The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Apple iPadOS 15: iPads which is a series of Apple iPad mobile devices running the iPadOS 15 operating system, a Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agent, VPN client, and WLAN client components, which are included on the mobile devices.
\r\nThe TOE operating system manages the device hardware, provides MDM Agent functionality, and provides the technologies required to implement native applications. It provides a built-in MDM framework application programmer interface (API), giving management features that may be utilized by external MDM solutions, allowing enterprises to use profiles to control some of the device settings.
\r\nThe TOE operating system provides a consistent set of capabilities allowing the supervision of enrolled devices. This includes the preparation of devices for deployment, the subsequent management of the devices, and the termination of management.
","evaluation_configuration":"Devices Covered by the Evaluation
\r\n| \r\n Processor \r\n | \r\n\r\n Device Name \r\n | \r\n\r\n Model Number \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A9 \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1822 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A1823 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A9X \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Pro 9.7-inch \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1673 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A1674 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1675 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Pro 12.9-inch \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1584 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A1652 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A10 Fusion \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1893 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A1954 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2197 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A2198 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2199 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2200 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A10X Fusion \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1670 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A1671 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1821 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Pro 10.5-inch \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1701 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A1709 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1852 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A12 Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n
\r\n \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2125 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2133 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2124 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2126 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen) \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n A2152 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A2154 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2123 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2153 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad 10.2-inch (8th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2270 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A2428 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2429 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2430 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A12X Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Pro 11-inch \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1934 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A1979 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1980 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2013 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2014 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A1876 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1895 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A1983 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A12Z Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2068 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2228 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2230 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2231 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2069 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A2229 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2232 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2233 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A13 Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad 10.2-inch (9th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2602 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2603 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2604 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2605 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A14 Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Air (4th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2316 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2324 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2072 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2325 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A15 Bionic \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad mini (6th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2567 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2568 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2569 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n M1 \r\n | \r\n\r\n iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2301 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n A2377 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2460 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n iPad Pro 12.9-inch (5th gen) \r\n | \r\n\r\n A2378 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n A2379 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2461 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n A2462 \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process. The criteria against which the Apple iPadOS 15: iPads was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, R5 supplemented by that found in the Protection Profiles cited above. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Apple iOS 15: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 15: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide, meets the requirements of the PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management Agents, Virtual Private Network Clients, and Bluetooth, Version 1.0; the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients Version 1.0; and the Functional Package for TLS Version 1.1.
\r\nThe Apple iOS 15: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 15: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide document satisfies all the security functional requirements stated in the Apple iPadOS 15: iPads Security Target, version 1.2. The evaluation was subject to CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in November 2022. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report number CCEVS-VR-VID11238-2022, prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data-at rest, for secure communication channels, and for use by applications. In addition, the TOE implements a number of cryptographic protocols that can be used to establish a trusted channel to other IT entities.
\r\nAs noted in the Security Target 1.5, the TOE provides cryptographic services via the following cryptographic modules.
\r\n· Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1] (User Space)
\r\n· Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1] (Kernel Space)
\r\n· Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
\r\nExcept for making answering calls, emergency calls, accessing Medical ID information, using the cameras (unless their use is generally disallowed), using the flashlight, using the control center, and using the notification center, users need to authenticate using a passcode or a biometric (fingerprint or face). The user is required to use the passcode authentication mechanism under the following conditions.
\r\n· Turn on or restart the device
\r\n· Press the Home button or swipe up to unlock your device (configurable)
\r\n· Update software
\r\n· Erase the device
\r\n· View or change passcode settings
\r\n· Install iPadOS Configuration Profiles
\r\nThe passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode policies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the frequency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed attempts of entering the passcode.
\r\nThe TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity and the user is required to either enter his passcode or use biometric authentication (fingerprint or face) to unlock the TOE.
\r\nExternal entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPsec) can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.
\r\nThe security functions listed in the Security Target can be managed either by the user or by an authorized administrator through a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system. The Security Target identifies the functions that can be managed and indicates if the management can be performed by the user, by the authorized administrator, or both.
\r\nSome of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are:
\r\n· Protection of cryptographic keys—keys used for TOE internal key wrapping and for the protection of data-at-rest are not exportable. There are provisions for fast and secure wiping of key material.
\r\n· Use of memory protection and processor states to separate apps and protect the TSF from unauthorized access to TSF resources—in addition, each device includes a separate system called the SEP which is the only system that can use the Root Encryption Key (REK). The SEP is a separate CPU that executes a stand-alone operating system and has separate memory.
\r\n· Digital signature protection of the TSF image—all updates to the TSF need to be digitally signed.
\r\n· Software/firmware integrity self-test upon start-up—the TOE will not go operational when this test fails.
\r\n· Digital signature verification for apps
\r\n· Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked
\r\nThe TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request and after an administrator-configurable time of inactivity.
\r\nAccess to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by user/administrator defined policy.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product:
\r\n· IEEE 802.11-2012
\r\n· IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)
\r\n· IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6)
\r\n· IEEE 802.1X
\r\n· EAP-TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)
\r\n· TLS (1.2)
\r\n· IPsec
\r\n· Bluetooth (4.2, 5.0)
\r\nThe TOE provides the ability for responses to be sent from the MDM Agent to the MDM Server. These responses are configurable by the organization as per the Device Management document.
","features":[]}