The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Layer (hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a hardware encryption layer that is used for Data-At-Rest (DAR) encryption as part of the underlying rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server, denoted as the Curtiss-Wright DTS1 CSFC/ECC Cryptographic Data Transport System (DTS) (hereafter referred to as the DTS1). The underlying DTS1 is intended for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the DTS1 is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) that provides quick off load of data. The RMC can be easily removed from one DTS1 and installed into any other DTS1 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to the software-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1 (see the separate ST corresponding to that evaluation), the DTS1 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC.
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The DTS1 supports protocols including CIFS, NFS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and iSCSI. The DTS1 enables CIFS and NFS disables all other protocols by default. The TOE also supports SSH, which is always enabled. The administrator can enable or disable the desired protocols to support their use-case and application.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, July 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Curtiss-Wright DTS1 Data Transport System (Network File System) User Guide, DDOC0099-000-AH document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, August 13, 2020. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in July 2020. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Environmental Strengths:
\r\nThe logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
\r\nUser data protection:
\r\nThe TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an operational mode
","features":[]}