The TOE, sometimes referred to as Cisco NGIPSv, provides advanced threat protection as an intrusion prevention system that can be deployed inline (as an IPS to block suspicious or malicious traffic in real-time) or passive (as an IPS/IDS sensor) by integrating real-time inspection and logging of IPv4 and IPv6 traffic.
\r\nThe Firepower Management Center (FMC) is a network appliance that provides a centralized management console and database repository for the Firepower System deployment. Administrators can also deploy 64-bit virtual Firepower Management Centers (FMCv) as ESXi hosts using the VMware vSphere Hypervisor. The FMC is a key component in the Cisco NGIPSv system. Administrators can use the FMC to manage the Cisco NGIPSv system, and to aggregate, analyze, and respond to the threats they detect on their network.
","evaluation_configuration":"In the evaluated configuration, the TOE consists of at least one FMC managing one or more Sensors all running version 7.0. The FMC can be a physical appliance or virtual appliance but the sensor is a virtual appliance.
\r\n| \r\n TOE Configuration \r\n | \r\n\r\n Hardware Configuration \r\n | \r\n\r\n Software Version \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FMC1000-K9 \r\nFMC2500-K9 \r\nFMC4500-K9 \r\nFMC1600-K9 \r\nFMC2600-K9 \r\nFMC4600-K9 \r\n | \r\n\r\n The Cisco FMC provides centralized management console with up to 4 management interfaces, and up to 10 Gbps speed. \r\n | \r\n\r\n Release 7.0 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FMCv \r\nNGIPSv \r\n | \r\n\r\n UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, UCSC-C480-M5, UCS-E160S-M3 and UCS-E180D-M3 including VM ESXi 6.7 or 7.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Release 7.0 \r\n | \r\n
","security_evaluation_summary":"
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide for Cisco NGIPSv 7.0 with FMC/FMCv 7.0, Version 1.0, May 16, 2023 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco NGIPSv 7.0 with FMC/FMCv 7.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, May 16, 2023. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in May 2023. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11339-2023) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the NGIPSv 7.0 with FMC/FMCv 7.0 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity audit:
\r\nThe TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events such as login attempts and management functions. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the logs to an external syslog server over a secure communication channel. The timestamp included in the audit content can be manually set on FMC/FMCv and automatically synchronized with other TOE components.
\r\nCommunication:
\r\nThe TOE allows authorized administrators to control which Sensor is managed by the FMC. This is performed through a registration process over TLS. The administrator can also de-register a Sensor if he or she wish to no longer manage it through the FMC.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE provides FIPS-certified algorithms to provide key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including TLS, HTTPS, and SSH.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE requires users (i.e., administrators) to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console as well as network accessible interfaces (SSHv2 and HTTPS) for remote interactive administrator sessions.
\r\nThe TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. All authorized TOE users must have a user account with security attributes that control the user’s access to TSF data and management functions. These security attributes include username, password, and roles for TOE users. In addition, the TOE supports X.509v3 certificate authentication for the external syslog server.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides a web-based (using HTTPS) management interface for all TOE administration, including the IDS and access control rule sets, user accounts and roles, and audit functions. The ability to manage various security attributes, system parameters and all TSF data is controlled and limited to those users who have been assigned the appropriate administrative role.
\r\nThe TOE also provides a command line interface (CLI) and shell access to the underlying operating system of the TOE components. The shell access must be restricted to off-line installation, pre-operational configuration, and maintenance and troubleshooting of the TOE. The CLI provides only a subset of the management functions provided by the web GUI and is only available on the Sensors. The use of the web GUI is highly recommended over the CLI.
\r\nSecurity management relies on a management workstation in the operational environment with a properly supported web browser or SSH client to access the management interfaces.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability) or can utilize a trusted time server in the operational environment.
\r\nThe TOE ensures that data transmitted between separate parts of the TOE are protected from disclosure or modification. This protection is ensured by transmission of data between the TOE components over a secure, TLS-protected tunnel.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display an informative advisory banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated. The administrators can also terminate their own interactive sessions when needed.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access or HTTPS for web GUI access. The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a syslog server, using TLS connections.
\r\nIntrusion Prevention System:
\r\nThe TOE provides intrusion policies consisting of rules and configurations invoked by the access control policy. The intrusion policies are the last line of defense before the traffic is allowed to its destination. All traffic permitted by the access control policy is then inspected by the designated intrusion policy. Using intrusion rules and other preprocessor settings, these policies inspect traffic for security violations and, in inline deployments, can block or alter malicious traffic.
\r\nIf the vendor-provided intrusion policies do not fully address the security needs of the organization, custom policies can improve the performance of the system in the environment and can provide a focused view of the malicious traffic and policy violations occurring on the network. By creating and tuning custom policies, the administrators can configure, at a very granular level, how the system processes and inspects the traffic on the network for intrusions.
\r\nUsing Security Intelligence, the administrators can blacklist—deny traffic to and from—specific IP addresses, URLs, and DNS domain names, before the traffic is subjected to analysis by the access control rules. Optionally, the administrators can use a “monitor-only” setting for Security Intelligence filtering.
","features":[]}