[]}