The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6. The TOE is a multi-purpose network device that includes WLAN access system capabilities. The Aruba Mobility Controller Series platform serves as a gateway between wired and wireless networks and provides command and control over Aruba Access Points (APs) within an Aruba dependent wireless network.
\r\nThe Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs) and Aruba Virtual Mobility Controllers (VMCs) are wireless switch hardware and virtual appliances that provide a wide range of security services and features including wireless and wired network mobility, security, centralized management, auditing, authentication, secure remote access, and self-verification of integrity and operation.
\r\nThe ArubaOS is a suite of mobility applications that runs on all Aruba controllers and allows administrators to configure and manage the wireless and mobile user environment. The TOE is generally deployed in a configuration consisting of one or more Aruba mobility controllers (MC and/or VMC) and multiple Aruba wireless APs.
\r\nIn an encrypted WLAN, a wireless client first associates to the Mobility Controller through an AP and then authenticates (IEEE 802.11i ) using credentials to obtain access to the network. The authenticated wireless client is then assigned a role based on the configuration in the Mobility Controller or the authentication server. The role, in turn, maps a set of firewall policies to the client’s session such that all wireless client traffic passes through a logical firewall component before traffic is forwarded outside of the Mobility Controller. The client’s role can also be used to determine VLAN membership.
","evaluation_configuration":"The evaluated configuration consists of the Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS version 8.6 and the following required software licenses:
\r\n· Policy Enforcement Firewall
\r\n· RFprotect
\r\n· Advanced Cryptography
\r\nThe TOE includes the following hardware and virtual appliance models:
\r\nMobility Controller Hardware Appliances
\r\n| \r\n Product Model \r\n | \r\n\r\n Part Number(s) \r\n | \r\n\r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 9004 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n R1B25A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Atom C3508 (Denverton) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7005 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW636A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7008 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JX932A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7010 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW703A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7024 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW707A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7030 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW711A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7205 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW740A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP316 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7210 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW746A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP416 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7220 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW754A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7240 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW762A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7240XM Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JW830A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 7280 Mobility Controller \r\n | \r\n\r\n JX914A \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadcom XLP780(MIPS64) \r\n | \r\n
Mobility Controller Virtual Appliances (deployed on ESXi v6.5.0)
· MC-VA-50
\r\n· MC-VA-250
\r\n· MC-VA-1k
\r\n\r\n
VM Platforms
\r\nThe Mobility Controller Virtual Appliances are deployed on ESXi version 6.5.0. The following virtual machine platforms are included in the evaluated configuration:
\r\n| \r\n Name \r\n | \r\n\r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n\r\n Memory \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HPE EdgeLine EL8000 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon Gold 6212U (Cascade Lake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 128GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Klas Telecom VoyagerVM3 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D (Coffee Lake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 96GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n IAS VPN Gateway Module Classic Plus \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Core i7 (Skylake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 32GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Pacstar 451/3 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D (Coffee Lake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 32GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Pacstar 451/3 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon E3 (Coffee Lake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 32GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n DTECH M3-SE-SVR4 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon E3 v5-1505L (Skylake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 32GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n DTECH M3x \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Core i5 (Skylake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 32GB \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n GTS NXGEN-L11/12 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Core i7 (Coffee Lake) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 16GB \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Aruba OS 8.6 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration Guidance), Version 1.10, February 2021 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6 Security Target (NDcPP21/WLANASEP10), Version 1.0, 02/05/2021. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in February 2021. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-11111-2021) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Aruba Mobility Controller Series with ArubaOS 8.6 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity audit:
\r\nThe TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events including start-up and shutdown of the TOE, all administrator actions, and all Protection Profile Auditable Events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the logs to a designated syslog server in the operational environment.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE includes cryptographic modules that provide key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including IPsec, SSH, and TLS/HTTPS.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE requires administrators to be identified and authenticated before they can access any TOE security functions. The TOE supports role-based authentication, so user accounts are assigned predefined roles which restrict them based on their assigned role. The TOE maintains these administrator and user attributes which can be defined locally with usernames and passwords or can be defined in the context of local RADIUS or TACACS+ services. Authentication can be either locally or remotely through an external authentication server, or internally. Wireless clients are identified and authenticated by different authentication mechanisms such as 802.1X, etc. After an administrator-specified number of failed attempts, the user account is locked out. The TOE’s password mechanism provides configuration for a minimum password length. The TOE also protects, stores and allows authorized administrators to load X.509.v3 certificates for use to support authentication for IPsec connections.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides the administrator role the capability to configure and manage all TOE security functions including cryptographic operations, user accounts, passwords, advisory banner, session inactivity and TOE updates. The management functions are restricted to the administrator role. The role must have the appropriate access privileges or access will be denied. The TOE’s cryptographic functions ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE has its own internal hardware clock that provides reliable time stamps used for auditing. The internal clock may be synchronized with a time signal obtained from an external trusted NTP server. The TOE stores passwords on flash using a SHA1 hash and does not provide any interfaces that allow passwords or keys to be read.
\r\nThe TOE runs self-tests during power up and periodically during operation to ensure the correct operation of the cryptographic functions and TSF hardware. There is an option for the administrator to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
\r\nThe TOE includes mechanisms so that the administrator can determine the TOE version and update the TOE securely using digital signatures.
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE allows administrators to configure a period of inactivity for administrator and wireless user sessions. Once that time period has been reached while the session has no activity, the session is terminated. All users may also terminate their own sessions at any time. A warning banner is displayed at the management interfaces (Web GUI and CLI) to advise users on appropriate use and penalty for misuse of system.
\r\nIn order to limit access to the administrative functions, the TOE can be configured to deny wireless clients based on the time/date, IP address (location), as well as information retained in a blacklist.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE uses IPsec to provide an encrypted channel between itself and third-party trusted IT entities in the operating environment including Aruba access point(s), external syslog server, external authentication server, 802.1x authentication server, and NTP server.
\r\nThe TOE also provides a protected communication path between itself and wireless users. The TOE protects communication with wireless clients using WPA2 with 802.1x EAP-TLS.
\r\nThe TOE secures remote communication with administrators by implementing TLS/HTTPS for remote Web UI access and SSHv2 for CLI access. In each case, both the integrity and disclosure protection is ensured via the secure protocol. If the negotiation of a secure session fails or if the user cannot be authenticated for remote administration, the attempted session will not be established.
","features":[]}