The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models included in this evaluation are the IR1800, IR8300, C1131, and C8000V virtual router, which is included in the evaluation as a virtual network device (vND). The IR8340-K9 is an IR8300 model, and the IR1800 models are the IR1821-K9, IR1831-K9, IR1833-K9, and IR1835-K9. The C8000V provides a router deployed on a virtual machine (VM) instance on x86 server hardware. The software is comprised of Cisco IOS-XE version 17.9.
","evaluation_configuration":"The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external network. The Cisco IOS-XE configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The router configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through the internetworking device and forwarded to their configured destination.
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. They must be attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic. The internal (trusted) network is in a controlled environment where implementation of security policies can be enforced.
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V), Cisco 1000 Integrated Services Routers (ISR1000), Cisco Catalyst 1800 Rugged Series Routers (IR1800), Cisco Catalyst 8300 Rugged Series Routers (IR8300) IOS-XE 17.9 was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The product, when delivered configured as identified in the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V), Cisco 1000 Integrated Services Routers (ISR1000),Cisco Catalyst 1800 Rugged Series Routers(IR1800), Cisco Catalyst 8300 Rugged Series Routers (IR8300), satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V), Cisco 1000 Integrated Services Routers (ISR1000),Cisco Catalyst 1800 Rugged Series Routers(IR1800), Cisco Catalyst 8300 Rugged Series Routers (IR8300) running IOS-XE 17.9 Security Target, Version 0.4. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in April/2023. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
\r\n· Security Audit
\r\n· Cryptographic Support
\r\n· Identification and Authentication
\r\n· Security Management
\r\n· Packet Filtering
\r\n· Protection of the TSF
\r\n· TOE Access
\r\n· Trusted Path/Channels
\r\n\r\n
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE implements all SFRs of the NDcPP v2.2e and MOD_VPNGW v1.1 as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures prescribed therein.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail or a configurable audit trail threshold to track the storage capacity of the audit trail. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel to an external audit server.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates for all processors listed in ST. The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a (see Table 1 for certificate references).
\r\n\r\n| \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n Description \r\n | \r\n\r\n Supported Mode \r\n | \r\n\r\n Module \r\n | \r\n\r\n CAVP Cert. # \r\n | \r\n\r\n SFR \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used for symmetric encryption/decryption \r\n | \r\n\r\n CBC (128, 192 and 256) | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n SHS (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Cryptographic hashing services \r\n | \r\n\r\n Byte Oriented \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_COP.1/Hash \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512) \r\n | \r\n\r\n Keyed hashing services and digital signature \r\n | \r\n\r\n Byte Oriented \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n DRBG \r\n | \r\n\r\n Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 \r\n | \r\n\r\n CTR_DRBG (AES 256) \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_RBG_EXT.1 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n RSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n Signature Verification and key transport \r\n | \r\n\r\n PKCS#1 v.1.5, 3072 bit key, \r\nFIPS 186-4 Key Gen \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_CKM.1 | \r\n
| \r\n ECDSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n Cryptographic Signature services \r\n | \r\n\r\n FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_CKM.1 | \r\n
| \r\n KAS-ECC-SSC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Key Agreement \r\n | \r\n\r\n NIST Special Publication 800-56A \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_CKM.2 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n KAS-FFC-SSC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Key Agreement \r\n | \r\n\r\n NIST Special Publication 800-56A \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n\r\n FCS_CKM.2 \r\n | \r\n
The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 2 below:
\r\n\r\n
Table 2 TOE Provided Cryptography
\r\n| \r\n Cryptographic Method \r\n | \r\n\r\n Use within the TOE \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Internet Key Exchange \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to establish initial IPsec session. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Secure Shell Establishment \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to establish initial SSH session. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n RSA Signature Services \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used in IPsec session establishment. \r\nUsed in SSH session establishment. \r\nX.509 certificate signing \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n SP 800-90 RBG \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used in IPsec session establishment. \r\nUsed in SSH session establishment. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n SHS \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification \r\nUsed to provide SSH traffic integrity verification \r\nUsed for keyed-hash message authentication \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic. \r\nUsed to encrypt SSH session traffic. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HMAC \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used for keyed hash, integrity services in IPsec and SSH session establishment. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n RSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used in IKE protocols peer authentication \r\nUsed to provide cryptographic signature services \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n ECDSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to provide cryptographic signature services | \r\n
| \r\n FFC DH \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used as the Key exchange method for SSH and IPsec \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n ECC DH \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used as the Key exchange method for IPsec \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
Identification and authentication
\r\nThe TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE supports use of IKEv1 (ISAKMP) and IKEv2 pre-shared keys for authentication of IPsec tunnels. The TOE also uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec connections. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports the use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
\r\nThe TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. After a defined number of authentication attempts fail exceeding the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user account.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage the following:
\r\n· Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
\r\n· All TOE administrative users;
\r\n· All identification and authentication;
\r\n· All audit functionality of the TOE;
\r\n· All TOE cryptographic functionality;
\r\n· The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
\r\n· Update to the TOE and verification of the updates;
\r\n· Configuration of IPsec functionality.
\r\nThe TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators. The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE is restricted to authorized administrators.
\r\nAdministrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login and can also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN peers. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map sets.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
\r\nAdditionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
\r\nThe TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and that of the cryptographic module.
\r\nThe TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
\r\nWhenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from the TOE and reloads.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters the “exit” or “logout” command.
\r\nThe TOE can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\n\r\nThe TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2 which has the ability to be encrypted further using IPsec and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server, as well as to protect communications with a CA.
","features":[]}